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The breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 has had a 
variety of significant repercussions on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and other aspects. 
This doctoral project examines the evolution of Chinese intellectual perceptions of the 
Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, before and after the collapse.  
Relying on a larger body of updated Chinese sources, this thesis will offer re-
evaluations of many key issues in post-Mao Chinese Sovietology. The following topics 
will be explored or re-examined: Chinese views of Soviet policies in the early 1980s prior 
to Mikhail  Gorbachev’s assumption of power; Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev’s 
political reform from the mid-1980s onward, before the outbreak of the Tiananmen 
Incident in 1989; Chinese scholars’ evolving views on Gorbachev from the 1980s to 
1990s; the Chinese use of Vladimir Lenin and his policies in the early 1980s and early 
1990s for bolstering and legitimizing the CCP regime after the Cultural Revolution and 
the Tiananmen Incident, respectively;  and the re-evaluations of Leonid Brezhnev and 
Joseph Stalin since the mid-1990s.  
First, the thesis argues that the changing Chinese views on the USSR were not only 
shaped by the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations, China’s 
domestic political climate, and the political developments in Moscow. Even more 
importantly, views changed in response to the earth-shaking event of the rise and fall of 
world communism in the last two decades of the 20th century.  
Second, by researching the country of the Soviet Union, Chinese Soviet-watchers did 
not focus on the USSR alone, but mostly attempted to confirm and legitimize the Chinese 
state policies of reform and open door in both decades. By examining the Soviet past, 
Chinese scholars not only demonstrated concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but 
also attempted to envision the future direction and position of China in the post-
communist world. This included analysis of how China could rise to be a powerful nation 
under the authoritarian one-party rule, without succumbing to Western democracy and the 
sort of collapse that doomed the USSR. In short, Chinese research on Soviet socialism has 
primarily served to trace the current problems of Chinese socialism, in order to legitimize 






















The breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 has had a 
profound impact on China. The Soviet dissolution has had a variety of significant 
repercussions on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and other aspects. This doctoral project 
examines the Chinese intellectual evolving perceptions of the Soviet Union in the 1980s 
and 1990s, before and after the collapse. The research will focus on what Chinese 
scholars had learned the lessons of the Soviet demise, and how they used their subject of 
study to legitimize the communist one-party rule in China after the end of the Cold War. 
It is going to show, that the Chinese views on the Soviet Union had been influenced 
and shaped by the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations, 
China’s domestic political climate, and the political developments in Moscow. Moreover, 
the research found that many Chinese scholars did not see the Soviet downfall as a 
precursor of a similar collapse in China itself; rather, it was regarded as a sign of the rise 
of the Chinese model of socialism. According to them, the USSR after its first leader 
Vladimir Lenin had deviated from what they saw as true socialism, while China has 
consistently practiced true socialism by taking its local conditions into account. Therefore, 
the fall of the Soviet Union was the fall of a state but not of socialism. Chinese-style 
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The breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991 has had a 
profound impact on China. The Soviet dissolution has had a variety of significant 
repercussions on Chinese politics, foreign policy, and other aspects. However, many 
myths about post-1991 Chinese Sovietology have been circulated and perpetuated by a 
body of secondary literature.1 This project attempts to clarify some of these relevant 
issues and rectify inaccuracies in the existing scholarship, many of which have been 
unclear or misunderstood in previous studies. For example, as we will see in the literature 
review section, some such studies claim that the Chinese government has allocated 
considerable funds for Chinese Soviet-watchers (for those scholars who study and 
research the state of the USSR) across the country. This was supposedly done to illustrate 
the negative consequences of the Soviet demise after 1991, and to provide advice for the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime in preserving its own authoritarian system. In 
fact, funding for Chinese scholarship in the humanities and social sciences (including 
Soviet studies) faced financial cutbacks throughout the 1990s. The academic trend of 
                                                             
1 Christopher Marsh, “Learning from Your Comrade’s Mistake: The Impact of the Soviet Past on China’s 
Future,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36, no. 3 (2003): 259-72. Marsh, Unparalleled Reforms: 
China’s Rise, Russia’s Fall, and the Interdependence of Transition (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2005). Jeanne 
Wilson, “The Impact of the Demise of State Socialism on China,” in The Transformation of State Socialism: 
System Change, Capitalism or Something Else?, ed. David Lane (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 269-
85. David Shambaugh, China’s Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2008). Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Soviet Watchers in the 1980s: A New Era in Scholarship,” World 
Politics 37, no. 4 (July 1985): 435-74. Rozman, The Chinese Debate About Soviet Socialism, 1978-1985 
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1987). Rozman, “China’s Concurrent Debate about the 
Gorbachev Era,” in China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-Present, eds. Thomas Bernstein and Hua-yu Li 
(Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2010), 449-76. Thomas Bernstein, “Introduction: The Complexities of 
Learning from the Soviet Union,” in Ibid., 1-26. Guan Guihai, “The Influence of the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union on China’s Political Choices,” in Ibid., 505-16. Minglang Zhou, “The Fate of the Soviet Model of 




highlighting negative lessons from the Soviet Union might only be a sudden upsurge and 
short-term fervour indicative of the limited financial resources available. In other words, 
such studies might not comprise an adequate systematic and state-supervised research 
project in the long run.  
Moreover, others have argued that most Chinese scholars after 1991 have concluded 
that the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, and his liberalization were the 
fundamental catalysts in bringing down the Soviet Union. In reality, Gorbachev and his 
liberal programs were by no means the only, or even the most significant, factor in the 
USSR’s dissolution, as represented in Chinese analysis in and after 1991. Chinese 
scholars presented a much broader historical view and offered a more systemic analysis 
of the multiple reasons for the collapse. Since the mid-1990s, some Chinese scholars have 
traced the roots of the tragedy back to the administrations of Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph 
Stalin, arguing that conservative forces and the rigid communist system were the decisive 
factors in bringing it about – rather than the figure of Gorbachev alone.  
Drawing upon a larger body of updated Chinese sources, this thesis will offer re-
evaluations on many key issues in post-Mao Chinese Sovietology. The following topics 
will be explored or re-examined: Chinese views of Soviet policies in the early 1980s prior 
to Gorbachev’s assuming power; Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) 
and political reform from the mid-1980s to the outbreak of the Tiananmen Incident in 
1989; Chinese scholars’ evolving views on Gorbachev from the 1980s to 1990s; the 
Chinese use of Vladimir Lenin and his policies in the early 1980s and early 1990s for 
bolstering and legitimizing the CCP regime after the Cultural Revolution and the 
Tiananmen Incident, respectively; the re-evaluations of Brezhnev and Stalin since the 
mid-1990s; and the influence of Sino-Soviet (later Sino-Russian) relations, Soviet 




the USSR.  
 
Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology in perspective  
According to Gilbert Rozman, Chinese Sovietology has been the second most 
important school of Soviet studies after the Anglo-Saxon scholarship, with one of the 
largest body of Soviet Russian specialists in the world.2  From 1949 to 1976, Soviet 
studies in China under Mao Zedong were profoundly affected by the ups-and-downs of 
Sino-Soviet relations. China saw the USSR as both mentor/enemy and as a 
positive/negative model over time. When Stalin was in power, China closely emulated the 
USSR on nearly everything; once the Sino-Soviet conflicts escalated in the late 1950s, 
however, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) started to attack the Soviet Union as a 
sworn enemy. During the peak time of Sino-Soviet friendship in the 1950s, the PRC 
government encouraged Chinese people to learn from the USSR and translate the Soviet 
experience into a Chinese reality. From the 1960s onward, the rapid deterioration of Sino-
Soviet relations was accompanied by drastic changes in Chinese academia. Chinese 
scholars were required to switch from their previous glorification of the USSR to 
intensive denunciations of the Kremlin. During this period, there was virtually no 
Sovietology and no genuine academic research on the country at all. Since that period, 
there has been a widespread theory that Chinese Sovietology under Mao, like other 
academic disciplines, was predominantly enslaved to the state’s agenda; this theory is 
nearly universally accepted.3  
It is true that there was no visible academic community of Soviet studies in Mao’s 
China. Under Mao’s reign, the humanities and social sciences were either abolished or 
                                                             
2 Rozman, “China’s Soviet Watchers in the 1980s,” 473-74.  
3 For Chinese Sovietology under Mao, see Liu Keming, “Jianguo yilaide sulian dongou yanjiu,” [Soviet and 
East European Studies Since the Founding of the PRC] in Liu Keming Ji [Collected Works of Liu Keming], ed. 
Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan [The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue 




suppressed. During this time, few published articles and books concerning the Soviet 
Union were written by trained Soviet or Russian specialists; in fact, few such academics 
were living and working in China during this period. Thus, the contents of academic 
publications concerning Sovietology are actually no more than news reports, political 
propaganda, and essay translations (normally from Russian to Chinese, but sometimes 
also from other European languages to Chinese).  
China at this time simply did not have a genuine field of Sovietology operating 
within its universities; the higher education system had almost ceased to function, due to 
the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Chinese writers who were writing about the Soviet 
Union were authorized to do so only upon the request and permission from the CCP. 
These writers were mainly teaching staff in the departments of history or political 
economics at various universities, and bore no titles of the professorship. Some of them 
were even employees of Party propaganda units, journalists, Soviet-returned students, and 
Red Guards (this was more common during the Sino-Soviet split).4 As we will see in 
subsequent chapters, even in the wake of Mao’s departure in the early 1980s, Chinese 
scholars were still in the process of working out old issues dating back to the Mao era. 
Because of political fear and ossified mental habits, hard as they tried to embrace the new 
age, these scholars were still accustomed to transposing academic discussions from the 
plane of scholarship to that of Marxist analysis of class struggle.   
After the passing of Mao, Sino-Soviet relations remained strained in the early 1980s. 
The new Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping, after taking the helm, began to introduce reform 
and open door policies. The moribund Soviet economic and political systems that had 
been practiced in China for more than three decades under the disguise of Maoism were 
                                                             
4 For one such example, see the following book published under Mao: Renmin Chubanshe [People’s 
Publishing House], ed. Sulian xiuzheng zhuyi shixue guandian pipan [Critique of Soviet Revisionist 




now under serious re-assessment and heavy criticisms by Chinese scholars. After the mid-
1980s, the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, the rise of Gorbachev, and his 
liberalization in the name of glasnost all led to a turning point in Chinese Sovietology. 
The emergence of Gorbachev in 1985 drastically changed China’s political and 
intellectual atmosphere. His strong willingness to overhaul the obsolete socialist system 
through intense political reform in the USSR held great appeal for Chinese intellectuals. 
Stimulated by the relaxed political environment in the 1980s under the liberal-minded 
CCP leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, Chinese scholars began to view and discuss 
the Soviet Union and its reforms in a more positive and objective way. The subsequent 
discourse of Chinese Sovietology was largely shaped by the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, 
Gorbachev’s decision to remove the power monopoly of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1990, and finally the tectonic change of the USSR in 
1991. These three events shaped Chinese perceptions of the past Soviet socialist system 
and ushered Chinese Sovietology into a new era.  
In this thesis, the researcher will follow Robert Daniels in defining Sovietology as 
“the specialized study of the Soviet Union from the standpoint of the familiar academic 
disciplines: history, economics, geography, occasionally sociology and anthropology, and 
above all political science.” 5 In Daniels’s opinion, “Sovietology, of course, was never a 
discipline unto itself, let alone a monolithic academic cult,” 6 and “Sovietology did not 
constitute a peculiar discipline, a unique method, or a single set of conclusions.” 7 Some 
Western scholars also draw a clear line between Sovietology and Kremlinology, the latter 
being defined as either “an approach that seeks to explain Soviet society primarily in 
terms of the political jockeying for power that takes place among the men in the Kremlin,” 
                                                             
5 Robert Daniels, “Soviet Society and American Soviet Studies: A Study in Success? ,” in Rethinking the 
Soviet Collapse: Sovietology, the Death of Communism and the New Russia, ed. Michael Cox (London: 
Pinter, 1999), 115. 
6 Ibid., 115. 




8 or as “a subcomponent” of Sovietology.9 In this research, like Daniels, the investigator 
does not separate the two disciplines and uses the term  “Sovietology” in an inclusive way, 
encompassing the study of all aspects of the Soviet Union, with a focus on the two 
quintessential issues: Chinese perceptions of Soviet foreign relations, and Soviet leaders 
and politics.  
The use of the term “Sovietologists” (or Soviet-watchers) in this thesis for those who 
study and research the state of the USSR is based on Christopher Xenakis’ definition. 
Xenakis defines US Sovietologists broadly, to include “political scientists, economists, 
sociologists, historians, diplomats and policy makers, working in academia, government, 
private think tanks, and the media.” 10  He uses the terms “Sovietologists,” “Soviet 
experts,” “foreign policy analysts,” “Cold War theorists,” and “political scientists” 
interchangeably, citing the examples of George Kennan, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard 
Pipes, and Strobe Talbott. These individuals are both Soviet-specialists and policy makers, 
while Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser are also Soviet-watchers and journalists 
simultaneously.11   
In terms of this elastic definition of the field and the diversity of scholars’ 
backgrounds, the situation in China is generally similar to the situation in the US as 
described by Xenakis. For example, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, although 
some Chinese scholars specialize in either Soviet or world communism, most of those 
mentioned and quoted in this thesis are generalists rather than specialists in Soviet studies. 
On the other hand, unlike the US, some Chinese writers mentioned in the thesis do not 
have academic qualifications. They are either Party bureaucrats, media reporters, 
                                                             
8 Harold Fisher, American Research on Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959), 78. 
9 Steven Rosefielde and Stefan Hedlund, Russia Since 1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
56. 
10 Christopher Xenakis, What Happened to the Soviet Union? : How and Why American Sovietologists were 
Caught by Surprise (London: Praeger, 2002), 4. 




university students, or even secondary school teachers, whose thoughts on the problems 
of the Soviet Union have been published in various academic journals and official 
newspapers. Their articles often express more political zeal than scholarly expertise or 
analytical insight. Generally speaking, the descriptions by Xenakis of US Sovietologists 
could also be applied to the Chinese situation. Chinese Soviet-watchers are a diverse 
group, rather than representatives of a single school of thought or central theory. Their 
publications never imply a complete homogeneity of views. However, although their 
academic training is in different disciplines and by no means confined to Soviet studies, 
their research and publications are relevant to Sovietology in one way or another.12 
The educational levels of Chinese Soviet-watchers are varied (Table 1). One case in 
point involves the Institute of Soviet and East European Studies (Sulian dongou 
yanjiusuo), which was renamed as the Institute of Russian, East European, and Central 
Asian Studies (Eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiusuo, or IREECAS) in 1992.13 IREECAS is 
the largest powerhouse in research of the former Soviet Union in the PRC. It is affiliated 
with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), which is China’s most prominent 
organization specializing in the humanities and social sciences and under the control of 
the State Council and Party supervision.  
IREECAS employs more than 100 administrative and academic staff, recruiting 
China’s most well-known intellectuals in the field and academics from all over the 
country. There are several categories of scholars at the Institute. 14  First, some older 
scholars (born before 1949) often do not possess any academic degrees, and are 
essentially self-taught Soviet-experts. The best examples are Liu Keming and Ma Weixian, 
                                                             
12 Similarly, Robert Desjardins in his book on post-war French Sovietology also includes not only the 
scholarship of French Soviet specialists but also the writings of French historians, economists, and political 
scientists, whose works are orientated only incidentally toward the USSR. See Desjardins, The Soviet Union 
Through French Eyes, 1945-1985 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), 10.  
13 For the convenience of narrative, the researcher will use the name of IREECAS throughout the thesis. 
14 All the information of IREECAS’ scholars’ backgrounds can be found at its official website 




both of whom are veteran scholars and former IREECAS directors in the 1980s. Second, 
some scholars attended university, but attained their BA degrees before 1949 (Xu Kui and 
Xing Shugang); others received a BA after the founding of the PRC (Li Jingjie, Zhang 
Wenwu, Huang Tianying, Chen Lianbi, Liu Gengcen, and Zhao Changqing). This would 
have been on the eve of the Cultural Revolution, when most of the PRC universities were 
going to cease to function. Third, for those with postgraduate credentials, some were 
awarded Master’s degrees in various Chinese universities (Peng Dapeng, Xu Zhixin, and 
Pan Deli). There is also a group of academics holding a PhD or equivalent. For instance, 
there are several people from the older generation who have associate doctorates from the 
Soviet Union before 1991 (Jin Hui, Li Renfeng, and Lu Nanquan). The younger 
generation (born during and after the 1960s) either obtained doctorates in Russia after the 
collapse (Xue Fuqi and Zhang Hongxia), or in Chinese universities, either from 
IREECAS (Xing Guangcheng and Liu Fenghua), CASS (Zheng Yu and Jiang Yi), China 
Foreign Affairs University (Zhang Shengfa), or Beijing University (Bai Xiaohong). Their 
majors range from Soviet (or Russian) studies and international relations, to political 
science and economics. None of them has sought any academic degree from the West, 
although some of them have stayed in Western universities as short-term visiting scholars 
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Other renowned Chinese Soviet-watchers based in other PRC institutions share 
similar academic backgrounds with those in IREECAS (Table 2). One important figure 




international relations at Renmin University and an expert in the history of world 
communism, who does not possess any academic credentials at all.15 Another is Huang 
Zongliang (born in the 1940s), vice-director of the Institute of Russian Studies at Beijing 
University, who obtained his BA at Beijing University in the 1960s.16 Yang Kuisong17 and 
Shen Zhihua (both born in the 1950s),18 professors at East China Normal University and 
specialists in the Sino-Soviet relations, acquired their BAs and post-graduate credentials, 
respectively, after 1978.  
There are also two well-known Soviet-specialists based in the Central Party School 
(CPS). Jiang Changbin (born in the 1930s), former director of the Centre for International 
Strategic Research at CPS, possesses only a BA degree in Russian Literature from the 
Harbin Institute of Foreign Language Studies.19 After being awarded the MA in History 
from Beijing Normal University in 1989, Zuo Fengrong (born in the 1960s), a professor 
at CPS, went to CPS to study her PhD in International Politics under the supervision of 
Jiang Changbin. She remained to teach in CPS after earning her doctorate in 2001.20  
The last example is Chen Zhihua (born in the 1930s), a researcher in the Institute of 
World History at CASS and a canonical scholar on Leonid Brezhnev, who studied in the 
USSR and gained his BA from the University of Leningrad in the 1950s.21 Among all the 
Sovietologists mentioned in Table 1 and 2, only Zuo Fengrong is a female scholar. As we 
                                                             
15 Zhongguo renmin daxue guoji guanxi xueyuan [School of International Studies at Renmin University of 
China], http://sis.ruc.edu.cn/static/teachers/socialism/gaofang.html [accessed January 1, 2017]. 
16 Zhongguo gongchandang xinwenwang [News Web of the Chinese Communist Party],  
http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/74144/75838/ [accessed January 1, 2017]. 
17 Huadong shifan daxue lishixi [Department of History at East China Normal University],  
http://history.ecnu.edu.cn/products_view.asp?id=2189 [accessed January 1, 2017]. 
18 Huadong shifan daxue lishixi [Department of History at East China Normal University],  
http://history.ecnu.edu.cn/products_view.asp?id=2179 [accessed January 1, 2017]. 
19 On Jiang’s biography, see Jiang Changbin and Zuo Fengrong, Sidalin zhengzhi pingzhuan [The Political 
Biography of Stalin] (Beijing: Zhonggong dangxiao chubanshe, 1997), 622. 
20 Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao guoji zhanlue yanjiusuo [The Institute for International Strategic Studies 
of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China],  
http://iiss.ccps.gov.cn/yjtd/201405/t20140508_49351.html [accessed January 1, 2017]. 
21 On Chen’s biography, see Chen Zhihua, Bolieriniefu shiqide sulian [The Soviet Union under Brezhnev] 




will see in subsequent chapters, women were remarkably underrepresented at the apex of 
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To summarize, there are basically three groups of Chinese Soviet-researchers 
represented in this thesis. These researchers have different academic backgrounds and 
their writings demonstrate this diversity. The older generation grew up under Mao and 
regained its momentum in research after the 1970s, after the stifling academic period 
resulting from the Cultural Revolution. This generation of scholars generally displayed a 
nostalgic attitude toward socialism and positive views on the Soviet Union (Liu Keming, 
Xu Kui, and Gao Fang).  
Second, there is the generation of middle-aged scholars, whose formative years were 
undermined by the disastrous Cultural Revolution, but who also came back to research 
and writing after 1976 (Zhang Shengfa, Xu Zhixin, and Pan Deli). This generation, 
however, lived through very bitter experiences under Mao; they thus showed their support 
for Gorbachev’s reforms in the 1980s and levied consistent criticisms (albeit not very 
fierce) toward the rigid Soviet socialist institutions in both decades.  
Finally, the younger generation, born in and after the 1960s, attended universities 
right after Mao’s death and brought vigour to Soviet studies (Xing Guangcheng, Zuo 
Fengrong, and Zheng Yu). They grew up in the age of reform and had more exposure to 
the influence of Western scholarship. However, as seen in their writings in and after the 
1990s, they were not necessarily against Soviet communism; most of them were educated 
in the Chinese system and employed by state institutions. Like many in the older 
generations, they were actually part of the establishment intellectuals.  
Regarding the language competence of post-Mao Chinese Soviet-watchers, China 
began to invite foreign language tutors to teach its university students in the late 1970s.22 
In the case of CASS, the Academy hired US and Japanese professors to conduct foreign 
                                                             
22 The point is illustrated by Tani Barlow and Donald Lowe, Teaching China’s Lost Generation: Foreign 




language courses for its graduate students from the early 1980s onward;23 these language 
courses thus became a long-term part of the Academy’s graduate training system.24 In the 
case of Chinese Soviet-specialists in IREECAS, most of them had a rigorous grounding in 
Soviet culture and history, and could work with Russian sources with ease. Their articles 
since the early 1980s demonstrate that these scholars were well informed about the up-to-
date Soviet archives and information. Many of them made trips to the USSR for academic 
exchanges and research visits. They constantly quoted from a large volume of Russian 
primary documents, including speeches by Kremlin leaders, Soviet journals and 
newspapers, reports from TASS, and direct comments of Western Sovietologists. Former 
IREECAS Director Wu Enyuan had journal articles and book chapters published in the 
Russian Academy of Sciences.25 Some scholars even published their research outcomes 
on the Soviet Union in Western languages; for example, Xing Guangcheng wrote a 
number of articles in English,26 and Dong Xiaoyang presented a conference paper at the 
World Congress of International Council for Central and East European Studies in the UK 
in 2001.27  
As the name suggests, IREECAS employs scholars specializing in the former Soviet 
Union and Russia as well as in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Many scholars there 
have a number of linguistic endowments in different regions. For example, in his three 
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articles published in the 1980s, Huang Tianying used references including original 
documents in Chinese, Russian, English, French, Hungarian, and Polish.28 The IREECAS 
official bimonthly journal of Sulian dongou wenti (Matters of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, or MSUEE), which accepts submissions from all over China, is also a 
showcase of the language versatility of Chinese Soviet-analysts across the PRC.29 Cao 
Shengqiang, a professor of international relations at Shandong University, cited 
substantially from Anglo-Saxon scholarship (including books written by Thomas G. 
Paterson, Thomas W. Simons, and Robin Edmonds) in his 1996 article to assist his 
interpretation of Soviet-East European relations.30 Cao Liqin, a lecturer of Korean studies 
at Jilin University, even quoted the Korean archives to support her arguments in the 1991 
article on the Soviet-North Korean relations under Gorbachev.31  
It is also worth pointing out that some articles published by MSUEE used only 
Chinese and Russian sources. These works were normally written by the middle-aged 
generation of scholars like Chang Qing, Li Jingjie, and Huang Zongliang, who studied at 
Chinese or Russian universities before the Cultural Revolution and were rarely exposed to 
Western scholarship during their formative years. In extreme cases, some scholars 
exclusively referenced sources in the Chinese language; these included the Chinese 
translations of the works of Marx and Lenin, and of other Soviet leaders’ speeches and 
talks. Those articles were mostly produced by the older generation of scholars, such as 
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Liu Keming, Xu Kui, and Gao Fang, who were less educated or attended universities 
before 1949. They often understood and used only the Chinese language to undertake 
their research on the USSR. 
Apart from revealing the excellent language abilities of Chinese Soviet-analysts, the 
information above also demonstrates that most of those scholars were establishment 
intellectuals employed by either CASS or other Chinese state higher institutions. They 
had the privilege of visiting the Soviet Union and becoming familiar with various foreign 
language materials, which outsiders may not have been allowed to access. Particularly 
during the 1980s, when China’s archives were largely closed to the general public,32 it 
was politically problematic and logistically impossible for an independent scholar outside 
the official circles to gain access to these materials. 
Almost all Chinese Soviet-watchers included in this thesis come from the following 
three kinds of institutions: the first is IREECAS, which carries a great deal of weight in 
Soviet studies in China. IREECAS is also the headquarter of the Chinese Association of 
East European and Central Asian Studies (CAEECAS), which administers the 
membership of Chinese Soviet-specialists across the country. IREECAS constantly plays 
a key role in hosting and organizing the annual meetings of CAEECAS.33 Moreover, the 
reputation of IREECAS extends beyond the academic realm. Many highly ranked Party 
officials pay visits and deliver speeches at the Institute, and these are occasionally 
publicized in the headlines of Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), the PRC’s largest Party 
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mouthpiece.34 Second, this thesis’ scope includes attention to scholars in Soviet studies 
from other institutions in CASS, such as the Institute of World History and Institute of 
Marxism-Leninism. Last, the investigation also includes Chinese Soviet-watchers from 
provincial academies of social sciences and other universities (including the party 
schools), particularly to those with units, departments, and journals devoted specifically 
to research on the USSR.35  
Though the training and recruitment of Chinese scholars in Soviet studies vary 
somewhat between institutions, the teaching philosophy and normal procedures are often 
nearly identical within the PRC.36 One example is the Graduate School at CASS, which 
focuses mainly on research and is exclusively designated for the training of graduate 
students.37 Though the school renounced the Soviet-style educational method in the 1980s 
and decided to begin importing Western training elements, CASS continued to use 
Marxism-Leninism as the philosophical principle framing studies of the post-Mao 
domestic and international situation.38 The Academy indicated that social sciences should 
be based on the guidance of Marxist-Leninist theories in seeking solutions to the practical 
problems of socialist modernization.39 CASS required all graduate students (both Masters 
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and PhDs) to complete the compulsory courses on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong 
Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory during their first year of study;40 only then could 
students take courses in their own disciplines and begin writing graduation theses.41 In 
fact, the general requirement used to evaluate the academic quality of graduation theses 
across all majors was the question of how well Marxism had been utilized to raise, 
analyse, and resolve problems.42  
Like other Chinese higher institutions, graduate students at CASS were selected for 
communist party membership based on their academic performance and, most 
importantly, their political virtue.43 Such practice continued in the 1990s and beyond.44 
Moreover, elsewhere in China Party bureaucrats are in charge of school administration – 
rather than professional scholars. This administrative role is usually titled dangwei shuji 
(Party Secretary). It is noteworthy that upon graduating, many graduate students at CASS 
have been promoted to be Party secretaries (rather than academic scholars), where they 
assume administrative duties in different departments and schools within CASS. One 
such example is Meng Qinhai. After obtaining a graduate degree in Chinese Literature at 
CASS, he became the Party Secretary and Vice-Director of IREECAS from 2005 to 
2009. 45  This is evidence of the so-called “scholar-bureaucrat” tradition termed by 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Sciences Must Uphold Marxism as the Theoretical Guidance], Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiu 
shengyuan xuebao, no. 6 (1982): 3. 
40 All the courses proposed by CASS must get the prior approval from the CCP Central Propaganda 
Department. See Renmin Chubanshe [People’s Publishing House], ed. Huqiaomu yuzhongguo shehui 
kexueyuan [Hu Qiaomu and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2007), 
258. 
41 Xu Zhenzhong, “Benyuan jiaoxue dongtai” [Information about Teaching and Curricula at Our Academy], 
Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiu shengyuan xuebao, no. 6 (1983): 29. 
42 Wang Shijing, “Women xuyao xuedao gengduode makesi zhuyi” [We Need to Learn More about 
Marxism], Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiu shengyuan xuebao, no. 2 (1983): 17.  
43 Deng Liqun, “Woyuan juxing shoujie yanjiusheng biye dianli” [The Graduate School is to Hold the First 
Graduation Ceremony], Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiu shengyuan xuebao, no. 6 (1981): 75. 
44 Fang Keli, “Jingxin jiaoyu yange guanli” [Strong Education, Close Supervision], Zhongguo shehui 
kexueyuan yanjiu shengyuan xuebao, no. 6 (1997): 13. 
45 Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan eluosi dongou zhongya yanjiusuo [Institute of Russian, East European, and 
Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences],  




Dorothea Martin, which indicates the tradition of integrating academia into the broader 
communist system of cadre promotion.46 
In addition, a survey of the backgrounds of Chinese Soviet-analysts in IREECAS and 
other universities in the PRC reveals that a large number of them have been retained by 
their own institutions after graduation. They tended to stay in their institutions until 
retirement, and rarely changed their working units once they were hired. This 
phenomenon of academic inbreeding was common in 1980s China.47 In 1983, nearly one 
third of master degree graduates from CASS stayed and worked for their own 
departments. 48  In 1989, CASS President Hu Sheng demanded that the Academy 
overcome its problem of academic inbreeding.49 However, the issue was not resolved 
until the late 1990s, when CASS announced that its job positions would no longer give 
priority to its own graduates.50  
 
Funding, academic freedom, and writing style in Chinese Sovietology 
Unlike the natural sciences, which enjoy abundant funding and a level of autonomy 
in China,51 the humanities and social sciences are consistently underfunded and subjected 
to political intrusion in the PRC. This is largely due to the politically sensitive nature of 
the subject matter(s). Generally speaking, most of the potential projects in the humanities 
and social sciences in post-Mao China have been evaluated for research grants by the 
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National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science.52 The Office was founded in 
1991 and its predecessor in the 1980s was the Social Sciences Council. The Office is a 
branch of the Central Propaganda Department (CPD) and the CPD is directly responsible 
for the CCP Central Committee. The National Planning Office and its provincial branches 
are the largest source of funding for social science research in China. They aim to direct 
Chinese scholars into the areas of study which best serve the interests of the Party.53 Even 
Chinese scholars wishing to apply for foreign funding must gain approval from this 
Office; these cases are not always successful.54  
Such funding procedures and organizational relations demonstrate that financial 
allocation for the humanities and social sciences in the PRC is ideologically driven. 
Decisions are influenced more by politics than by scholarship; the reality is that the 
humanities and social sciences have been poorly funded in post-Mao China. One article 
revealed that many scholars from these disciplines are forced to pay journal editors in 
exchange for the publication of their papers.55 Another article revealed that although the 
Beijing Academy of Social Sciences is funded by the Beijing city government, most of 
the time the city government had to collaborate with private companies in seeking 
funding for the Academy.56 In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, allocations of funding 
in social sciences were more tightly controlled. 57  On the other hand, since Deng 
Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992, when China began to accelerate reforms and herald a 
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market economy after Tiananmen, the priority of social science awards mostly went to 
projects with applied research on Chinese socialism.58 
A number of secondary sources claim that the Chinese government has allocated 
considerable funds encouraging Chinese Soviet-watchers to draw lessons from the Soviet 
demise after 1991, and to provide advice for the CCP regime in preserving its own 
communist system from similar dissolution. 59  The PRC-based scholar Guan Guihai, 
associate dean of the School of International Studies at Beijing University, even suggests 
that while it is generally difficult for Chinese scholars in the social sciences to obtain 
national research funds, since 1991 this has become much easier if the research has 
something to do with the Soviet Union.60  
In reality, however, the generous state funding support for Chinese Sovietology 
claimed by the authors above was a myth. To give one example, CASS had been plagued 
by the issue of insufficient funding throughout the 1980s and 1990s. CASS President Hu 
Sheng complained about the lack of money for research, as well as the dismal living and 
working conditions for staff, twice during the CASS annual meetings in 1985 and 1991.61 
As a national key research institute, CASS was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the 
State Council and was totally dependent on the financial support of the state.62 However, 
such state support was far from satisfactory. The working conditions of the Academy 
were still substandard at the end of the 1990s. Most of the staff in CASS lacked computer 
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and internet access in 1998.63 In 1996, CASS even signed cooperation agreements with 
foreign foundations in Germany and Taiwan, which garnered funds to assist research.64 
CASS leadership never ceased efforts to secure governmental funding for the Academy. 
Their efforts were unsuccessful until 1999, when several members of the CCP Central 
Committee (such as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji) made an inspection tour of CASS, for 
commemorating the 22-year founding anniversary of the Academy. The Party leaders 
announced that they would seriously support the increase of funding and the improvement 
of living standards for the institutional staff.65   
In the case of IREECAS, the Institute similarly struggled to secure funding for its 
research activities and the publications of its flagship journal of MSUEE (called RECAS 
after 1991). In 1996, IREECAS scholar Lu Nanquan revealed many difficulties in the 
Institute. His working report highlighted the meagre funding support, the loss of scholars 
due to insufficient salaries, and the increased price of the institutional journal that resulted 
in the decreased subscription rate. 66  He suggested that in order to overcome these 
problems, IREECAS should take advantage of the Soviet collapse, “using our research 
outcome to serve the Central Committee (zhongyang), in exchange for their attention and 
support.” 67  In 2000, IREECAS decided to publish one more institutional journal in 
addition to the extant RECAS. The new journal was entitled Eluosi dongou zhongya 
shichang yanjiu (Market Studies of Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia), the focus 
of which was the pragmatic study and locating of the market opportunities in the 
Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). It was intended to offer advice to Chinese 
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entrepreneurs, thus seeking alternative funding sources for research.68  
Situations like this were not confined to IREECAS, for other PRC academic 
institutes and journals specializing in Soviet and Slavonic studies were also under the 
threat of the deficit-chopping axe. In 1991, during the annual meeting of CASEES (called 
CAEECAS in and after 1993), one of the issues was how to raise money for research 
activities and academic meetings for the Association in the future.69 In 1993, during the 
third council conference of CAEECAS, many participants aired grievances on the same 
issues raised by Lu Nanquan in his 1996 report. These included the difficulty of 
publishing research outcomes in the field, the loss of scholars, and the pervasive funding 
problems facing Chinese institutions as well as CAEECAS.70 At the end, CAEECAS even 
proposed to report to the Party about these problems and to ask for solutions.71  
In 1983, Sun Hongyou, editor of Sulian wenti yanjiu ziliao (Research Materials on 
the Soviet Union), wrote that the journal was severely underfunded by Anhui University, 
and therefore could not have afforded to organize other research activities and 
conferences.72 These financial difficulties were still problematic when the journal was 
renamed as Eluosi yanjiu (Russian Studies) in the 1990s. In 1996, Ha Yucan, director of 
the Institute of Russian Studies at Anhui University, acknowledged that the journal was 
struggling for survival despite great efforts to keep it afloat.73 The journal was finally 
terminated in 2000, due to “the reasons of funding and human resources.” 74 In 1994, 
IREECAS Director Zhang Wenwu strongly argued that “the present system in which the 
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state monopolies the funding allocation and the administration of research would not be 
compatible with the needs of reality,” and “the reform orienting toward an open and 
flexible system is needed.” 75   
One major reason for the financial cuts in Chinese Soviet studies from the 1990s 
onward was the increasing dominance of economic and academic marketization after 
Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992; this is when the CCP announced that China 
would further its economic reform.76 Since the 1990s, Soviet studies, like other academic 
disciplines in China, has become swamped by growing market forces and 
commercialization. Chinese scholars in the humanities and social sciences have been 
particularly hard hit by the effects of the market economy. On the agenda of the 1995 
CASS annual meeting was a discussion on how to maintain research quality and improve 
working conditions in the face of significant reforms in China.77 At the same time, Beijing 
Review reported that many professors from Beijing University, an institution famous for 
its arts programs, were so underpaid that they were forced to moonlight or take second 
jobs.78  
There is also much to be said with respect to academic freedom within the field of 
Chinese Sovietology. Since the early 1980s, China has worked to reverse Maoist policies, 
implement reform and open door policies, promote thought liberalization, and reflect on 
the Cultural Revolution and communist system. Deng Xiaoping once promised that the 
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government would promote the social and political status of Chinese intellectuals;79 he 
claimed the state would loosen its grip on scholars, improve their living standards, and 
bring their talents into full play in post-Mao modernization.80 After the mid-1980s, China 
went even further to curtail the political intrusion on scholars, due to the impact of 
Gorbachev and his glasnost, and the relatively liberal administrations under Hu Yaobang 
and Zhao Ziyang. As a result, the Chinese academic community began to look relatively 
more open and cosmopolitan than ever before in PRC history.81 
Second, after the early 1980s, Chinese scholars began to have access to a variety of 
Western scholarly works, as well as to original Soviet archives. Most of these scholars 
had CCP memberships. As we will see in subsequent chapters, some of them were 
academic elites and were occasionally invited to contribute articles to Renmin ribao and 
other PRC official newspapers, which are privileges for any intellectuals even in today’s 
China. They were endowed with the right and opportunities to read many foreign 
documents not open to the public, and to go abroad to meet Soviet and Western scholars. 
Such privileges provided them with opportunities to acquire crucial knowledge on the 
USSR, acquaint themselves with foreign scholarship on Sovietology, and learn more 
about the dark sides of Soviet socialism. Indeed, in 1982 CASS had academic exchanges 
with more than 30 countries.82 For example, IREECAS Director Xu Kui visited the USSR 
15 times before 1989. 83  Similarly, frequent academic exchanges occurred between 
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Chinese Soviet-watchers and the USSR in other PRC universities.84 While the exchanges 
of IREECAS scholars with the West had slightly declined after Tiananmen, frequent visits 
to CIS states and Eastern Europe were unaffected, even after 1991.  
This being said, post-Deng China is still not a wholly democratic country free of any 
political interventions. In the early 1980s, the social sciences in China were asked to act 
in accordance with the freedom of academic research and government guidelines 
simultaneously. In 1988, Renmin ribao required that the research of the social sciences 
should meet the practical needs of reforms and economic development. 85  Before the 
Tiananmen Incident, Chinese scholars attempted to garner more freedom for their 
research and dared to criticize the control from the Party.86 After the crackdown on the 
demonstrations, however, the CCP regime immediately reverted to constraining Chinese 
intellectuals and academic research. In subsequent years, Renmin ribao published 
accounts of the systematic discipline of individual Chinese scholars, as well as the 
imposition of strictures on the humanities and social sciences.87  
Regarding the academic journal articles included in this thesis, it should be 
mentioned here that this research is based wholly on the “national core journals” 
(Guojiaji hexin qikan) published in the PRC. All of them are available for purchase in 
Greater China and downloadable from any recognized Chinese university. The project 
engages mainly with the following four categories of journals for investigation:   
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The first are those journals focusing on research in the humanities and social sciences 
in general (Shehui kexue yanjiu, Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi). Second are those journals 
dealing with problems of socialism or communism in the world (Dangdai shijie shehui 
zhuyi wenti, Shehui zhuyi yanjiu). The third group forms the core of this thesis’ research; 
they concentrate on questions and issues relating to the former Soviet Union (later the 
Russian Federation and other CIS states after 1991) (Sulian dongou wenti, Eluosi yanjiu). 
Last, the research scope also includes relevant articles in various university journals 
(Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yangjiu shengyuan xuebao, Zhonggong zhongyang 
dangxiao xuebao).   
All the journals selected for this project accept submissions from all over China.88 
Most (but not all) of the contributors are academics, and the journals maintain acceptable 
quality standards and have a good reputation in the Chinese academic world. Some of 
them, such as Sulian dongou wenti and Shehui zhuyi yanjiu (Socialism Studies), are the 
very best PRC journals in their fields. The backbone of the research is the IREECAS 
journal (Sulian dongou wenti or MSUEE). This journal distinguishes itself from other 
journals, as it publishes numerous articles demonstrating Chinese Sovietologists’ 
academic exchanges with foreign countries, speeches of visiting CCP officials, and 
research agendas and other related administrative documents regarding Chinese Soviet 
studies.   
It goes without saying that Chinese articles are generally checked by editors for 
political acceptability prior to publication. Though their funding sources are varied, 
Chinese academic journals (like other kinds of journals in China) are subject to 
censorship. Journal editors often reject findings that are at variance with the prevailing 
Party line, requiring contributors’ work to demonstrate adherence to Party values. In the 
                                                             





opinion of Hu Zuyuan, a scholar at the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, “The 
responsibility of editors is not only making sure that submissions have met the 
publication standard, but also vetting if those have conformed to Party line and policies.” 
89 Indeed, scholars often censor their own works before submitting them, particularly 
when touching upon such politically sensitive subjects as Soviet studies. They take great 
care to formulate their ideas in politically acceptable language, which inevitably impacts 
on the content and quality of the writing. As Margaret Sleeboom-Faulkner once wrote in 
describing the disastrous effects of such self-censorship within CASS, “A slight nuance 
can change its entire meaning.” 90  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many journals claimed that the nature and goals of 
their respective publications were either to use Marxism as a guideline for research,91 or 
to serve the needs of Chinese socialism and modernization.92  Though prior to 1989 
editors in the PRC still retained a level of independence in pursuing their initiatives,93 in 
the wake of the Tiananmen Incident the Party began to require all publications in China to 
be streamlined and brought under firm control. The Party would closely monitor the 
production and circulation of publications.94 For example, the effects of this were clearly 
felt by MSUEE, which had once proposed to cease its tradition of internal circulation and 
put the journal into the public market.95 However, because of the Tiananmen Incident, the 
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journal had to postpone this decision until 1992.96  
In addition, there are many problematic aspects of the journals included in this thesis. 
At times, these problems may render the research process more challenging than one 
might expect. First, many articles do not reveal the educational and working backgrounds 
of authors. Readers thus have difficulty discerning the academic expertise of authors, as 
well as identifying with the institutions with which they are affiliated. Authors of the 
articles also did not disclose their personal information in their writings, sometimes using 
a nom de plume or even nom de guerre for authorship. Very occasionally, the journals 
would publish the information on academic conferences or seminars, but most of them are 
very short abstracts in nature, and they often do not reveal the names and identities of the 
participants.97 This situation was most evident in the 1980s; things have been improving 
since the mid-1990s, when China learned to meet international standards in publishing 
academic articles. Even then, however, many journals still declined to provide 
background information on authors. The investigator has thus had to do independent 
research; this includes utilizing internet resources, and more informal channels such as 
personal contacts and connections with relevant Chinese universities.  
Another noteworthy issue involves the writing style of Chinese authors in these 
journals. Namely, their quotations from foreign writers, such as Lenin and other Soviet 
leaders, have not always been standardized. Most of the time the authors seem to be 
conveying the main idea of primary and secondary sources, without actually quoting them. 
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The quotations are more like summaries than direct references. Sometimes, these articles 
do not show the origins of the quotations in footnotes or endnotes, particularly those from 
Russian and other foreign texts.98 In the most serious cases, some articles do not include 
any quotations or bibliographies.99 There is no information on whether the sources are in 
Chinese or in other foreign languages, or whether they are from the originals or from 
translations. Besides, the translations from Russian to Chinese in PRC academic journals 
are sometimes quite hasty and problematic.100  
Last, the practices of duplicate submission, redundant publication, and even 
plagiarism are widespread. Many articles in various journals consulted are wholly or 
partially identical to each other (differing in title only). For example, IREECAS scholar 
Li Jingjie’s 1980 article on the Warsaw Pact in Renmin ribao was a slightly abridged 
version of another article he published half a year later in MSUEE.101 Zhao Longgeng, 
another IREECAS scholar, published two articles in 1989 on Gorbachev’s nationality 
policy in two different journals. Except for the difference in titles, the content of the two 
papers is almost exactly the same.102 To tackle the issue of academic integrity, in 1997, 
Xiao Hong, an editor of Bianji xuebao (Acta Editologica) – China’s most authoritative 
journal for investigating and determining the impact factors of PRC academic articles, 
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recommended that Chinese journals not accept duplicate submissions (yigao duotou) 
under any circumstances, and must take legal actions against those contributors who 
violate guidelines.103 The situation consistently occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, although 
many of the problems gradually disappeared in the 1990s.  
 
Literature review 
The first problem regarding secondary scholarship has to do with the role of Mikhail 
Gorbachev in Chinese Sovietology. Scholars of this literature observe that Chinese 
Soviet-watchers began making positive comments about the Soviet leader immediately 
after he assumed power in 1985.104 However, these scholars turned against Gorbachev 
soon after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.105 Moreover, some authors (such as Guan 
Guihai, Gilbert Rozman, and David Shambaugh) argue that most Chinese scholars after 
1991 considered Gorbachev and his liberalization to be the fundamental catalysts in 
spelling the collapse of the Soviet Union.106 The literature seems to agree that Chinese 
scholars were univocal in assessing Gorbachev’s individual actions and failings, and that 
they overstated the implications of Gorbachev and his liberal programs for China, both in 
the 1980s and 1990s. 
As will be demonstrated in coming chapters, Chinese scholars had actually presented 
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a broad historical view and offered a systemic analysis of the multiple reasons for the 
collapse, rather than being preoccupied by the so-called “blame game” targeting 
Gorbachev. 107  Firstly, most Chinese academic articles concerning the USSR did not 
present positive views on Gorbachev in and after 1985. Many of them remained 
suspicious and wary of the new Soviet leader, and some of them even challenged the 
sincerity and feasibility of his policies. Only after about a year with Gorbachev at the 
helm did Chinese scholars begin to review his glasnost and political reform positively. 
However, Chinese scholarship remained critical of Gorbachev’s foreign agenda, which 
was characterized by the concept of New Thinking, until the end of 1987. This is when 
three major obstacles plaguing Sino-Soviet relations began to resolve and bilateral 
relations gradually improved; these obstacles were the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its 
large troop deployment along the border of China, and Moscow’s support of Vietnamese 
military intervention in Cambodia.  
Secondly, a full-fledged Chinese attack on Gorbachev did not appear either in the 
wake of the Tiananmen Incident or after the Soviet disintegration. Instead, strong Chinese 
criticisms emerged in early 1990, when Gorbachev was elected as the President of the 
USSR and initiated the process of terminating the CPSU power monopoly in March 1990. 
After that, China became aware of the negative ramifications of such a move against PRC 
communist one-party rule.  
Thirdly, while Chinese scholars considered Gorbachev as one of the agents 
responsible for bringing down Soviet socialism, Gorbachev and his liberal programs were 
by no means the only elements or the biggest factors in the USSR’s dissolution.108 In fact, 
Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev throughout the 1980s and 1990s were quite 
evolutionary. Views changed in response to domestic and international politics, and Sino-
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Soviet (later Sino-Russian) relations. For instance, Chinese scholars evidently had a good 
impression of Gorbachev’s concepts of humanistic socialism and glasnost after the mid-
1980s. This positive assessment was owing to the open political climate in China at the 
time, and the need of the CCP to initiate its own political reform in order to facilitate 
economic modernization. Some articles even demanded that the Chinese government 
learn from Gorbachev in doing political and economic reforms simultaneously. After the 
collapse of European and Soviet socialist regimes in the early 1990s, Chinese scholars 
changed suit and attacked Gorbachev’s method, arguing that economic rejuvenation 
should precede political reform. However, after the Sino-Russian relations consolidated in 
the mid-1990s, Chinese criticisms of Gorbachev gradually subsided.  
Actually, Chinese Soviet-watchers were doing research on different Soviet leaders 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, particularly on Lenin, who featured prominently in 
Chinese writings and claimed equal importance to Gorbachev. After 1991, many scholars 
attempted to find causes other than Gorbachev for the havoc wreaked on the USSR, such 
as peaceful evolution and the inherent problems of Soviet socialism. They remarked that 
Gorbachev might have been manipulated by the West, and that the last Soviet leader was 
not wholly responsible for the downfall. Some scholars even trace the roots of the 
downfall back to the administrations of Brezhnev and Stalin, arguing that the 
conservative force and rigid communist system (rather than the figure of Gorbachev) 
were decisive.  
Second, some secondary literature argues that the “lesson-drawing” from the USSR 
after 1991 was a state-directed and long-term research project collectively undertaken by 
Chinese Soviet-experts across the state.109 In their view, Chinese Soviet-specialists had 
consistently followed the Party’s needs, and had continued their efforts to analyse the 
                                                             




implications of the Soviet collapse on the Chinese socialist regime in and after the 
1990s.110 In order to investigate whether the Chinese government did indeed have such a 
clear mission and systematic agenda, it is helpful to revisit the details in the primary 
documents in CASS and IREECAS, respectively.  
On the eve of the Soviet disintegration in October 1991, there was an institutional 
meeting conducted by CASS President Hu Sheng; the participants were from various 
affiliated institutes and included those from IREECAS. Hu Sheng wanted scholars to 
summarize “the lessons of Soviet reforms and the great changes of socialism in the world.” 
111 But in March 1995, four years after the Soviet demise, CASS announced its 20 key 
research areas for the coming years. Of these 20 research areas, only the History of the 
Soviet Union was directly relevant to Soviet studies. There were three other areas having 
something to do with the study of world socialism (Studies on Marxism, Studies on 
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, and Studies on the Schools of Foreign Marxism). 
The rest of the research areas included subjects like Modern Chinese and Market 
Economic Research, and had almost nothing in common with the abovementioned 
themes.112 In December 1998, Hu Sheng’s successor Li Tieying (vice-chairman of the 
CCP Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and president of CASS from 
1998 to 2003) demanded that CASS scholars specializing in international studies pay 
attention to the following six areas: the histories of the Soviet Union and CPSU; the 
translations of Soviet archives; Japanese history; Islamic studies; WTO research; and EU 
and the Euro.113 Thus, it seems that Soviet studies in CASS after 1991 was considered 
more of a “normal” research topic, rather than an ad hoc study that had a pragmatic and 
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specific purpose. Indeed, it seemed far from being a state-directed research project with 
the long-term goal of analysing implications for Chinese socialism. Both Hu Sheng and 
Li Tieying had directed the CASS research priorities that included Soviet studies as listed 
above; however, those agendas had more to do with internal institutional requirements 
than with top-down state orders.  
Besides, although the collapse of the USSR seemed to be a crucial event for the CCP 
regime, the episode did not pose any imminent threat to the survival of the Party rule. 
This is in contrast to the case of the Falungong religious movement (Buddhist Law 
Society).114 On July 1st, 2000, CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin and Premier Li Peng 
paid a visit to CASS. Jiang in particular argued that CASS should “organize all of its best 
scholars together to criticize Falungong,” and promised that “the state will provide all 
kinds of support.” Two days later, Li Tieying supervised a large meeting of more than 60 
scholars from CASS, and ordered them to immediately establish “a research assignment” 
(keti) based on “the spirit of the Central Committee” (zhongyang jingshen), with the 
purpose of attacking the “heresy” (xieshuo) of Falungong.115  
Last, unlike the case of Falungong, neither Hu Sheng’s and Li Tieying’s speeches 
concerning Soviet studies mentioned funding sources – either from the state or elsewhere. 
Given the evidence of the bleak financial conditions presented above, it is very unlikely 
that Soviet studies would have even enjoyed the same level of importance and support as 
did the study of Falungong from the CCP. 
In IREECAS, some articles appearing before and after 1991 did challenge the 
academic community, as well as the general public, to pay more attention to the changes 
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of the Soviet Union. However, these demands were often made by scholars wishing to 
study the Soviet experience in order to aid China’s reforms.116 Other times, they stemmed 
from the desire of MSUEE’s editorial board to elicit more papers dealing with the ups-
and-downs of the Soviet Union.117 In 1994 and 1996, RECAS published two articles 
reporting the research agendas of IREECAS in 1995 and 1996, respectively. In the 1994 
paper, only three items out of the 24 research targets were related to the USSR; these 
included the history of the Soviet Union, the historical lessons of the Soviet turbulence, 
and the Sino-Soviet relations.118 In the 1996 paper, there was only one category (the 
causes and consequences of the Soviet collapse) concerning Soviet studies among the 29 
research priorities. 119  In both reports, a large portion of the key research areas was 
devoted to the studies of Russia, Caucasia, Central Asia, and other CIS states that gained 
independence after 1991.  
As for documents regarding CAEECAS, before the demise of the Soviet Union, the 
Association did encourage its members to study the failure of Soviet political and 
economic reforms, drawing lessons for China.120 However, after the end of 1992, the 
official research topics were geared toward CIS states rather than the former Soviet Union. 
In every subsequent CAEECAS annual conference, more time was dedicated to 
discussions of Russia and Central Asia (both of which border China), and their future 
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relations with the PRC.121 In 2000, CAEECAS announced its five research agendas for 
the 21st century during the fifth annual conference in Beijing. The topics were Russian 
politics, economy, foreign policy, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe.122  It seems that 
Soviet studies in and after 2000 would amount to little of significance in China.  
Indeed, the number of articles in the IREECAS journal with topics and themes 
related to the former Soviet Union in almost every discipline (either history, foreign 
relations, or politics) declined markedly after the mid-1990s. There were actually very 
few of them appearing by the end of the 1990s. On the other hand, the numbers of 
publications researching the Russian Federation and Central Asia, and their relations with 
China, increased noticeably after 1992. Such situations were not confined to IREECAS, 
and similar trends occurred in other Chinese academic journals as well. Although they are 
by no means current-affair journals, the trend nonetheless reflected the shifting needs and 
interests of Chinese Soviet-watchers in the 1990s, the changing landscape of world 
politics, and the reorientation of China’s foreign policy (in which the PRC attempted to 
form an alliance of authoritarian regimes encompassing China, Russia, and Central Asia 
against the democratic West after the end of the Cold War).123  
After the fall of the USSR, China began to establish good neighbourly relations with 
the post-Soviet states like Russia and the Central Asian republics, most of which share 
borders and seek business opportunities with China. Many articles in Chinese academic 
journals began to focus on research topics relevant to newly independent CIS states, 
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rather than the former Soviet Union; the former held more practical value for China in the 
new era. Once again, the funding constraints described above made Chinese Soviet-
analysts unable to invest more time on their prior research subjects. The studies on the 
Soviet successor states in and after the 1990s also reflected the effort of Chinese scholars 
to seek alternative funding opportunities, which would also sustain their research in the 
future.124 As such, the trend of gleaning negative lessons from the Soviet Union might be 
only a sudden upsurge and short-term fervour most noticeable from the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s. Thus, it is not best described as a systematic, long term, and state-supervised 
research project.   
Apart from these issues, there are two problems regarding the use of sources in the 
prior secondary literature on Chinese Sovietology. First, many authors of the secondary 
literature (such as Guan Guihai, Minglang Zhou, and Shambaugh) claim that since 1991 
the Chinese government sponsored many Chinese scholars and institutes for the study of 
the Soviet collapse. However, these authors reference few sources corroborating their 
claims, whether in the main texts or in the footnotes.125 Jeanne Wilson does reference 
sources in her article, explaining how she knows that the Chinese government had been 
encouraging and funding PRC Soviet-analysts to do lesson-drawing research on the 
Soviet demise.126 However, the information she quotes is from two secondary sources 
written by Christopher Marsh, both of which are problematic because they do not give 
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readers the origins of such information.127  
Second, the assumption of most secondary literature is that Chinese Sovietology has 
become a mere “lesson-drawing” approach since 1991, designed and authorized by the 
PRC regime. Within this perspective, previous literature has often selected and analysed a 
full range of Chinese articles on Soviet studies published in and after 1991. The major 
concerns of those chosen papers mostly involve the causes of the Soviet demise, and how 
China might avoid making the same errors as did the USSR.128  From these Chinese 
articles, one gets the sense that since 1991, the “lesson-drawing” approach has become 
the sole avenue for Chinese research on the former USSR. Many of the quoted Chinese 
publications focus on discovering the inherent problems of Soviet socialism and the 
mistakes of Gorbachev’s reforms.129 By reading these secondary sources, one gets the 
sense that Chinese Sovietology is indeed an instrument crucial for the CCP regime as it 
reflects on its own survival after 1991.  
 
Methodology, sources, and thesis structure 
In order to clear up misunderstandings about Chinese Sovietology, the researcher has 
chosen a unique approach to reveal the true nature of Soviet studies in post-Mao China. 
First, the project will use IREECAS as the backbone of the research. The investigator will 
focus on the publications in the bimonthly official IREECAS journal of Sulian dongou 
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wenti (Matters of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe or MSUEE), as the primary 
source for analysis. The IREECAS journal not only publishes articles written by the 
IREECAS’ employed scholars, but also accepts submissions contributed by other scholars 
across China. It can thus be used as a medium that reflects the historical development of 
Soviet studies in post-Mao China. In addition, because the CAEECAS was funded and 
organized by CASS and IREECAS respectively, the IREECAS journal also publishes 
many documents regarding the administrative and logistical issues of both the CAEECAS 
and IREECAS itself. From these materials, it is possible to glean important, detailed 
information, such as the annual research agendas of Chinese Sovietology.  
Second, the investigator will also examine other PRC humanities and social science 
publications regarding the research on the USSR, mostly focusing on the four categories 
of journals previously classified. By engaging these publications (either from the 
IREECAS journal or others) the study will not be limited to those publications merely 
learning lessons from the Soviet collapse after 1991. Instead, it will pay attention to 
various thematic research projects diverging in focus and analysis between the early 
1980s and the end of the 1990s. Such a methodology may reduce a certain bias that 
argues that Chinese Sovietology is “lesson-drawing” in nature, and instead direct the 
audience to review Chinese Sovietology as a whole from a more objective perspective. 
Third, the research intends to examine the thinking of Chinese Sovietologists against 
the backdrop of political and social changes in China from the 1980s to 1990s. The 
project will be based not only on the analysis of primary sources already undertaken, but 
will also attempt to locate the developments of Chinese Sovietology amid the rapid 
changes in the social and political environment of the first two decades of post-Mao 
China. This time span covers many important events occurring in both China and the 




Tiananmen Incident, and the Soviet disintegration. Such a methodology should give 
readers a clear picture of the evolution of Chinese Sovietology, and a sense of how the 
wider arena of Chinese social and political history in these two decades had an impact on 
these scholarly writings. Therefore, in order for this research to be successfully located in 
the rich fabric of the intellectual activities of contemporary China and in the changing 
environment, the investigator has also identified the following three kinds of documents 
that may be beneficial to the dissertation: 
Articles in PRC official newspapers and journals concerning aspects of the 
former Soviet Union: Renmin ribao (People’s Daily, owned by the CCP Central 
Committee); Guangming ribao (Guangming Daily, published by the CCP Central 
Propaganda Department); Hongqi (Red Flag, renamed as Qiushi or Seeking Truth after 
1988 and under direct control of the CCP Central Committee); Beijing Review (China’s 
only national English weekly news magazine published in Beijing by the China 
International Publishing Group), etc.  
Writings and speeches of PRC officials and leaders on the matters of the Soviet 
state: Mao Zedong wenji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong); Deng Xiaoping xuanji 
(Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping); and other contemporary Chinese leaders’ related 
speeches scattered among the current Chinese newspapers.  
Chinese and English translations of works and speeches of Soviet leaders from 
Lenin to Gorbachev: as Chinese scholars always cite the words of Soviet leaders (such 
as works of Lenin and Stalin and memoirs of Khrushchev and Gorbachev) to support their 
arguments in articles, it is important for the researcher to check the accuracy of those 
quotations.  
The investigator has obtained most of the essential primary sources listed above from 




Hong Kong (CUHK), or it has been downloaded from the Digital Library Service at 
CUHK. Both sites contain a large quantity of PRC official and unofficial reading 
materials, as well as a substantial amount of Chinese scholarship on Sovietology.  
The dissertation will be divided into seven chapters. In addition to the Introduction, 
Chapter Two will offer an account of the relationship between the Chinese communist 
regime and Chinese Sovietology, and how the discourse of Chinese Sovietology writings 
intertwined in the principle of post-Mao Chinese state-building – “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics;” the Confucian tradition; the Marxist theoretical framework; and the 
legacy of Chinese historiography.  
The two core parts of the thesis consist of two chapters each and they will examine 
the two quintessential issues: Chinese scholarship on Soviet foreign relations and Soviet 
leaders and politics, respectively, in chronological order from the 1980s to 1990s.  
The first part (Chapters Three and Four) will dwell on the discourse of Chinese 
scholarship on the foreign relations of the USSR. This will include topics ranging from 
criticisms of Soviet hegemonism to discussion on Moscow’s relations with Yugoslavia 
and the Third World in the 1980s, and from the changing views on Gorbachev’s New 
Thinking to reflections on Lenin’s early Soviet rule after the Tiananmen Incident. 
The second part (Chapters Five and Six) scrutinizes Chinese perceptions of Soviet 
leaders and politics. It will first look at how Chinese scholars used Lenin and his writings 
in the early 1980s to help the CCP regime in rebuilding the Party institutions and the 
people’s faith in communism after the Maoist disaster. It will also examine the evolving 
views of Chinese scholars on Gorbachev’s glasnost and liberalization since the mid-1980s, 
against China’s political climate leading up to Tiananmen. Last, the thesis will analyse 
two phenomena in 1990s Chinese Sovietology – reflecting on Brezhnev’s stagnation and 




Finally, the last chapter will summarize the state and vista of Chinese Sovietology in 
both decades. It will argue that by researching the country of the Soviet Union, Chinese 
Soviet-watchers did not focus on the USSR alone, but mostly attempted to confirm and 
legitimize the Chinese state policies of reform and open door in both decades. In short, 
Chinese research on Soviet socialism has primarily been concerned to trace the current 
problems of Chinese socialism, in order to legitimize their solutions – rather than a truth-
seeking process for the knowledge of the Soviet Union.  
According to the topic of this PhD thesis, the investigator was meant to undertake 
fieldwork in Beijing, rather than in Hong Kong. In fact, the investigator applied to 
IREECAS in Beijing in the summer of 2014, in order to obtain permission to interview 
scholars and peruse archives there. However, IREECAS declined the application and did 
not provide a written explanation for such denial. Therefore, as a foreign scholar, the 
investigator was unable to apply for a visa to enter the PRC. It is the investigator’s guess 
that the application was denied due to the project’s politically sensitive nature. As such, 
the investigator has chosen to do the fieldwork in Hong Kong instead, without an 
opportunity to interview the relevant people. It is worth noting that the IREECAS 
administrator warned the investigator in a prior conversation that the Institute does not 
have any official or secret archives stored within. A researcher would thus be forced to 
rely on two methods – interviewing the scholars there or reading their journal articles. 
Besides, many IREECAS academics indicated to the investigator that they did not accept 
e-mail questionnaires as an alternative form of interview, due to the strict disciplinary 
requirement of CASS.  
As a result, the author has not had at his disposition all the necessary materials. He 
has had to study the subject by sifting through the documents, but without meeting the 




country to which the subject relates. A certain degree of limitation is perhaps impossible 
to avoid, inasmuch as the author is merely an interpreter of the writings of Chinese 
scholarship, rather than an on-the-spot witness of the events and situations described. 







Chapter 2  
Knowledge and Power 
 
Introductory remarks 
Existing secondary literature on this topic primarily focuses on the way Chinese 
Soviet-watchers have learned from the Soviet demise in and after 1991, but little attention 
has been paid to how this research was used to legitimize Chinese communist rule in the 
1980s and 1990s. This thesis will focus on not only the lessons that Chinese scholars have 
drawn from Soviet socialism and its final collapse, but more importantly, how Chinese 
Sovietologists used their construction of analytical narratives and interpretations of the 
events in the USSR to justify PRC state policies, alter people’s perceptions on socialism 
after 1991, and rationalize the communist one-party dictatorship in China.  
Before going into the four core chapters, this chapter will offer an account of the 
relationship between the Chinese communist regime and Chinese Sovietology, and how 
the discourse of Chinese Sovietology writings intertwined in the principle of post-Mao 
Chinese state-building – “socialism with Chinese characteristics;” the Confucian tradition; 
the Marxist theoretical framework; and the legacy of Chinese historiography. The chapter 
is intended to give readers a survey of how the various narratives, interpretative 
frameworks, guiding thoughts, and philosophical concepts shaped the political motives 
and ideological assumptions of Chinese Sovietologists in both decades. 
 




The secondary literature’s conclusion regarding large state funding and the nature of 
long-term research in Chinese Sovietology might be based on an unspoken assumption. 
Namely, there may be an assumption that there should be a crucial interaction between 
scholarship and politics, and a cosy relationship between the government and the 
academy in Chinese Sovietology (like similar relationships in the West). 130  David 
Shambaugh once remarked that IREECAS is “more than an academic organization, it was 
performing an important intelligence function for the CCP and the Chinese government,” 
and that such a function “is exemplified by the fact that the institute has off and on, over 
the years, been under the jurisdiction of the International Liaison Department of the 
Central Committee of the CCP.” 131  
First (and as shown in Table 1 in the Introduction), it should be clarified, that the 
Soviet and East European Division (the predecessor of IREECAS) fell within the 
jurisdiction of the International Liaison Department (ILD) affiliated with China’s Foreign 
Ministry before the 1980s – not the Central Committee of the CCP as Shambaugh claims. 
Moreover, many of IREECAS’ first generation of scholars (such as Xu Kui and Liu 
Keming) were former staff of the Division in ILD.132 During the Cultural Revolution, 
however, the Party radical Kang Sheng governed ILD and the functioning of the 
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Department was undermined.133 After the passing of Mao, CASS began the process of 
reorganization, including the recruitment of academic staff from ILD and elsewhere.134 
This was not because CASS wanted to gather personnel for the purposes of foreign 
intelligence, but simply because there were virtually no experts left to undertake 
academic research on the outside world. After the Cultural Revolution, CASS essentially 
had to begin from scratch. After 1980, the Soviet and East European Division was 
reorganized to become a branch of CASS and an academic research unit of IREECAS; it 
was no longer subordinate to ILD. The former staff of ILD who had been transferred to 
IREECAS in the early 1980s also became scholars engaging in academic research 
thereafter.135 Unlike the cases of Condoleezza Rice and Zbigniew Brzezinski in the US, 
there is little evidence to suggest that IREECAS scholars were subsequently relocated to 
government service during their tenures, or after retirement. Chinese Sovietologists do 
not have dual roles, unlike Brzezinski.  
Second, while Party officials and leaders occasionally visited CASS and IREECAS 
to deliver speeches on research involving the Soviet Union and its importance, these were 
more akin to official rhetoric than a serious call for systematic research plans. This is 
illustrated by the lack of evidence demonstrating coordinated efforts or actions between 
the government and scholars afterward. Generally, Chinese research and writings on the 
Soviet Union (either from CASS or elsewhere) were initiated on the basis of individual 
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scholarly interest. Even then, these scholars were sometimes required to heed the Party’s 
call in ensuring their research was within the limits of the permissible.  
Third, under Mao Zedong Chinese intellectuals were greatly disdained by the state, 
due to their independent thinking and potential political disobedience.136 Although the 
treatment of Chinese intellectuals substantially improved after 1978, the CCP regime 
remained suspicious of those from the humanities and social sciences. This is evidenced 
by the clear contrast in funding allocations for the natural sciences on one hand, and the 
humanities and social sciences on the other (as presented in the last chapter). Moreover, 
most of the organizers and participants in the 1987 and 1989 state-wide student 
demonstrations were majoring in subjects like philosophy (Yan Jiaqi) or history (Wang 
Dan), which only incurred the ire of the Chinese government toward scholars from those 
disciplines. The tension became more severe after the Tiananmen Incident. For example, 
during the chaotic events in 1989, many CASS scholars joined the pro-democratic 
demonstrations. Some of them were arrested while others later fled China.137 In the wake 
of Tiananmen, the Party tightened its grip on CASS and those in the social sciences. 
CASS graduate students were required to undergo military training before taking their 
professional courses.138  
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In the 1990s, the CCP appointed the Director of the Central Propaganda Department 
Wang Renzhi and the Central Committee member Li Tieying to be CASS Vice-President 
and President, respectively, in order to further its control of the Academy.139 It seemed 
that CASS was no longer a favourite of the Party after Tiananmen. In the 1990s, many 
CCP leaders came to CASS delivering speeches, in which they requested scholars to align 
their research with the needs of socialism. Such talks sounded more like oblique 
criticisms, political demands, and warnings aimed at keeping scholars in line, than 
legitimate requests for the production of academic works in keeping with the specific 
purposes of the state.140 While IREECAS’ Lu Nanquan had proposed that Chinese Soviet-
watchers exchange their scholarly outcomes with the government after 1991 (as presented 
in the last chapter), such statements seemed more like fundraising and fishing for political 
capital than like genuine attempts to produce strategic research beneficial for the state.  
Fourth, as Xenakis describes, the US government largely increased funding for 
Soviet research during the Cold War, and its higher education “became an instrument of 
national policy.” This occurred when the contest between the superpowers was at its 
peak.141 Through their academic endeavours, American Sovietologists “just tried hard to 
transform the Soviet state into democracy, which served the American interest.” 142 On 
the other hand, while conflicts between Beijing and Moscow intensified under Mao, the 
bilateral relations gradually improved after Deng Xiaoping took charge, and both sides 
                                                             
139 Brady, Marketing Dictatorship, 49.  
140 Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan [The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences], ed. Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan 
biannian jianshi, 1977-2007 [A Short Chronicle of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1977-2007], 
146-47. 
141 Xenakis, What Happened to the Soviet Union? , 125. 




became strategic partners after 1991. Since the 1980s, China generally has not perceived 
the Soviet Union (later the Russian Federation) to be its biggest enemy or global 
competitor (as did the US during the Cold War). Therefore, the Chinese government did 
not feel a need to expend the same level of resources as did the US in studying the 
USSR.143  Although Beijing was initially concerned about repercussions of the Soviet 
demise for China after 1991, these fears were short-lived. As discussed in the preceding 
chapter, the numbers of academic articles and research agendas concerning the USSR 
diminished after the mid-1990s. The Chinese political leadership seemed to no longer 
deem Sovietology worthy of significant attention. 
Finally, total dependence on government funding caused problems in US Sovietology 
during the Cold War, which “led to a situation where the intelligence agencies or the 
military were able to set the academic agenda.” 144 By contrast, the constant state of 
insufficient financial support from the Chinese government in both decades may suggest 
that it was not necessary for the Party to set the research agenda in Chinese Sovietology 
(although Chinese scholarship did fall prey to political intrusion from time to time). 
Besides, as Xenakis reveals, the relatively generous research funding before 1991 “had 
provided the American Sovietologists a chance for their career fulfilment,” and “they 
were quick to recognize this and to seize the opportunity to co-opt with the US 
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government.” 145 On the other hand, given the relatively warm relations between both 
states since the 1980s and the absence of generous financial support in the field, Chinese 
Soviet-watchers did not have to strive for their rise of status and fortune in conjunction 
with Sino-Soviet (Russian) relations.  
Indeed, a number of research institutes set up in IREECAS during the 1990s were 
funded by private organizations, not the CCP regime. For example, the Centre for Russian 
Studies was established in 1995 and funded by “private companies, foreign organizations, 
and personal donations.” 146 And again, the funding sources of the Chinese Institute for 
Research in International Affairs (founded in 1999) were “dependent on the domestic and 
foreign capital investments and donations.” 147  These new academic units aimed to 
provide advisory services to the general public and private enterprises, rather than the 
government. These academic units have the ability to gradually achieve autonomy – at 
least in economic terms.  
To conclude, although politicization of scholarship in China is common, in terms of 
Chinese Sovietology the intellectual complex did not have the sort of significance and 
influence on the decision-making realm that is described in the secondary literature.148 
The sort of Party demands displayed in the articles from IREECAS and elsewhere (i.e. the 
demands of studying the Soviet Union and serving Chinese socialism) were basically 
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slogans that failed to represent the reality of the situation. The official rhetoric served as 
the declaratory but not the operational doctrine. Those speeches were intended to 
mobilize, but not patronize, the intellectuals to do the research.  
Chinese Soviet-watchers might function as advice-providers for the PRC government 
through either their publications or participation in conferences, but they were by no 
means the primary actors in the CCP policy-making process. In some cases, those 
scholars’ suggestions went against the will of the Party. As we will see in Chapter Five, 
during the pre-Tiananmen period scholars’ demand that the Chinese government imitate 
Gorbachev’s pursuit of political reform was ignored by the Party conservatives, and even 
Deng Xiaoping himself. Most of the time, their research outputs were not the 
authoritative statements of the Chinese government, but were more likely explaining or 
confirming Party policies for reinforcing the legitimacy and authority of the CCP rule. 
Their research was shaped by China’s political climate and foreign relations, but the 
writings could not themselves alter the course of the national agenda. 
Existing secondary literature focuses primarily on what lessons Chinese Soviet-
watchers have learned from the Soviet demise in and after 1991, but little attention has 
been paid to how those scholars used their research to legitimize Chinese communist rule 
in the 1980s and 1990s. According to the secondary scholarship, Chinese Sovietology 
after 1991 has consistently emphasized the role of Gorbachev and his policies, which (in 
the eyes of the Chinese communist regime) brought about the downfall of the Soviet 
empire. Previous secondary literature seems to overly concentrate on the writings of 




the 1990s has been mistakenly regarded as the central theme of post-Mao Chinese 
Sovietology. For example, Marsh demonstrates that Chinese Sovietology was only 
evident around the fall of the USSR in the late 1980s and early 1990s. He points out that 
almost all of the articles published by Chinese scholars specializing in Soviet studies after 
1991 contain some discussions or implicit hints about the collapse of communism.149 
Shambaugh writes that after 1991 Western Sovietology may have languished due to the 
passing of the Soviet Union, but in the PRC the situation is reversed – Chinese research 
on the USSR persists and flourishes in the new political climate.150 
Moreover, apart from the two works produced by Rozman,151 many scholars neglect 
the state of Chinese Sovietology in the 1980s. Most of the literature also overlooks some 
research issues in the 1990s, such as the revival of research on Brezhnev and the re-
assessment of Stalin after the mid-1990s. Research in the 1990s confirmed and 
legitimized Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen agendas of renouncing the 
past Soviet model of economic development, opposing leftism, and saving Chinese 
socialism by speeding up the process of reform and open door. By depicting Brezhnev’s 
stagnation and Stalin’s rigid centralization as the primary causes of the Soviet collapse, 
Chinese writings suggested that state legitimacy comes more from economic results than 
democratic politics. They argued that economic prosperity, rather than political reform, 
should be the guiding principle for the survival of Chinese socialism after the fall of the 
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Soviet Union. The new trends in Chinese Sovietology in the 1990s are crucial for an 
understanding of post-Mao Chinese Sovietology as a whole. The historical developments 
of Soviet studies in China in the 1980s and 1990s are actually two sides of the same coin. 
Both decades are interconnected, and one cannot see a clear picture of the subject without 
looking at the 20-year trajectory.  
Furthermore, contrary to the descriptions in the secondary literature, it is not correct 
to say that Chinese Sovietology after 1991 was only concentrating on the dark sides of the 
Soviet Union, drawing negative lessons for China’s use in preserving its own communist 
regime. As we will see in Chapter Four, Chinese scholars since 1989 have drawn parallels 
between the early Soviet Union and China after Tiananmen, when both regimes were 
facing international sanctions and isolation. These scholars argued that China might learn 
from Lenin’s teachings that encouraged engagement in formal relations with the West, 
while concentrating on economic development and maintaining a proletarian dictatorship. 
They manipulated the symbol of Lenin and his post-1917 foreign policy, in an attempt to 
shore up and legitimize Chinese communist power after the Tiananmen crisis. 
To summarize, in the eyes of Chinese scholars after 1991 the state of the Soviet 
Union was not only a political example that should be learned from and a grave mistake 
that should be avoided, as claimed by most of the previous scholarship. As noted above, 
the interpretation of Lenin’s open policy after Tiananmen and the revival of research on 
Brezhnev since the mid-1990s both demonstrate that Chinese scholars viewed the former 
Soviet Union as both a warning from the past, as well as an image of a possible Chinese 




concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but also attempted to envision the future 
direction and position of China in the post-communist world. This included analysis of 
how China could rise to be a powerful nation under the authoritarian one-party rule, 
without succumbing to Western democracy and the sort of collapse that doomed the 
USSR. 
Central to my analysis is the premise that Chinese Sovietology writings in the 1980s 
and 1990s evolved primarily as a response to China’s then-contemporary challenges and 
concerns facing individuals. Political developments of the PRC and personal involvement 
(direct or indirect) with ongoing political and social events in both decades, influenced 
and motivated Chinese Soviet-watchers’ changing perceptions of their subject study. 
Post-Mao Sovietology writings are inseparable from scholars’ own participation in the 
social and political discourses of contemporary China, and from their embrace or 
elaboration of ideologies that served and justified their political claims and current state 
agendas. In short, to research Soviet socialism has primarily been to trace problems of 
Chinese socialism as experienced by scholars at the time of their research; this was done 
in order to legitimize socialist solutions, rather than to seek truth about the Soviet Union.  
Going through the issues of Chinese Sovietology writings in both decades, there are 
three threads behind the façade of the analyses of Chinese Soviet-watchers. At first glance, 
there are different scholars researching diverse topics related to the USSR in their articles, 
which should be called the individual narrative. Moreover, many of those articles argued 
that after the death of Lenin, the Soviet Union was no longer socialist in nature. Stalin’s 




of the departure of socialism. Such a collective argument could be regarded as the 
secondary narrative.  
More importantly, there is an overarching master narrative drawn from the most 
common conclusions of post-Mao Chinese Sovietology: firstly, scholars argued that 
throughout the history of the Soviet Union, only the first leader Lenin had wholeheartedly 
and consistently practiced what they saw as true socialism. Lenin’s premature death 
resulted in the demise of genuine socialism, and it was left to other countries to revive the 
system in the future. In other words, most Chinese scholars’ research on the Soviet Union 
in both decades began under, and subscribed to, the banner of Lenin. Secondly, according 
to the Chinese Soviet-watchers presented in the thesis, although having experienced many 
ups-and-downs, China still cleaves to a classical Leninism that constructs socialism by 
taking local conditions into account. Chinese writings made it clear that the fall of the 
Soviet Union was mainly due to the post-Lenin leadership that did not practice enough 
socialism or deviated from authentic Marxism-Leninism. It resulted in the Soviet system 
failing to realize its full potential. This problem had little to do with true socialism but 
rather the distortion of it. According to those Chinese scholars, since the Soviet Union 
had stopped practicing bona fide socialism after Lenin, so the collapse of the USSR was 
the collapse merely of a state – but not of socialism. Socialism would not die and China is 
a true socialist state; therefore, the PRC will not fall. In sum, China under the CCP is true 
to Lenin’s immortal legacy, and this would guarantee the success of socialism in China.   
In research of the Soviet Union in both decades, Chinese scholars can be said to 




and it has applied the stand, viewpoint, and method of Leninism in building the country. 
The Party has scientifically analysed China’s national conditions and constructed 
socialism according to its own circumstances. In their eyes, Lenin symbolizes the 
fundamental principle of Chinese state-building – “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” 
which is the new concept of socialism defined and promoted by post-Mao China after 
1978. In other words, socialism could incorporate everything for its own strengthening 
and survival. The term not only conveys that China’s socialist system should be a product 
of Sinicization of Marxism-Leninism, but also re-defines that socialism is not a doctrine; 
instead, it is a conflicting and self-contracting theory – you can ipso facto put whatever 
you want inside as long as it is conducive to Chinese socialist modernization. Notably, 
this theory is also unchallengeable.  
The conceptual guideline of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been in 
place from the departure of Mao Zedong up to present. Chinese Sovietology followed this 
official principle closely in both decades. Scholars used it as the theoretical premise that 
would govern and lead their writings and research on the USSR. This research paradigm 
had already been determined in the early 1980s, and post-Mao Chinese Sovietology is the 
product of 1978 – but not of 1991. Academia was not only learning lessons from the 
USSR, but also doing evidential research on the legitimation of the renewed application 
of orthodox Marxism-Leninism in China. Soviet studies in China in both decades 
remained true to this post-Mao political mandate, which heralds Deng Xiaoping’s 
proposal to repudiate the post-Lenin Soviet model, construct socialism according to 




Although the arguments are not monolithic, despite the varied output, scholars’ 
conclusions mainly centre on this core narrative and interpretative framework. Their 
research outcomes are the result of learning lessons from Moscow, and are also a 
prerequisite for legitimizing CCP rule and the Chinese way of practicing socialism. 
 
Chinese-style socialism, Chinese scholarship, and Chinese Sovietology 
What is “socialism with Chinese characteristics”? It is a term invented by Deng 
Xiaoping, who formulated and developed the concept by observing the reality of China 
through his years serving in the Chinese leadership since 1949. Deng believed that 
Marxism-Leninism is not dogma, and that learning those theories should not be divorced 
from reality.152 He criticized that Soviet model as not applying to the realities of China 
and argued that Chinese socialism should incorporate elements of capitalism.153  
After the end of the Maoist decades, in the opening speech given to the CCP 12th 
National Congress in 1982, Deng encouraged learning from the experience of foreign 
countries and using them as a lesson for the cause of China’s post-Mao modernization. 
He formally put forward the term “building a socialism with Chinese characteristics” in 
the speech. He described it as the basic conclusion the Party had reached after reviewing 
the long history of the country.154 Two years later, Deng went further to substantiate the 
concept in a talk with a Japanese delegation. While reaffirming that China should “adhere 
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to Marxism and keep to the socialist road,” he claimed that “by socialism we mean a 
socialism that is tailored to Chinese conditions and has a specifically Chinese character,” 
and “this calls for highly developed productive forces and an overwhelming abundance of 
material wealth.” 155 The term looks like a grand but extremely vague expression that 
perfectly fits Deng’s basic approach: stretching the acceptable ideological framework to 
allow the country to pursue policies that work. In early 1992, in order to accelerate the 
reforms and strengthen the CCP rule after the Tiananmen Incident and the fall of 
communism in Europe, Deng remarked that socialism is “the ultimate achievement of 
prosperity for all,” and it should “achieve superiority over capitalism.” He made it clear 
that by doing so, China was still following the road of socialism but not capitalism.156  
In the opening speech delivered at the CCP 13th National Congress in 1987, another 
milestone in accelerating China’s reform and open door after the 1978 Third Plenary 
Session, Premier Zhao Ziyang summed up the definition of “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” in the following words:  
 
Socialism with Chinese characteristics is the product of the integration of the fundamental 
tenets of Marxism with the modernization drive in China and is scientific socialism rooted 
in the realities of present-day China. It provides the ideological basis that serves to unite all 
the Party comrades and all the people in their thinking and their action. It is the great 
banner guiding our cause forward.157 
 
Zhao argued that because the world was changing so rapidly, “Marxism needs further 
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extensive development.” He called for “all Marxists to widen their vision, develop new 
concepts, and enter a new realm.” He said that “the historic contribution of Marx and 
Engels is that they transformed utopian socialism into scientific socialism,” and remarked 
that integrating the Marxist theory with Chinese conditions is exactly the hallmark of 
scientific socialism.158 What Zhao meant is that China should persist with the socialist 
system that had been established by Mao, and that socialist ideology could not be altered 
or challenged. That being said, the utopian thinking and practice of the past should be 
disregarded, and contemporary conditions needed to be studied and explored in order to 
guide China through reforms, and on to modernization under the communist rule.   
From the words of Deng and Zhao above, the neology “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” can be seen to serve four purposes. First, the concept legitimizes Mao’s 
efforts in building socialism as according with the practice of integrating Marxist 
orthodoxy with China’s realities. In effect, this preserved faith in the Chairman after the 
disastrous Cultural Revolution. Second, the term implies that China should accept 
socialism and the CCP dictatorship as its destiny. It defines socialism as still being 
superior to capitalism, despite the fact that China had suffered greatly under Mao. Third, 
the axiom demonstrates that China needed to learn from more advanced examples of 
capitalism, in order to strengthen its own socialist system and fortify the Party’s rule that 
had been devastated during the Cultural Revolution. Last, and most importantly, the 
motto serves to justify Deng’s policies as the continuation of – but not deviation from – 
those of Mao Zedong. It served to legitimize the direction of the post-Mao regime as 
                                                             




being still socialist in nature.   
In 1983, in a speech in remembrance of the centenary of Karl Marx’s death, CCP 
Secretary General Hu Yaobang commended that both Lenin’s victory in the October 
Revolution and Mao’s triumphant revolution in 1949 were examples of integrating the 
universal truth of Marxism with the concrete realities of the two countries.159 One month 
later, Deng Xiaoping made the same point during a talk with an Indian delegation, putting 
Lenin and Mao on an equal footing.160  
Deng always spoke of the first Soviet leader highly. In 1956, he identified China’s 
1950s endeavour to peacefully transform capitalist industry and commerce with “the one 
which Lenin had in mind but was unable to take.” 161 After the death of Mao in 1985, 
Deng was not shy to say that he admired Lenin’s moderate approach to socialism, 
symbolized by the New Economic Policy (NEP). Deng perceived NEP as the path that 
China should be taking.162 During his summit meeting with Gorbachev in 1989, Deng 
again praised that “Lenin was a true and great Marxist.” He said this was “because it was 
not books that enabled him to find the revolutionary road and to accomplish the October 
socialist revolution in backward Russia but realities, logic, philosophical thinking, and 
communist ideals.” 163 In Deng’s mind, Lenin was an example of Chinese-style socialism 
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personified. For Deng, Lenin, Mao, and he himself were the great Marxists who shared 
the same legacy of building socialism by integrating theories with practice and learning 
from different things, while upholding the faith of proletarian dictatorship and 
communism – this is socialism with Chinese characteristics.  
On December 13, 1978, Deng Xiaoping made a speech during a Party central 
working conference, which would serve as the keynote address for the forthcoming Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP – and which signalled the 
departure of Maoism and the beginning of post-Mao China’s reform and modernization. 
Deng remarked:  
 
What shall we learn? Basically, we should study Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
Thought and try to integrate the universal principles of Marxism with the concrete practice 
of our modernization drive. Only if we study these well will we be able to carry out 
socialist modernization rapidly and efficiently. We should learn in different ways – through 
practice, from books and from the experience, both positive and negative, of others as well 
as our own. Conservatism and book worship should be overcome. So long as we unite as 
one, work in concert, emancipate our minds, use our heads and try to learn what we did not 
know before, there is no doubt that we will be able to quicken the pace of our new Long 
March. Under the leadership of the Central Committee and the State Council, let us 
advance courageously to change the backward condition of our country and turn it into a 
modern and powerful socialist state.164 
 
Deng’s words can be summarized in two parts: post-Mao China should uphold 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, while adapting those orthodox principles 
to the realities of the country. On the other hand, Chinese people should study the new 
situation in the world and be open to new thoughts, in order to transform China from a 
backward state under Mao, to a powerful and modernized socialist country in the future.  
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In 1986, eight years after the Third Plenary Session, Peng Dingan, president of the 
Liaoning Provincial Party School, featured an article entitled “The Historical 
Responsibilities of Contemporary Chinese Marxists” in Renmin ribao. In the first part of 
the article, the author praised the 1978 Third Plenary Session as “a breakthrough in 
Chinese history,” and commended the courage of the Chinese leadership for putting 
forward the theory of “constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics” during the 
Plenary Session. Peng remarked that Deng Xiaoping’s introduction of the theory was 
unprecedented, since no one in the history of the CCP before had conjured up such an 
inspiring vision of the future. In his opinion, the founding of the Soviet Union in 1917 
was the first successful example of “integrating communist theories with the local 
conditions of a state.” However, because of Lenin’s premature death, the task remained 
incomplete in the communist world, and “it will leave China to achieve the goal of 
constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 165  
In the second part, Peng predicted that there would be “four difficult, great, and 
glorious historical assignments (lishi keti)” for contemporary Chinese Marxist theoretical 
workers. First, they should uphold and continue to study Marxism. Second, they should 
apply Marxist theories to new realities and the current world situation. Third, they needed 
to use new concepts and new theories to substantiate, enrich, and develop Marxism to a 
higher level. Last and most importantly, they must learn from the past bitter experience of 
building socialism in China under Mao, and remember the negative lessons and failures 
of other communist countries in constructing socialism. He concluded, “Both upholding 
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and developing Marxism are our historical responsibilities as well as our contributions to 
China and the whole world.” 166  
In the realm of academia, the principle of constructing socialism with Chinese 
characteristics seems to have become the theoretical guidance for research in the 
humanities and social sciences in the PRC after 1978. The editorial board of Dangdai 
shijie shehui zhuyi wenti (Problems of Contemporary World Socialism) wrote in the 
inaugural issue of the journal in 1983 that “studying the different kinds of socialism in 
foreign countries has become a trend in China,” and the goal of the journal was “asking 
Chinese scholars to contribute their articles based on Marxist stand, attitude, and 
methodology, to research of the problems of contemporary socialism, for facilitating 
China’s socialist modernization.” 167 Two years after, Zhao Mingyi, a scholar of law at 
Shandong University, published another article in the same journal and asked that 
Chinese scholars focus on three aspects with regard to researching contemporary world 
socialism: thoughts of various socialist schools; comparative studies of various socialist 
models in the world; and differences between non-scientific and scientific socialism, 
which needed to be judged by the criteria of “whether socialism has been integrating 
Marxist fundamentals with actual conditions and realities of various countries.” 168 At the 
end, he summarized the significance of studying contemporary world socialism in China, 
which included upholding and developing Marxism, providing lessons and experience for 
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constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics, reforming the current Chinese 
socialist system, supporting revolutionary struggles in other countries, and ensuring the 
final victory of Marxist scientific socialism in the world.” 169  
In 1988, Wen Jize, former president of the Graduate School at CASS, delivered a 
speech commemorating the School’s ten-year anniversary. He commended that while the 
turmoil during the Cultural Revolution imposed by the Gang of Four had abused Marxist 
theories and caused suffering for the Chinese people, yet the 1978 Third Plenary Session 
and the CCP 13th Congress that had just taken place in 1987 “eventually found a path of 
constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics and led China into a new historical 
stage.” 170 As a result, Wen remarked that there would be “a great and difficult task facing 
CASS graduate students in learning and developing Marxism.” Apart from upholding 
Marxist principles, he said, the task for all graduate students would be to “eliminate the 
mechanical understanding of Marxism and learn new theories to enrich and develop 
Marxism, for analysing and studying the practical problems of China.” 171  
In 1998, Hu Jintao, then the vice-president of China and the future CCP secretary 
general from 2002 to 2012, commented in a speech commemorating the 20-year 
anniversary of the 1978 Third Plenary Session that Chinese theoretical workers should 
carry forward the spirit of the Plenary Session in applying Marxism to the actual 
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conditions of China. He said that they should also uphold the Deng Xiaoping Theory of 
“constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics,” for “researching new conditions, 
resolving new problems, and moving Marxism toward the future.” 172  
In the same year, another article appeared in Beijing daxue xuebao (Journal of Peking 
University). The author Zhang Baosheng was the PRC Vice-Minister of Education. He 
made an interesting argument regarding the relationship between the ethos of the 1978 
Third Plenary Session and post-Mao China’s humanities and social science research. 
According to him, because those disciplines had been decimated during the Cultural 
Revolution, and because the spirit of the Third Plenary Session involved such values as 
emancipating the mind, seeking truth from facts, and using Marxist theories to study and 
explore new ways of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, one could surmise 
that the Session had contributed to revitalized research. He argued that “the line 
prescribed at the Third Plenary Session has become the foundation of post-Mao 
humanities and social science research.” He argued that post-Mao Chinese humanities 
and social sciences should serve the needs of economic modernization, strengthen 
research on Deng Xiaoping Theory, develop Marxism, and make a contribution to the 
principle of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. 173  In short, what Zhang 
Baosheng meant is that without Deng Xiaoping and his new principles that were put 
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forward at the 1978 Third Plenary Session, there would have been no rebirth of China’s 
humanities or social sciences after the death of Mao. As a result, Deng Xiaoping Theory 
and the post-Mao China’s principle of constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics 
should become the theoretical framework of, and guidance for, China’s humanities and 
social science research after 1978.   
Regarding the relationship between Deng Xiaoping’s concept of Chinese-style 
socialism and Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology, it is first worth noting that the concept of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics and Deng’s speeches on the Soviet Union not only 
became the theoretical framework of research of Chinese humanities and social sciences 
(including Sovietology), but they also influenced the quoting and writing styles of many 
Chinese Soviet-watchers. In 1994, there was an article written by Liu Seqing, editor in 
chief of Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations). The author used 
more than 50 quotations from Deng Xiaoping’s selected works, solely for arguing that 
China’s direction of reform and open door was successful. By contrast, the Soviet Union 
did not build socialism by integrating Marxist theories with its realities, therefore leading 
to its demise.174 In his 1998 article, Guo Jianping, an associate researcher at the Central 
Party School, cited almost every speech of Deng Xiaoping from the 1950s to 1990s  in 
order to prove that Deng’s appraisal of the rigid Soviet model and its unsuitability for 
China were true.175 It seems that both authors were happy to allow Deng to speak for 
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them when it came to analysing the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, while not quoting Deng’s words, both Li Yunhua (an IREECAS scholar) 
and Huang Zongliang (vice-director of the Institute of Russian Studies at Beijing 
University) closely imitated Deng’s rhetoric in their own articles. The language used by 
these two authors appears in almost the same vein as when Deng spoke during his 
southern tour in 1992. On this tour, the Chinese leader was intent to return the attack by 
the Party conservative force after the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and called for the 
acceleration of reform and open door in the wake of the demise of world communism. 
Following Deng’s southern trip, when summarizing Soviet lessons for China’s future 
reforms, Li Yunhua said that “by observing the lessons of Soviet building socialism for 
more than 70 years, we must realize that the open policy will be a long term strategy,” 
and China should guard against “the interference from both the left and the right, but 
leftism is the primary threat.” 176  As for Huang Zongliang, he stated in 1993 that 
“Marxism-Leninism is an open system that embraces different schools,” and “being 
indulged in quarrelling over whether the road of reform is capitalist or socialist would 
only render the socialist theories ossified.” 177  
By comparing the quotations above with Deng’s original in 1992, one finds a 
surprising similarity in wording and language style, and wonders if those words come 
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from the same person.178 As such, we can see that Deng’s understanding of the Soviet 
Union and his definition of socialism deeply influenced the thinking, mind-set, language 
style, and even grammar and syntax of Chinese Sovietology writings. 
Second, as we will see in subsequent chapters, both the status of the first Soviet 
leader Vladimir Lenin and the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics attached 
a great significance to Chinese Sovietology writings in the 1980s and 1990s. Chinese 
scholars always put Deng Xiaoping and Lenin on the same pedestal and stated that Deng 
had long followed Lenin’s principle of building socialism according to one country’s 
special conditions. This was particularly true in the 1990s, when Lenin’s policies 
coincided with China’s interests. At the time, Chinese Sovietologists used the 
interpretation of Lenin’s writings to bring vigour to the weakening legitimacy of Chinese 
socialism after the Tiananmen suppression and the demise of world communism, and to 
give a new impulse to Deng’s policies and future reforms against the post-Tiananmen 
leftist offensive. Chinese scholars used Lenin to help rebuild the authority of the Party 
and communism in China. 
As early as in the 1950s, Deng Xiaoping had already recognized that China should 
follow the path “which Lenin had in mind but was unable to take” for building 
socialism.179 In 1985, after China had come out of the disastrous Mao era, Deng admitted 
to Robert Mugabe, prime minister of Zimbabwe, that he still did not know what socialism 
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meant after more than 30 years of building socialism in China. But he mentioned that 
“Lenin had a good idea when he adopted the New Economic Policy,” which championed 
the market economy and open society, while upholding the one-party rule. At the end of 
the conversation, Deng concluded that the correct way was to “build socialism with 
Chinese characteristics,” which means to apply the universal principles of Marxism-
Leninism to China’s own realities. 180  In 1989, a few months before the Tiananmen 
Incident, Huang Nansen, a philosophy professor at Beijing University, published an 
article in Makesi zhuyi yanjiu (Studies on Marxism), which was funded and administered 
by CASS. He summarized the following four essences of Leninism: Leninism is a 
pragmatic Marxism (shijiande makesi); some elements of Leninism may only apply to the 
age when Lenin was still alive, and today we need to develop Leninism to make it more 
relevant; Leninism is socialism with Russian characteristics based on the Russian 
tradition and mentality; having said this, Leninism still has universal value for present day 
world socialism.181  
In 1992, a few months after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, Zhu Guocheng, a scholar 
at the Chengdu Cadre College in Sichuan Province, remarked at the beginning of his 
article that “Lenin’s theory has close relations to China’s policies and it is the theoretical 
foundation of our socialist construction.” 182 In his opinion, not only China’s economic 
policy, but also Deng’s political reform (or, more accurately speaking, administrative 
                                                             
180 Deng, “Reform is the Only Way for China to Develop Its Productive Forces,” August 28, 1985, in Deng, 
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 143. 
181 Huang Nansen, “Liening shiren bushishen” [Lenin was a Human Being, Not God], Makesi zhuyi yanjiu, 
no. 2 (1989): 169-72. 
182 Zhu Guocheng, “Liening ‘yiguo jiancheng shehui zhuyi’ delilun yuqishi” [Lenin’s Theory of “Socialism in 




reform) had originated from Lenin’s party construction program after 1917, such as 
separation of the state and the Party, increasing the working efficiency, and combating the 
cumbersome bureaucracy.183 Zhu Guocheng even argued that China’s “special economic 
zone” and “one country, two systems” both originated from Lenin’s policies during the 
early Soviet Union, when the country borrowed heavily from capitalist elements to 
strengthen its socialist economy.184  
In 1995, Li Shenglu, a scholar at the Sichuan Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, 
identified the following three concepts of Deng Xiaoping with those of Lenin: everything 
must be based on practice, rather than theory; the key of building socialism is economic 
development, not political struggle; and socialism and capitalism are not in 
contradiction.185 He praised, “Deng Xiaoping’s thinking in reform and open door is in fact 
using Lenin’s theory to build socialism with a Chinese character. He has inherited and 
developed Leninism.” 186 In 1999, Ye Qingfeng, a professor of socialist studies at the 
Central Party School, made it clear that “the path launched by the Third Plenary Session 
is a return to and a logical continuation of Lenin’s New Economic Policy,” and “The New 
Economic Policy is exactly the direction of China taken since 1978.” 187  
In 1993 and 1995, there were two articles written by Gao Fang (a professor of 
international relations at Renmin University in Beijing) and Sun Chengshu (a professor of 
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philosophy at Fudan University in Shanghai), respectively. Both articles concluded that 
there were three breakthroughs of socialism in human history.188 The first was the birth of 
Marxism symbolized by the publication of The Communist Manifesto; the second 
milestone was the Lenin administration in the early Soviet Union from 1917 to 1923; the 
last landmark was the period of time represented by Deng Xiaoping’s launching of reform 
and open door policies in 1978, and his putting forward of the idea of “socialist market 
economy” during his southern trip in 1992. 189  Interestingly, both authors’ articles 
excluded the once-hailed post-Lenin Soviet model as one of the breakthroughs of 
socialism in world history. Moreover, they tended to agree that Deng’s post-1978 
direction was more a vision inspired by Lenin’s post-1917 administration than by Marx’s 
Manifesto. As Sun Chengshu commented:  
 
There is a clear line linking between Deng’s reform programs and Lenin’s policies. Deng’s 
dictum of socialism with Chinese characteristics has behove us to rethink socialism. He is 
entitled to be the greatest Chinese Leninist in the contemporary era.190 
 
Last, the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics was not only intended to 
legitimize Deng Xiaoping as a true disciple of Leninism, or the post-Mao PRC regime 
and its reform direction as a product of genuine socialism. To some extent, as we will see 
in subsequent chapters, the use of the term in post-Mao Chinese Sovietology was also 
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meant to protect and save Mao’s image and status; these had been severely damaged 
before his death in 1976, owing to the Chairman’s highly repressive policies carried out in 
China from 1949 onward. Deng Xiaoping once remarked in 1960: 
 
Mao Zedong Thought and Marxism-Leninism are one and the same thing. Mao Zedong 
Thought not only adheres to the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, but also adds much 
new content to the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore, we should not separate 
Mao Zedong Thought from Marxism-Leninism as if the two were different things.191  
 
After Mao died, Deng did not change his tune; rather, he went even further in 1983, 
saying that both Mao’s founding of communist China in 1949 and Lenin’s October 
Revolution in 1917 were examples of integrating the universal principles of Marxism-
Leninism with the local conditions of the two countries, respectively.192 Not only Deng, 
but other CCP leaders like Li Ruihuan and Jiang Zemin, also expressed similarly positive 
views on Mao after the 1980s. These leaders linked Lenin, Mao, and Deng together as 
examples of practicing what they saw as true socialism, by taking local circumstances 
into account.193 In 1998, CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin commended that while Mao 
was integrating Leninist theory with Chinese conditions to achieve a successful 
revolution in 1949, it was Deng who creatively used Leninism to facilitate China’s 
modernization after 1978.194  
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In academia, Yu Lin, chief editor of Shehui kexue zhanxian (Social Science Front), 
which was funded and administered by the Jilin Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, 
wrote in 1981 that “Maoism is the collective wisdom of the CCP,” and “it has nothing to 
do with Mao’s personal character and the mistakes he made in the evening of his life.” He 
concluded that “Maoism is a product of integrating Marxism-Leninism with the practice 
of Chinese socialist revolution.” 195  
In 1993 and 1995, both Hu Sheng (CASS president) and Wang Zhen (an associate 
professor at Dalian College of Political Science in Liaoning Province) published articles 
on the Sino-Soviet relations under Mao. There are three points worth summarizing from 
these works: Mao’s mistake was not that he copied the Soviet model mechanically, but 
that he extricated China from the Soviet model in a rushed and ineffective manner. Mao’s 
break with Moscow in the 1960s was a good and serious decision, and it signalled the 
beginning of China’s farewell to the unsuitable Soviet model; Mao’s subsequent 
programs (such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution) were all 
explorations searching for alternative ways of establishing a socialist society in China. 
Both authors concluded that Mao’s past experiments, regardless of the costs, were the 
origin of Deng’s 1978 reform programs and the theory of building socialism in a Chinese 
way.196  
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Deng Xiaoping once told the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci in 1980 that CCP “will 
not do to Chairman Mao what Khrushchev did to Stalin.” 197 In 1997, Yang Xiaoyan, a 
lecturer at Beijing Technology and Business University, criticized that Khrushchev’s 
1956 secret speech – which revealed and condemned Stalin’s supposed crimes – was the 
origin of the 1989 East European turmoil and the final collapse of the Soviet Union.198 In 
fact, Mao Zedong might have already sensed sentiment. He said in November 1956, a few 
months after the release of Khrushchev’s secret speech, that the USSR had two swords – 
one was Lenin, another was Stalin. And regarding the possibility of Stalin being 
denounced and the fate of the Soviet state being in danger, he remarked that “Once this 
gate is opened, by and large Leninism is thrown away.” 199 
In this regard, post-Mao Chinese Soviet-watchers seem to have taken heed of Mao’s 
1956 admonishment and understood Mao’s premonition perfectly. They seem to have 
realized that although China was able to blame the Soviet model created by the post-
Lenin Moscow leaderships, nevertheless both Lenin and Mao, the fundamental pillars of 
the socialist states, could never be overturned under any circumstances. Otherwise, the 
consequences for China would be disastrous, akin to those of the USSR in 1991. 
Therefore, as we will see in subsequent chapters, scholars generally aligned Lenin and 
Mao with the direction of post-Mao China in their writings and research on the Soviet 
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Union; this served as self-imposed boundaries for their research, beyond which they were 
unable to go.  
Moreover, according to Zhu Guocheng and Gao Fang, the post-1917 Lenin 
administration equalled Deng’s post-1978 reforms. Both paths symbolized what they saw 
as true socialism, which meant integrating Marxist theory with local conditions. Both 
measures were “the middle way marching toward socialism,” which distinguished them 
from the leftist errors committed by Stalin and the rightist tendencies represented by 
Khrushchev and Gorbachev.200 This perfectly encapsulated the research outcomes of post-
Mao Chinese Sovietology in the 1980s and 1990s: after Lenin, the Soviet Union was no 
longer socialist in nature. The demise of the Union was due to leftism and rightism after 
Lenin, so the collapse of the state in 1991 had nothing to do with the nature of socialism. 
Chinese Sovietologists appear to have concluded that the backwardness of Chinese 
socialism in pre-1976 times was not due to socialism or Maoism, but that the culprit was 
the Soviet model invented by post-Lenin leaderships. After 1978, China returned to what 
it deemed as the right path of true Leninism – Deng’s reform and open door directions, 
and socialism with Chinese characteristics, which were intended to guarantee the success 
of PRC modernization even after the demise of world communism.  
 
Chinese historiography and Chinese Sovietology 
In order to further understand the nature of contemporary Chinese Sovietology and 
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how Chinese Soviet-watchers used their writings to serve the CCP regime, we need to 
trace the tradition of Chinese historical research. The interplay of scholarship and politics 
has a long history in China, in which scholarly research (particularly in the fields of the 
humanities and social sciences) has been easily turned to political uses.201 The situation 
has been exacerbated since the communists took control in 1949. Unlike in democratic 
countries, where intellectuals generally have more autonomy, the CCP regime (like others 
in the socialist world) expects intellectuals to be cogs in a machine, not independent 
thinkers. As a result, the practice of Chinese scholars in the field of Sovietology is largely 
the result of the mentality of traditional Chinese intellectuals. Chinese Sovietologists 
support the party-state as a priority, by legitimizing socialism and reform agendas in their 
writings. Through their research (as presented in this thesis), Chinese Soviet-watchers are 
directly or indirectly participating in defining the reform process, and devising and 
legitimizing reform ideology and propaganda. Their writings often say more about China 
than about the Soviet Union. PRC Sovietologists in both decades constantly sought to 
capitalize on their research of the USSR. By doing so, they attempted to further China’s 
interests and seek solutions for its own socialist system. It became a striking example of 
scholarship in which traditional criteria of evidence and argument, objectivity and truth, 
are largely overruled by normative political considerations.  
Like PRC scholarship in the field of historical research, there are two trends in 
Chinese Sovietology writings: the Confucian tradition and Marxist theoretical framework. 
In the first case, ancient Chinese classics, such as Confucians and Mencius, are always 
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full of descriptions of Chinese thinkers appealing to examples of ancient kings.202 Those 
distant personages are presented as concrete embodiments of moral qualities for present 
societies. Jonathan Unger once commented:  
 
The recording and interpretation of history has, for the past two millennia, contained a 
special significance in China. More than in most other countries, history was and its 
considered a mirror through which ethical standards and moral transgressions pertinent to 
the present day could be viewed. This perspective on history was based in Confucian 
doctrine, which admonished followers to plumb the past for such lessons. It became a 
method of commentary about contemporary times that members of the literati class learned 
how to manipulate, sometimes as a means of flattering an incumbent emperor and 
government.203 
 
Burton Watson contends that there are two functions within the tradition of Chinese 
historical research represented by Shiji (Records of the Grand Historian), which was 
written by Sima Qian in the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD). According to Watson, firstly, 
“these works were intended not primarily as objective records of the past but as guides to 
moral and political conduct.” Secondly, “it was the creation of a new golden age in the 
present by a wise application of the moral values appropriate to the times.” 204 Indeed, 
writing history in China, despite the intent of historians to portray the past as objectively 
as possible, is in fact still a political enterprise. The past is continually reconstructed to 
meet the needs of the state. In this case, the PRC regime, akin to its imperial forebears, 
has always impinged on scholars in a manner reminiscent of the dynastic rulers in 
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validating the rule of the state.205 
Second, since the founding of the PRC, Marxism has become the guiding principle of 
Chinese scholarly research in the humanities and social sciences, and the field of history 
in particular. Marx once remarked, “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in 
various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” 206 It is the Marxist determinist vision 
of history and its appeal to voluntarism that have been used by the party-state to 
legitimize the communist regime and its own policies. Under such a Marxist framework, 
the CCP regime demands that PRC historians use whatever means necessary to 
appropriate and shape the past for contemporary political purposes.207 Chinese scholars in 
the field are regarded as not having been able to organize a field of their own. Neither are 
they able to define and act autonomously according to the self-set rules of their own 
academic “game.” Instead, scholars are compelled to think and work according to rules 
set by the Party. For them, interpreting historical documents without the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism has simply been impossible after 1949.208  
Reading through the secondary literature as presented in the Introduction, one may 
get a feeling that Chinese Sovietology after the Soviet collapse had a strong sense of 
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urgency and crisis. The secondary literature has portrayed the Soviet demise as causing a 
great deal of concern among Chinese Soviet-watchers, who supposedly worried about the 
ramifications on the PRC’s one-party rule and the fate of socialist China. In reality, 
however, according to this author’s reading of Chinese post-mortems on the USSR after 
1991 scholars did not view the collapse of the Soviet Union as a sign of the coming 
downfall of China, but the source of its renewal. Chinese scholars re-invented and re-
conceptualized the image and norms of Chinese socialism as not only the tomorrow of 
world socialism, but also the tomorrow of humankind.  
In 1987, Beijing Review published an article just before the 13th Party Congress. It 
indicated that, while learning from the West and opening to the outside world would 
facilitate socialist modernization, China was nonetheless in “the preliminary stage of 
socialism,” and building socialism in China “will be a long-term project.” 209 In the wake 
of the Tiananmen Incident and the turmoil in Eastern Europe, many Chinese scholars 
suggested that the presently grim situation by no means indicated the ultimate failure of 
socialism. They argued that difficult political circumstances were sometimes caused by 
the capitalist peaceful evolution. They remarked that the history of socialism is far shorter 
than that of capitalism, so the advantages of socialism have not yet become evident to the 
world in so short a time. In their opinion, learning from the failure of the socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe would enrich China’s socialist theories and buoy the PRC’s 
confidence in upholding socialism. They agreed that socialism needs to be developed and 
explored, and continued reform is the only hope for socialism in the future. They all 
                                                             




concluded that Chinese socialism would manifest its increasing significance amid the 
current setbacks of the international communist movement. In their opinions, many 
people in the world had pinned all hopes of future socialism on China. They made it clear 
that the chaotic situation in many post-socialist states had demonstrated the disastrous 
outcomes for countries renouncing socialism.210 
In fact, after the Soviet collapse in 1991, some Chinese scholars went further to say 
that the failure of Soviet socialism and Gorbachev’s reforms had actually bolstered the 
confidence of the Chinese people and demonstrated the correctness of Chinese-style 
socialism. They argued quite optimistically that the USSR and China were two 
completely different models of socialism, and that there would not have been the rise of 
the Chinese model without the Soviet demise. They predicted that the revival of socialism 
was now imminent in China and that the 21st century would be the century of socialism 
with Chinese characteristics. They concluded that Chinese-style socialism had absorbed 
the negative lessons of the Soviet model and integrated Marxist theories into its own 
circumstances. Therefore, it should be an example to the world in the future, and would 
be marching toward its final victory with confidence.211  
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By presenting the contrasting performances of socialism in China and the USSR, 
scholars argued that socialism in China was very different in nature to that of the USSR, 
and was more sustainable because China had combined Marxism with its local conditions. 
Their sophistry was to interpret the demise of the USSR as not the end of socialism, but 
as the revival of Chinese-style socialism amid the ashes of the Soviet past. They were 
happy to say that China and its distinctive socialist system would prove to the world that 
socialism might still be a powerful force, and that Chinese-style socialism represented the 
future of mankind. 
The post-1991 narrative of Chinese Sovietology writings is still largely influenced 
and determined by the Marxist five-stage grand theory explaining the historical 
development of human society – that is, from slavery to feudalism, capitalism, socialism, 
and finally to communism. 212  This grand theory is still a powerful formulation that 
legitimizes the status of Chinese socialism and guarantees the position of China in the 
future world, amid the great despair resulting from the tragic collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Their writings answered pressing political questions in simplified, clear-cut, and 
comprehensive terms that resulted in a strong appeal for the CCP regime. Such narratives 
became dominant at the time when socialism in the world was facing an unprecedented 
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crisis. In arousing the revolutionary spirit and the hope for the survival of Chinese 
socialism, these scholars seem to have surrendered standard academic rigour in their 
writings. They played the roles of prophets and offered sharp, clear guidelines for future 
action. Their thoughts reflected a Marxist determinism that “man makes history,” as well 
as its voluntaristic interpretation of history,213 which portrays socialism as historically 
inevitable. This inevitability thus demands the participation and activity of individuals in 
realizing the inevitable, and inspiring people to conceive or create new future possibilities. 
Post-1991 Chinese Sovietology writings lie at the core of such Marxist worldview. 
In the post-Mao era, Deng Xiaoping’s precept of “seeking truth from facts” was not 
only a call for integrating Marxism with Chinese conditions to build socialism, but also a 
demand for intellectuals to explore whatever means necessary for strengthening the 
weakened legitimacy of the CCP after the disastrous Cultural Revolution, commanding 
support of his reform and open door policies.214 CASS President and historian Hu Sheng 
once said that “the goal of the historical research is to summarize past lessons for serving 
the needs of the present.” He argued that “we need to research the past events that have 
been selectively chosen and have strong ramifications on the present.” 215 According to 
David Shambaugh, the goal of the majority of post-Mao China’s American-watchers is 
“not to write studies for policy elites, but rather to view the world through a Marxist-
Leninist lens, write theoretical treaties, and hence justify policy in ideological terms.” He 
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says that these individuals’ collective task “is generally to transmit and perpetuate 
doctrine, not to create knowledge or foster independent thinking,” and “they must work 
within definite bureaucratic and intellectual confines.” It is reported that their research 
outcomes have never been a simple matter and have somewhat become the sources of 
legitimation for governmental policies.216  
Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology as presented in this thesis registers all the Confucian 
and Marxist influences that have characterized the past Chinese scholarly tradition, such 
as adapting orthodox theories to fit reality and explain the present, using the past to serve 
contemporary politics, propagandizing anti-imperialism and the West, and embracing 
determinism and the inevitability of socialism. By researching the Soviet Union and 
quoting substantially from Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Deng, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not 
focus on the USSR alone, but mostly attempted to confirm and legitimize the state 
policies of reform and open door, and to propagandize and predetermine the final victory 
of socialism in China.  
In order to further illustrate the Confucian and Marxist impacts on post-Mao Chinese 
Sovietology, it is helpful to examine the use of shi (standing for historical facts or 
historical materials) and lun (standing for historical interpretation or theory),217 and their 
association with the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics. There are three 
typologies that have been used in Chinese history writing since ancient times: yilun daishi 
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(theory takes the lead over historical materials); luncong shichu (interpretations and 
theories evolve from historical materials); shilun jiehe (combinations of historical 
materials and theory, in which theoretical approaches have priority over historical 
materials).218 These three paradigms could also find strong expression in contemporary 
Chinese Sovietology writing, which is, in fact, a derivative of Chinese scholarly tradition.  
After 1949, the narrative structure of luncong shichu, which was embracing the spirit 
of Western historiography and essentially a liberal tradition that had dominated the 
Republican era (1911-1949), gradually became marginalized and lost its prominence in 
the emergence of Marxist historiography that prevailed during the Maoist decades. This 
school of historical writing is committed to objectively discovering the past, and is based 
on rigorous and impartial scrutiny of primary sources, and letting the historical narrative 
speak for itself.219 This paradigm is certainly at odds with post-1949 Marxist guidance, 
which dictates history writing as the most effective and powerful means to legitimize and 
reinforce political ideology. Its goal is not to faithfully reconstruct the past, but to use the 
past to legitimate actions and agendas of the present-day regime.  
According to Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, there was mainly a contest between 
two philosophical concepts in historical writing under Mao: yilun daishi and shilun jiehe. 
The former was represented by the orthodox historians Guo Moruo and Fan Wenlan, who 
accepted the Party line as the official lun to guide history writing and argued that Marxist-
Leninist principles should be the compass for all PRC historians. The latter was upheld by 
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Jian Bozan (a professor of history at Beijing University) and Wu Han (a leading scholar 
in the history of Ming Dynasty and vice-mayor of Beijing), who did not take Marxism-
Leninism for granted and did not regard it as an instrument aimed at comprehending 
history. Rather, they perceived this ideological assumption as merely an auxiliary aid to 
assist research. 220  For them, “Marxism-Leninism was not to be found as an inherent 
principle of history; but inherent principles in history could only be found with the help of 
Marxism-Leninism.” 221  
Under Mao, the conviction of shilun jiehe was quickly placed outside the boundaries 
of orthodox historiography in the PRC, while the theory of yilun daishi took the lead and 
became mainstream in the realm of historical research. Yilun daishi looks at everything 
from a holistic point of view, from which the past has to be explained. For those scholars 
belonging to this school, the precondition for writing history is not working on historical 
records, but understanding totality in its claim for the future. This model is congruent 
with the CCP regime’s deterministic claim that Marxism-Leninism should be the 
universal law governing historical research and legitimizing its power.222   
After the end of the Mao era, shilun jiehe, with the paradigm’s new interpretation 
under new circumstances, gained ascendance in Chinese scholarly research after the 
1970s. In the early 1980s, Dai Yi (a professor of history at Renmin University) and Jin 
Jingfang (a professor of history at Jilin University) published articles in Renmin ribao and 
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Shehui kexue zhanxian (Social Science Front), respectively. Both of them argued that 
both of the concepts yilun daishi and luncong shichu had become outdated in the new era. 
In their opinion, Marxism-Leninism is not dogma, and historical research should develop 
new theories and enrich communist classics under the framework of Marxism-Leninism. 
They stated that shilun jiehe absolutely complied with Deng Xiaoping’s slogan of 
building socialism with Chinese characteristics, and it should be considered the best 
method of historical research, as the concept conveyed a strong sense that historical work 
should expand theories in light of the conditions of the country in question.223 
The renewed emphasis on the thesis of shilun jiehe should be understood in the 
context of China at the beginning of the reform era. In January 1983, CASS Vice-
President Huan Xiang wrote a report entitled “The Tasks of 1980s Chinese Social 
Sciences.” The author argued that Chinese social sciences should be upgraded, making 
the discipline more modernized and less dogmatized after the Mao era. He wrote that the 
tasks of Chinese social science scholars should explore how China could achieve 
modernization from within socialist model. However, these scholars were not able to 
challenge the historical conclusion that only socialism could save China.224 One year later, 
IREECAS Director Liu Keming stated in his report that studying the Soviet Union should 
serve the needs of China, its reform policy, and the purpose of building its own brand of 
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socialism.225 In 1986, an official document  disseminated in the Sixth Plenary Session of 
the 12th CCP Central Committee declared that while Marxism-Leninism was the guiding 
principle, “the theory also needs to be developed in keeping with historical and scientific 
advance.” The document concluded that the task of China’s Marxist theoretical workers 
was “to apply Marxist basic principles and methods to the creative solution of new 
problems.” 226  In 1988, Hua Sike, a scholar at Central China Normal University, 
suggested that under the new circumstances, Chinese social science workers should 
articulate a renewed understanding of how both socialism and capitalism could aid in 
China’s modernization.227  
From the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident to the end of the 1990s (particularly 
after Deng’s southern tour in 1992), there was a new development of the shilun jiehe 
thesis. In 1992, after surveying the discourse of shilun jiehe throughout PRC history, 
Jiang Dachun, a researcher at CASS Institute of Modern History, argued that the thesis in 
contemporary China should no longer be guided by orthodox Marxism, but by the new 
line of socialism with Chinese characteristics.228 In 1994, Hu Jintao, then the secretariat 
of the CCP Central Committee, redefined the concept “Marxist” in his speech delivered at 
the Central Party School. He argued that upholding Marxism was not sufficient, and “a 
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person who possesses the ability to develop Marxism is a true Marxist.” 229 In 1998, in the 
aftermath of the fall of world communism, CASS President Li Tieying in his annual 
CASS report wrote that when socialism was in crisis, it was also an opportunity for 
Chinese scholars to contribute something new to the revival of socialism. And by this 
“something new,” he meant none other than Deng’s dictum of building socialism with a 
Chinese character, which Li Tieying considered as the future theoretical framework for 
China’s social science research.230 As such, we can say that the renewed emphasis on 
shilun jiehe in the 1980s and 1990s is a new kind of yilun daishi in disguise. The only 
difference was that the lun (theory), which had previously been the orthodox and 
dogmatic Marxism-Leninism, had been replaced by Deng’s flexible and seemingly 
inclusive slogan of building socialism in a Chinese way – it was new wine in an old bottle. 
 
Concluding remarks 
As demonstrated in this chapter, in order to grasp the narratives and analyses of the 
Soviet Union, one has to examine Chinese Soviet-watchers in their historical context. In 
so doing, we see that Soviet-watchers’ perceptions of the USSR and their direct or 
indirect involvement with ongoing or specific political and social circumstances in 
contemporary China motivated as well as constrained their rendering of the subject study. 
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Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology, in other words, was inseparable from these scholars’ 
participation in the social and political discourses of their own times, and from their 
embrace or elaboration of ideologies that served to justify their political claims. 
In sum, Chinese scholars projected Sovietology not as an autonomous realm, but as 
the legitimizer of post-Mao state policies. It led to the moulding of the scholarship in the 
image of political goals and assumptions. This is seen in the concept of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics, which is a grand but marvellously vague expression that perfectly 
fits Deng Xiaoping’s basic approach: stretching the acceptable ideological framework to 
allow the country to pursue policies that worked. Post-Mao Chinese Sovietology also 
became a malleable tool that could be reinvented to serve different political purposes 
regardless of academic authenticity. By doing so, Chinese Sovietologists sought to make 
Chinese-style socialism meaningful and valued. Writings on the Soviet Union have 
largely reflected China’s prevailing political climate as well as the current strategy of 
reform and open door. Although changes in the Soviet Union and in Sino-Soviet (and 
later Sino-Russian) relations have mattered, China’s domestic concerns have been 
primary. We can say that Chinese Sovietology is an epiphenomenon of PRC politics. 
In 1992, Li Huibin, a professor at Central China Normal University, divided the 
formation of the concept of building socialism with Chinese characteristics into three 
stages, from the time after Deng took power. It began with the Third Plenum in 1978 to 
the 12th Party Congress in 1982, which focused on summarizing the past lessons of 
building socialism since 1949. The conclusion of this stage was that learning about 




models mechanically – rather, Chinese socialism must integrate with Chinese conditions. 
The second stage lasted from 1982 to the 13th Party Congress in 1987, at which time the 
theory was further developed. During this period, the CCP leadership emphasized that 
China was still in the primary stage of socialism; therefore, the country should 
concentrate on developing the productive forces and use whatever means to construct 
socialism. The theory had finally taken shape and become systematic from 1987 to the 
14th Party Congress in 1992. Upon drawing lessons from Tiananmen and the Soviet 
demise, Chinese leaders had reached a consensus about making the principle of socialist 
market economy integral to China’s future development. The concept defines not only an 
economic reform with Chinese characteristics, but also a political institution with a 
distinctive Chinese style, which involves upholding a proletarian dictatorship while 
resisting Western multiparty democracy and pluralism.231  
Li Huibin’s description of the three phrases of formation and development of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics corresponds to the discourse of post-Mao Chinese 
Sovietology writings in these two decades. As we will see in the coming four core 
chapters (Chapters Three to Six), in the 1980s Chinese Soviet-watchers focused on 
criticizing Moscow’s policies and learning lessons from the Soviet system. They argued 
that China should extricate itself from the model of Soviet socialism, reform its own 
economic and political institutions, and embrace the advanced elements of the West. After 
the transitional period from the Tiananmen Incident to the aftermath of the Soviet 
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collapse, the turning point came in 1992, in the wake of Deng’s southern tour.  
Socialism with Chinese characteristics, the dominant framework for post-Mao 
Chinese Sovietology in the 1980s and 1990s, involved two pillars: learning from 
capitalist elements and retaining a socialist essence. Chinese Sovietologists in both 
decades were reiterating and reinforcing both points in their research and writings. While 
learning from capitalism was important, maintaining socialism was fundamental. 
Particularly after the tragic denouement of the USSR, the latter value was more 
pronounced; this was in and after the 1990s, when the former Soviet Union had turned 
into a relic of the past. The country became less and less a subject of serious academic 
study in China, but remained a symbol for Chinese scholars: reminding the domestic 
audience of the significance of deepening economic reform and open door policies as the 
key to keeping socialism vital, while upholding the fundamental importance of one-party 
dictatorship. For Chinese Soviet-watchers, this was the first and foremost lesson drawn 













Analyses of Soviet Foreign Relations  
Chapter 3  




In the early 1980s, when the Sino-Soviet relations were in estrangement and the 1979 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had exacerbated the bilateral relations, the CCP regime 
called for the state-wide denunciation of the so-called Soviet hegemonism (baquan zhuyi). 
After that, Chinese Soviet-watchers became preoccupied with criticizing Soviet 
hegemonism in their writings. This chapter will show that both the real Soviet military 
threat along the PRC border after Moscow’s incursion into Afghanistan, and the historical 
memory of the past Russian invasion of China played key roles in intensifying the 
hostility of Chinese scholars toward the USSR in the 1980s. The criticisms gradually 
receded after Mikhail Gorbachev took power in 1985, and the label of Soviet 
hegemonism finally disappeared from Chinese Sovietology writings in the late 1980s, 
when the bilateral relations had normalized.   
Moscow’s relations with Yugoslavia and the Third World also became popular topics 
in 1980s Chinese writings. In the early days of the decade, the CCP regime was attracted 
by Yugoslavia’s intransigence toward the Kremlin and, most importantly, Belgrade’s 
trajectory of reform that deviated from the orthodox Soviet model. Many Chinese writers 
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supported wholeheartedly Yugoslavia’s stand in its conflicts with Moscow since the end 
of the Second World War. The trend reflects China’s ambition of challenging the Soviet 
domination of the socialist camp, and its aspiration to embrace Yugoslavia’s trajectory of 
reform, which mixed central planning and market mechanism, and is exactly the path the 
PRC has taken since 1978. 
Chinese perceptions of Soviet-Third World relations should also be viewed in the 
context of China’s Third World policy direction in the 1980s, when the CCP regime was 
determined to end Maoist isolation and become a partner of the underdeveloped nations. 
Chinese scholars always had strong sympathy for the Third World and stood by the side 
of those countries through their criticisms of Soviet aggression in the region. Many of 
these scholars argued that Soviet behaviours were contradictory to Lenin’s 
internationalism. In the Chinese mind, Moscow’s unequal treatment of some Third World 
states evoked memories of China in the past, when the country had also been bullied and 
weakened by Tsars and the Kremlin after 1949. Chinese scholars strongly promoted and 
defended the case of the Third World in their articles. The writings demonstrate China’s 
determination to challenge Moscow’s authority, appeal for redress for past historical 
wrongdoings, and promote the moral superiority of Chinese socialism over that of the 
USSR.  
As such, seen from the 1980s Chinese criticisms of Soviet foreign policy, Chinese 
Soviet-watchers not only attempted to learn from the negative lessons of Moscow, as 
secondary sources have previously claimed. Most importantly, those scholars also 
endeavoured to propagandize and justify PRC’s post-Mao domestic and international 
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agendas through their subject study.   
Last, the chapter will examine China’s evolving perceptions of Gorbachev’s foreign 
policy that was defined by his concept of New Thinking from the mid-1980s onward. As 
noted in the Introduction, the existing secondary literature on Chinese Sovietology 
indicates that Chinese scholars began making positive comments about Gorbachev 
immediately after he assumed power in 1985, but that soon after the Tiananmen Incident 
in 1989 they had become completely hostile to the last Soviet leader. This chapter, 
however, is going to show that most Chinese commentators on the USSR took a dim view 
of Gorbachev upon his assumption of the leadership in 1985. Only around one year after 
Gorbachev was in power did Chinese scholars start to review his policy more positively. 
The shift is owing not only to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations since the late 
1980s, but also the relatively open political environment under the leadership of Premier 
Zhao Ziyang. Since then, many authors praised Gorbachev’s New Thinking as a return to 
what they saw as true Leninism, and predicted that it would make a significant 
contribution to the communist world.  
The chapter will also argue that there was no sign of massive criticisms of Gorbachev 
in Chinese writings in and after the 1989 Tiananmen uprising. Instead, Chinese scholars 
still seemed to admire, and produce positive evaluations of, the Soviet leader during this 
anti-liberal period in contemporary China. There are many reasons for this. The most 
important is that after the end of the Cold War, the CCP regime perceived the West as a 
much greater danger to the survival of the regime than the USSR. It saw the Soviet Union 
led by Gorbachev as a much-needed partner with which China could confront Western 
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power politics.  
 
Analyses of Soviet hegemonism 
After the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in 1979, not only did the Kremlin become 
a global political target, but the event also became a source of escalated tension between 
Beijing and Moscow – and this at a time when bilateral relations had been handicapped 
by conflicts since the 1960s. Deng Xiaoping, who was the vice-chairman of the Military 
Commission and already the preeminent leader of China after the passing of the Mao era, 
understood the gravity of the Soviet military threat to Chinese security. In a CCP Central 
Committee meeting in 1980, he claimed that “opposing hegemonism will be on our daily 
agenda,” and “the struggle against hegemonism is a grave task constantly confronting our 
country.” 232  Deng also realized that, by siding with the world to resist Soviet 
hegemonism, China would be able to re-embrace the global community after the long 
isolation under Mao. The situation was no doubt beneficial to his reform and open door 
policies. As he stated in the meeting, the event had “provided us with rather favourable 
international conditions for our four modernizations,” and “expanded the ranks of the 
international forces ranged against hegemonism.” 233 
Deng Xiaoping once defined “hegemonism” (baquan zhuyi) as denoting the situation 
when a country “becomes arrogant” and “acts like an overlord and gives orders to the 
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world.” 234 David Shambaugh in his book on Chinese scholarly perceptions of America 
has devoted several pages to ascertaining the Chinese concept of hegemony. A Chinese 
scholar at Renmin University defined the term in the following words during an interview 
he gave to the author:  
 
When we use this term in China, we mean big countries that try to control or interfere in 
smaller countries. Many scholars mix up imperialism and hegemony. We do not know if it 
is a system or a policy. Before the 1980s we thought it was a system, like Soviet social-
imperialism. We now define hegemony as a policy. For example, in the past when we called 
the United States imperialist we meant the system; today we use hegemony to describe its 
foreign policy.235 
 
Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, accusations of so-called Soviet 
hegemonism had carried weight within Soviet studies in China. In the first issue of 
Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) in 1981, the editorial board 
stated clearly that the journal was committed to “opposing hegemony, safeguarding world 
peace, and striving for a favourable international environment.” 236 In June of the year, 
IREECAS expressed its founding mission in a proposal submitted to the leadership of 
CASS. One of its agendas was “serving the global struggle against hegemonism and 
achieving our socialist modernization.” 237 Even other institutes within CASS, such as the 
Institute of West Asian Studies and Institute of African Studies, all indicated in their 
founding reports that, inter alia, the guiding principles of their research would be 
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“studying the implications of Soviet hegemony for those regions.” 238 Meanwhile, in the 
first issue of MSUEE, IREECAS Vice-Director Liu Keming criticized the Soviet 
leadership for causing the first socialist country to degenerate into “a social imperialist 
state,” and making the USSR become “the principal source of turmoil in the international 
society.” 239 The author argued:   
 
In order to safeguard world peace, it is essential to do research on policies, theories, and 
origins of Soviet hegemonism, reveal the true face of it, and make people realize its nature 
and danger. This is an important mission of our studies of Soviet problems.240  
 
The application of the term hegemonism throughout the history of the PRC has been 
quite evolutionary. In the early days of the regime, the use of the term was in the context 
of confrontations between the “two camps” during the Cold War. It was limited to 
describing the capitalist US and its allies only.241 During the early days of Sino-Soviet 
discord in the late 1950s, China started to criticize Moscow’s policy of peaceful 
coexistence with the West and its intention to control Beijing via the construction of long-
wave stations in Chinese territory. 242  In the early 1960s, when Sino-Soviet relations 
deteriorated, the PRC intensified its attack on the USSR, accusing Moscow of promoting 
its own values and institutions abroad in a way that resembled 19th century 
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According to Shambaugh, the changing point occurred in 1968, when the term 
“hegemonism” was employed by the Chinese to denounce Soviet aggression of 
Czechoslovakia and the “Brezhnev Doctrine.” 244 This is because the Brezhnev statement 
justifying the Soviet invasion had provided a basis for possible future intervention in 
other socialist states. China immediately felt the danger of such logic and responded 
vociferously to Moscow.245 The occasion stood as the major component in the escalation 
of Sino-Soviet tensions and the Kremlin was thereafter equated with hegemonism in 
China. By the early 1970s, Chinese scholars had begun to fuse “social-imperialism” 
together with “hegemonism” when referring to the Soviet Union, which was being 
described as “socialist in word, imperialist in deed.” In their point of view, “Imperialism 
refers to capitalist countries while hegemonism refers to countries regardless of system.” 
246  
It should be noted that under Mao, the Chinese definitions of both “imperialism” and 
“hegemonism” were highly emotionally charged rhetorical notions intended for 
ideological polemics that undercut adversaries’ positions – rather than rigorous concepts. 
The label of hegemonism pegged by the Chinese was an indication of the deterioration of 
Sino-Soviet relations, and of Mao’s intention to challenge Moscow’s leadership and 
authority in the communist world once Stalin had departed. After this point, China no 
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longer recognized the USSR as a socialist state and started to identify Moscow as equal to 
the imperial West.  
After the passing of Mao, many Chinese scholars were still locked in Maoist rhetoric 
in the early 1980s. In 1981, CASS Vice-President Qian Junrui demanded that Chinese 
scholars use “Mao Zedong Thought” to “guide our research on the present questions of 
international relations.” He emphasized that Mao’s “Three Worlds” concept was still “our 
theoretical basis and strategic framework,” which guided “the country’s cooperation with 
the Third and Second World, and resistance to the superpowers and Soviet hegemonism in 
particular.” 247 To take an example, the prestigious IREECAS scholar Xu Kui used the 
words “hegemonism,” “global expansionism,” and “socialist imperialism” more than ten 
times to depict Soviet activities in the world in his 1981 five-page article.248 
Chinese scholars may define hegemonism by the West as the oppressiveness of 
capitalism and colonization.249 In the case of the Soviet Union, they used the term to refer 
not only to the Soviet Union’s violation of others’ sovereignties, but also Moscow’s 
poking its nose into other countries’ affairs, as well as its unequal treatment of the 
socialist member states by subjecting them to the Soviet model. It was a term used by the 
Chinese to target Moscow’s paternalism or paternalistic vision in the socialist camp of 
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which China was a member. Up to the early 1980s, using the language of hegemonism to 
portray the Soviets in the PRC reflected China’s ambition of competing with the Kremlin 
for leadership in the Third World and the socialist camp. The term, as used by the Chinese, 
attempted to emphasize that China was a true socialist country while the USSR was not, 
and to emphasize that the faults of Sino-Soviet conflicts were on the side of the 
aggressive Moscow. 
Chinese criticism of Soviet hegemonism is not only the legacy of the Mao era. The 
Chinese have long had vivid memories of Tsarist Russia as one of the Western intruders 
who conspired to take over China over the centuries. In their research on the history of 
Russian invasions of China and its killing of Chinese inhabitants during the Boxer 
Uprising and Russo-Japanese War in the early 20th century, Chinese scholars in the early 
1980s always equated Tsarist behaviours with contemporary Soviet chauvinism.250 In the 
eyes of the Chinese, Moscow’s present search for global supremacy was no more than a 
Tsarist tradition, “disguised by the cover of ‘socialism’.” 251 Moreover, some Chinese 
scholars in the early 1980s tended to fault the present Soviet regime for being reluctant to 
abrogate the unequal treaties that the Tsarist government had signed with imperial China. 
In their writings, they demanded the return of the lost territories that had resulted from 
those treaties.252 By presenting the history of Soviet hegemonism and aggression in China 
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in this way, these scholars hoped to mobilize support for China’s stand in the Sino-Soviet 
border negotiation taking place then.253  
Moreover, at the time the Sino-Soviet relations were still in a stalemate, aggravated 
by the long-time shadow of Tsarist intrusions and Sino-Soviet conflicts since the 1960s. It 
is thus no surprise that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, a country neighbouring 
China, would produce a grave perceived threat to the PRC in the early 1980s. In January 
1980, an anonymous commentary with a sinister tone appeared in Renmin ribao:  
 
Once the Soviet Union has pushed its military force into the Persian Gulf and Indian 
subcontinent, it sends a dangerous signal. It shows that the USSR will continue its attack on 
Iran, Pakistan, and other countries. People should not assume that Moscow would target 
Afghanistan only. There is an urgent question before us: which country will become the 
next Afghanistan?254  
 
Chinese scholars not only were critical of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but 
also felt suspicious of Moscow’s desire in advancing on China. IREECAS scholar Yu Sui 
warned, “Both the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its support of Vietnamese 
occupation of Cambodia would pose a grievous threat to the security of Asia and China.” 
255 Xing Shugang, an IREECAS specialist in Soviet foreign relations, pointed out that 
“Soviet troops stationing in Asia is nothing other than encircling the PRC, sowing discord 
between China and its neighbouring countries, and obstructing the progress of China’s 
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modernization.” 256  It seems that Chinese accusations of Soviet hegemony were not 
merely politically motivated. The Chinese did not want to see Moscow’s expansionism 
becoming rampant in the world, as China would likely suffer from this situation. Chinese 
denunciation of Soviet hegemonism indicated not only China’s long memories of Russian 
humiliation, but also its feeling of being uncomfortable and insecure when Moscow 
extended its large military presence on the Chinese border.  
In reality, Chinese perceptions of Soviet hegemonism were quite evolutionary 
throughout the 1980s. In the early days of the decade, compared to the US, the USSR was 
described by a scholar as being “the most ferocious hegemonist.” 257 Beijing Review once 
stated that “the US is on the defensive in their contention, therefore, the major threat to 
world peace today comes from the Soviet Union.” 258  
After Gorbachev took charge in 1985, the negative view of Chinese scholars 
gradually abated while the positive assessment became more prominent. In his 1987 
article Xing Shugang argued that China should not condemn the Soviet Union as being 
non-socialist merely because of its display of erroneous hegemonist tendencies before. He 
remarked that hegemonism was only “a policy of Moscow” but it was “the nature of 
imperialist and capitalist states,” and predicted that “hegemonism would by no means 
forever exist in Soviet foreign policy formulating.” 259 In 1988, Gu Guanfu, a professor at 
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the China Foreign Affairs University, even suggested that Soviet foreign policy should 
not be described as being purely hegemonic after the 1970s, as “it has contributed to 
national liberation and anti-colonization movements in the Third World to some extent,” 
and it was different from “hegemonism of the imperial West.” 260  In light of Deng 
Xiaoping’s remark in 1978 (that socialism is incompatible with hegemonism) the change 
of Chinese perceptions from the mid-1980s onward indicated not only the improvement 
of Sino-Soviet relations, but also China’s recognition of the USSR as a true socialist 
country.261  
As demonstrated above, from the mid-1980s Chinese scholars no longer viewed 
hegemonism as the inherent nature of the Soviet system; rather, hegemonism was 
perceived as only a temporary policy of the Kremlin. As long as Moscow reversed such 
policies, China would drop the denigrated term accordingly. Indeed, the Chinese label of 
hegemonism in describing the Soviet Union was mostly related to China’s security 
concern of the three obstacles (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its large troop 
deployment along the border with China, and Moscow’s support of the Vietnamese 
military intervention in Cambodia) in preventing the Sino-Soviet rapprochement in the 
1980s. Once those obstacles were removed and Sino-Soviet normalization finally came in 
1989, the term “Soviet hegemonism” gradually faded from Chinese writings.  
Moreover, China under Deng Xiaoping adopted a pragmatic approach in domestic 
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and foreign policies: it would no longer engage in Maoist radicalism. During the 1989 
Sino-Soviet summit, Deng frankly told Gorbachev that he personally hated the senseless 
polemic exchanges between both sides under Mao.262 Deng might not want to see Soviet 
hegemonism rippling across the world, but what he needed most was a peaceful 
international environment conducive to China’s modernization. Once the bilateral 
relations improved and the demise of the Soviet Union became reality, language 
surrounding Soviet hegemonism thus ground to a halt and the coinage was no longer valid 
in Chinese vocabulary. 
In the 1990s, when the USSR had ceased to exist, the PRC no longer pegged the 
Soviets as hegemonists. Instead, owing to the Western sanction after the Tiananmen 
Incident, “hegemonism” or “power politics” (qiangquan zhengzhi) became synonymous 
with the West (particularly the US).263 Chinese officials used these terms to describe 
those countries that invoked the banners of human right and democracy to force their 
values and political systems on the Third World – the so-called “peaceful evolution.” 264 
 
Treatment of Soviet relations with Yugoslavia and the Third World 
With regard to Soviet foreign relations with other countries in the 1980s, the analysis 
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of Chinese scholars corresponded closely with the tone of post-Mao China’s state policies. 
They attempted to respond to and legitimize China’s official agendas through their 
research. There is one particularly significant example of the Chinese treatment of the 
Soviet-Yugoslavian relations.  
Although Mao Zedong once branded Yugoslavia as “revisionist,” 265 a derogatory 
term used to stigmatize any socialist countries opting for capitalist reforms, in the 1980s 
Yugoslavia became the centre of attention in the PRC. Under Deng Xiaoping, China’s 
foreign policy resembled Yugoslavia’s stance of being non-aligned and non-
confrontational.266 Chinese leaders greatly admired Belgrade’s spirit in defiance of what 
was seen as Moscow’s overlordship, evidenced by Party Secretary General Hu Yaobang’s 
1983 high appraisal of “Josip Tito’s principles of independence and equality among all 
communist parties, and of opposing imperialism, colonialism, and hegemonism.” 267  
Several articles by Chinese scholars in the 1980s shared the official claims to 
promote the case of Yugoslavia in their research. Jiang Qi, a professor of international 
relations at East China Normal University, regarded Moscow’s expelling Belgrade from 
the socialist camp in 1948 as owing to the latter’s uncompromising attitude. He remarked, 
“It was the origin of anti-hegemony struggle in Eastern Europe.” 268 Cai Kang, another 
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scholar at East China Normal University, wrote, “The non-aligned policy has evolved 
from a strategy of Yugoslavia to an international movement,” and “it has broken through 
the shadow of Soviet-type foreign policy model first time in socialist history.” 269  
Apart from its non-aligned foreign policy, Yugoslavia’s economic model (which had 
shaken the dominant position of Soviet-style socialism) also became an important reason 
to gather the Chinese support of Belgrade’s struggle against the Soviet rivalry. When 
ailing President Josip Tito’s health condition deteriorated, the event became a paramount 
concern of Renmin ribao in the first half of 1980. At the time, the official organ of the 
CCP carried day-to-day reports from Belgrade, wishing for Tito’s recovery and glorifying 
his contributions. After Tito’s death, during the memorial ceremony held in the 
Yugoslavian Embassy in Beijing, the first CASS President and CCP ideologue Hu 
Qiaomu paid the following tribute to Tito and Yugoslavian inspiration: 
 
Comrade Tito’s greatest contribution to the contemporary communist movement was that 
he and his close comrades-in-arms were the first ones to recognize that socialism should 
not be confined to one model. He initiated a new way of building socialism suited to the 
concrete conditions of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, under the leadership of President Tito, had 
boldly begun exploring the ways of socialist construction in the early 1950s. It did not 
follow the over-centralized economic pattern introduced by the Soviet Union. Led by Tito, 
the Yugoslav people have broken away from the conventional Soviet methods which were 
formerly considered inviolable, and have blazed a new trail to develop a socialist economy. 
The Yugoslavian example provided valuable experience for other countries to choose their 
own road of socialist construction according to their specific conditions.270 
 
In the mid-1980s, Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang expressed his gratefulness to the 
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Yugoslavian hosts, for “their experience of building socialism has greatly encouraged the 
Chinese people to draft our own reform programs.” 271 As one scholar commented:   
 
In the contemporary international socialist development, Yugoslavia’s socialist path is the 
most remarkable. Not only because it has turned itself from one of the most backward 
European nations to a moderately developed country, but also because it has contributed 
immeasurable theories of practicing scientific socialism to the world. The Yugoslavian 
experience of socialism has never been an easy journey, its lessons are worthy of study and 
attention.272 
 
In the wake of the Maoist decades, China found that the Soviet model disguised by 
Maoism had turned China poor and backward. China under Deng was eager to find a new 
way to make China a prosperous and strong socialist country. Yugoslavia’s reform 
experience initiated by Tito, which included the mixing of central planning and market 
mechanism, and took a distinctive approach to socialism by disregarding the orthodox 
Soviet methods, struck a chord with the Chinese. Such a distinctive model is exactly the 
direction of post-Mao China’s reforms. Many academic articles throughout the 1980s 
expressed their approval of Yugoslavian socialism in preference to the dogmatic Soviet 
orthodoxy, and showed a strong desire to learn from Belgrade.273  
Even in the wake of Yugoslavia’s falling apart in the 1990s, Chinese Sovietologists 
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still attributed the Soviet-Yugoslavian rift after World War Two to the Kremlin, and put 
the blame squarely on Moscow’s chauvinism and intolerance of Belgrade using its own 
method to construct socialism.274 In 1996, four years after China had joined the Non-
Aligned Movement as an observer,275 Li Xing and Zhou Xuemei (both were scholars at 
Beijing University) argued that the 1948 Soviet-Yugoslavian confrontations had inspired 
many subsequent dissent movements in the socialist camp, such as the 1968 Prague 
Spring and the 1980 Polish Solidarity uprising. They remarked that “the Yugoslavian 
model had shaken the dominant position of Soviet socialism and inaugurated the 
diversification of socialist models in the world.” 276 
As such, Chinese scholars’ open advocacy of Yugoslavia’s position in its conflicts 
with Moscow was due to not only China’s similar stance in non-aligned policy and anti-
Soviet hegemony, but also to China’s receptivity to Yugoslavia’s unique reform 
experience. After the PRC became economically successful in the 1980s, Chinese 
scholars would sometimes speak of Yugoslavia as a sort of maverick, as a countervailing 
weight to the Soviet brand of socialism. This in turn would validate the exception of the 
Chinese way of practicing socialism. The treatment of Yugoslavia, in particular, reflects 
the increasing confidence of Chinese scholars. They were arguing that Moscow should 
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accept a less centralized and more diverse socialist world.277 Chinese scholars’ clear-cut 
stand on supporting the post-Mao CCP policy of integrating Marxism with China’s 
concrete circumstances, and heralding the vision of the rise of Chinese-style socialism, 
could be reflected in their analysis of Soviet-Yugoslavian troubled relations.  
Having said this, it should be noted that China was extolling Yugoslavia mainly 
because it was disobedient to Moscow and committed to building a version of socialism 
that was independent of the Soviet model. It does not mean that Chinese scholars would 
be supporting any deviation from orthodox socialism. As we will see in the next chapter, 
Chinese writings were critical of what they saw as Gorbachev’s betrayal of socialism and 
submission to the West since the late 1980s. In reality, China’s endorsement of the 
Yugoslavian example is a sign of China’s determination to reform socialism – but not to 
renounce it.  
In the 1980s China did not fail to notice the rise of the Third World, which would 
play a crucial role in international relations and become a partner with China to contain 
the superpowers – at least in the CCP’s strategic worldview. During his 1982 talk with 
Javier Perez de Cuellar, secretary-general of the United Nation, Deng Xiaoping remarked 
that the international influence of the Third World “has increased considerably,” and 
“cannot be overlooked.” He stated that the foundation of China’s foreign policy was 
“opposing hegemonism and safeguarding world peace,” which was also “the position and 
immediate interests of the Third World.” Therefore, it would be essential for China and 
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the region to “strengthen unity and cooperation.” 278  Concomitant with this strategic 
perspective, Chinese scholars attempted to use post-Mao China’s Third World policy as 
their theoretical framework for analysis. Quoting from IREECAS scholar Zhang Jinglin: 
 
The foundation of our foreign policy is unifying the Third World, allying with the peoples 
who cherish peace and justice and oppose hegemonism. Our scholars should comprehend 
and resolutely carry out those policies as a whole and undertake the battle against 
superpowers’ hegemony in a more effective way.279  
 
As will be discussed, Chinese scholars in the 1980s seemed to view Soviet relations 
with the Third World through the prism of Sino-Soviet friction. Their arguments on the 
subject look more like explaining and demonstrating China’s different treatment of the 
Third World, rather than genuine research of the Soviet policy in the region. In their 
articles, Chinese scholars strenuously promoted and defended the case of the Third World. 
Their arguments indirectly symbolized China’s stance in challenging the Soviet authority, 
appealed for the redress of past historical wrongdoings on China done by Tsarist Russia 
and the Soviet Union, and promoted the moral superiority of Chinese socialism over that 
of the USSR.  
During Mao’s later period, China did not receive much goodwill from the Third 
World, mainly owing to Mao’s excessive obsession with bringing Chinese-based 
socialism to the poor nations. Such a strategy of exporting revolutions had caused 
resentment in numerous countries, particularly those in Southeast Asia, where it led to a 
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widespread anti-China sentiment.280 With the onset of the Cultural Revolution, the foreign 
policy of China had become heavily ideology-driven. Before Mao’s death in 1976, the 
PRC was crippled not only by economic stagnation but also international isolation. In the 
wake of Maoist decades, the new leader Deng Xiaoping expected PRC foreign policy to 
detach from the radical determinant of Maoism and return to the realities of modern 
international politics.281 The post-Mao leadership envisioned that China would become a 
progressive anti-colonial Asian power symbolized by its break with the Kremlin and the 
Maoist burden, and a true friend of the underdeveloped world.282  
In tune with the official view, some Chinese scholars portrayed Moscow as having 
taken advantage of numerous turbulences to interfere in the Third World, subjecting 
others to its beck and call.283 These articles tend to exaggerate the gravity of Soviet 
hostility and Moscow’s ability to dominate the world, although such radical views had 
trailed off after Gorbachev’s accession. Most of the writings presented above seem to 
conclude that the Soviet Union had achieved complete failure in its relations with the 
underdeveloped countries, become the only troublemaker and common enemy of the 
world, and ended up in having no friend in the global society.  
Meanwhile, Chinese official organs attempted to foster a new image of China. They 
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posited that the country was far from being isolated in the international community after 
the death of Mao; rather, it had joined the whole world to contain the advance of the 
superpowers. 284  In 1981, Foreign Minister Huang Hua suggested to his Canadian 
colleague Mark MacGuigan, that China and the West should establish close ties on the 
basis of containing Soviet aggressive behaviour in the Third World. 285  On another 
occasion, he remarked that by carrying the banner of anti-hegemony, China would be able 
to increase its influence in the Third World, which would be conducive to its global status 
and open door policy.286  
In 1982, scholar Zhang Jinglin claimed that, along with a broad base of the Third 
World countries, “An international anti-Soviet camp consisting of China and the West has 
developed rapidly.” 287 Two years later, both Li Jingjie (an IREECAS researcher) and 
Zhou Jirong (a professor of political science at Beijing University) agreed that after 
becoming stabilized and strong, China would play a larger role in international affairs, 
namely by halting the war and safeguarding peace.288 These authors seemingly made use 
of their subject study to argue that China after Mao was far from being separated from the 
world. Instead, China under Deng was re-engaging the world and earning respect from 
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international society by joining the global campaign against the Soviet advance. As a 
result of such sharp Chinese denunciations of Moscow’s expansionism, the West became 
eager for Chinese cooperation and sought to aid Chinese reforms, in order to ally with 
China in resisting the USSR.289  
There are three other reasons for why Chinese scholars had a strong bias toward the 
Third World and sympathized with those countries involved when it came to Soviet-Third 
World relations. The first one may be historical. In the eyes of the CCP, both China and 
other underdeveloped countries shared the common experience of falling prey to 
imperialist encroachment in the past,290 and China, in particular, had been invaded by 
Tsars since the early modern period and treated unfairly by the Soviet regime after 
1949.291 This historical background of complicated Sino-Soviet Russian relations was 
deeply rooted in the collective Chinese mind, and inevitably affected the writings of 
Chinese scholars.292 Several articles in the 1980s evidenced a strong grudge against the 
unequal relations between Moscow and the Third World. They condemned the forced 
Soviet model of socialism as a kind of neo-colonization, which did not benefit the Third 
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World, but instead made them backward and isolated.293  
Moreover, in the early 1980s some Chinese writings voiced their criticisms of the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as being contradictory to Lenin’s principle of 
internationalism.294 On the other hand, they portrayed China as having wholeheartedly 
supported the Afghan resistance and the emancipation of other Third World nations, while 
never meddling in their affairs. According to those writings, China was the true disciple 
of Lenin’s teachings, while Moscow’s behaviour was incompatible with Leninist 
internationalism.295 This picture of the PRC as enlightened and committed to fulfilling its 
internationalist responsibility to the Third World is not a contemporary invention. Mao 
Zedong once put forth that CCP members should “build China into a great and powerful 
socialist country, and help the broad masses of the oppressed and exploited throughout the 
world in fulfilment of our great internationalist duty.” 296 In the 1980s, Chinese Premier 
Zhao Ziyang said that the aid work to the Third World was China’s “compelling 
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internationalist obligation.” 297  As Liu Fengming (a professor of international law at 
Wuhan University) summarized in 1983:  
 
Our foreign policy is proletarian internationalism as well as the socialist foreign policy with 
Chinese characteristics. The starting point of our independent foreign policy is in the 
fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the peoples around the world. It is the 
combination of patriotism and internationalism. It is for safeguarding world peace. As a 
member of the Third World, China will unswervingly safeguard the unity and right of the 
region, and regard financially supporting those countries as our major international 
responsibility.298   
 
Thus, we can see that post-Mao China was aspiring to gain the upper hand over the 
Soviet Union in the name of the struggle against hegemonism, and more importantly, in 
the fight for moral leadership over the Third World. By using Lenin’s internationalism to 
accuse Moscow of being chauvinistic, self-serving, and exploitative in its relations with 
the underdeveloped countries, Chinese scholars instead would project a fair, humble, and 
benevolent image of Beijing, enabling it to assume the moral high ground vis-à-vis 
Moscow.  
Last, from the early 1980s onward the post-Mao reforms led to substantial expansion 
of Chinese national power and a notable growth in its international prestige and influence, 
while the Soviet Union was in the grip of economic difficulties. Chinese scholars shared a 
growing pride in what China had accomplished so far vis-à-vis what they saw as the 
demoralized USSR. Yang Zhangming, a professor at Tongji University in Shanghai, said 
that many Third World states had been influenced by China and Yugoslavia to develop 
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socialism according to their own conditions, while distancing themselves from “some 
socialist states that would offer aid, but with aid, came interference.” 299 Du Xiaoqiang, a 
scholar at Qinghua University, suggested that after China’s success in reforms, its 
distinctive style of socialism might “weaken the impact of the Soviet model on the Third 
World.” 300  
Deng Xiaoping remarked in April 1987 that when China fully developed it should 
not only “have blazed a new path for the peoples of the Third World,” but also “have 
demonstrated to mankind that socialism is the only path and that it is superior to 
capitalism.” 301 The Chinese regime at this stage lost no time in seizing the opportunity to 
portray China as the beacon of the Third World, by professing its respect to other 
countries’ sovereignties and institutions, publicizing its divergence with the Kremlin, and 
promoting the friendship and brotherhood between China and the developing nations. 
This was done in the hope that Chinese-style socialism would have greater appeal than 
the Soviet model, and take root in not only the poor countries but the wider global society 
as well.  
 
Changing views on Gorbachev’s new thinking 
Since the middle of the 1980s, Sino-Soviet relations gradually improved. The sign of 
rapprochement had appeared even before the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev. In December 
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1984, during the visit of the first Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Ivan 
Arkhipov, for the first time in 25 years Chinese media publicly conveyed warmth in its 
official relations with the Soviet Union. Chinese officials signed agreements calling for a 
substantial increase in trade and scientific exchanges, spoke optimistically about the 
future of bilateral relations, and expressed gratitude for the assistance given by Moscow 
in the 1950s.302 Once Gorbachev succeeded the deceased leader Konstantin Chernenko, 
the new Soviet boss stated that the USSR would like to restore the friendly relations with 
the PRC based on the principle of peaceful co-existence.303 CCP Secretary General Hu 
Yaobang wasted no time in reciprocating by replying that China also wished to “restore 
the neighbourly relations with Moscow.” 304  
Under the background of Sino-Soviet rapprochement, in a meeting for celebrating the 
20-year founding anniversary of IREECAS in May 1985, Huan Xiang, CASS vice-
president, asked the IREECAS scholars to increase research on Soviet foreign policy 
since Gorbachev took power, and Sino-Soviet relations within the new Soviet foreign 
agenda.305 After that, the foreign policy of Gorbachev became a popular subject of study 
for Chinese scholars.  
Gilbert Rozman on several occasions indicates that Chinese scholars began making 
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positive comments about Gorbachev immediately after he assumed power in 1985,306 but 
that soon after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 they had become completely hostile to the 
last Soviet leader.307 This argument may contain a kernel of truth in the case of Chinese 
perceptions of Gorbachev’s political reform, which will be examined in Part Two of the 
thesis. On the other hand, from the ascension of Gorbachev in 1985 to the aftermath of 
the Soviet demise, Chinese analyses of Gorbachev’s foreign strategy were somewhat 
different.  
As we will see, after Gorbachev’s ascension to power in March 1985, Chinese 
scholars generally expressed reservations about his new foreign direction. However, after 
1987 they became quite positive to the foreign agenda of the new Soviet leader. The 
researcher’s reading shows that in and after 1989, Chinese scholarly writings still spoke 
highly of the Soviet leader. Only around 1990/1991 did Chinese scholars slowly turn 
hostile to Gorbachev and his foreign policy characterized as the “New Thinking.” 308 
Views changed not only in response to the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet relations and 
China’s domestic political climate, but also in response to the political developments in 
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From Gorbachev’s assuming power in early 1985 to 1987, many Chinese 
commentators in MSUEE remained suspicious of the Soviet leader and felt uncertain 
about his future manoeuvers and agendas. Some authors depicted Gorbachev as having a 
practical consideration in designing his new schemes, such as creating a good 
international environment to facilitate his domestic reform, attracting potential foreign 
investment to the Soviet economy, and counterbalancing US advances while increasing 
Soviet influence in the world. As Li Jingjie commented: 
 
Soviet foreign policy after Gorbachev took power will still target on increasing the 
country’s economic and military strengths, and maintaining its superpower status. For a 
long time to come, the new Soviet leader conceivably will pay more attention to economic 
construction and create a peaceful international environment for domestic reform. But as a 
whole, the image of the USSR will remain the same in the global society. Its foreign policy 
is not going to have much difference.309  
 
According to the IREECAS researcher Huang Tianying, Soviet Third World policy 
after Gorbachev took power was little different from that of his predecessors. Moscow’s 
aim was still “focusing on the grand vision of competing with Washington.” 310 He argued 
that although Gorbachev had announced that the Soviet Union would no longer force 
other countries to practice socialism (the so-called “Directing Socialism” or yishehui 
zhuyiwei fangxiang), the underlying cause of this compromise was not a change in 
attitudes, but because “Moscow’s own financial problems have made it realize that 
pouring money into the Third World for constructing socialist system there is not 
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feasible.” 311 The author summarized the motives of Gorbachev’s revision on foreign 
policy in the following words: 
 
The readjustments are in form not in substance. The changes are designed for giving 
Moscow time and space to consolidate its strength for future competition with Washington. 
Moscow will nonetheless continue to employ such policy in certain countries, which are 
deemed to be strategically crucial to the Soviet Union and its competition with the West.312 
 
In terms of Gorbachev’s new orientation in the socialist camp, like Huang Tianying’s 
analysis, Zhu Ruizhen and Shan Lingkui (both were IREECAS researchers) did not 
regard the readjustments put forward by Gorbachev as genuine efforts to improve the 
conditions of the world. They argued that Gorbachev’s proposal at the CPSU 27th 
Congress, which involved recognition of the equality and diversity among the socialist 
states, was no more than “a strategy of strengthening the unity of the Soviet bloc and 
roping China in Moscow’s sphere, for contending with the West.” According to the 
authors, considerations of domestic economic reform reigned supreme in Gorbachev’s 
mind, as “both the recent success of economic reforms in Eastern Europe and China have 
challenged the authority of the USSR in the socialist world.” 313  
At the same time, the writings in MSUEE found echoes in scholarly interpretations 
within other Chinese academic journals. Dong Bainan, a researcher at the Shanghai 
Institute of International Affairs, remarked that Gorbachev’s new détente with the 
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capitalist world was “wooing Western Europe and Japan, in order to divide the West led 
by the US.” 314 Both Jia Bei and Gu Guanfu (both were researchers at the China Institute 
of International Studies in Beijing) argued that there were certain flaws in Gorbachev’s 
New Thinking. First, the concept was still oriented toward the Soviet-American global 
contest and the mind-set of a bipolar world.315 Second, while on the surface the New 
Thinking seemed to reverse the past Brezhnev’s hegemonism, Gorbachev still avoided 
talking about some crucial issues related to Sino-Soviet relations, such as troop 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Soviet-supported Vietnamese invasion of 
Cambodia.316 To quote from Gu Guanfu’s final conclusion: 
 
Gorbachev’s foreign policy readjustments have no much difference with before and no 
feasibility at all. They are mere propaganda gambits. Gorbachev’s plan is still largely in 
word but not in deed. We receive the vibration of the sound, not the application of the 
principle.317 
 
The main reason for China’s lukewarm reactions to the New Thinking during the 
early days of the Gorbachev administration was the tense Sino-Soviet relations at that 
time, notably the unresolved question of the three obstacles plaguing the two countries. In 
1985, the CCP regime expressed its concern regarding Gorbachev’s reluctance to resolve 
these unsettled problems after he assumed power.318 In 1986, Hu Yaobang complained to 
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journalists that, “Sino-Soviet relations have not made any headway since Gorbachev 
assumed power.” 319 Five months later, Chinese Foreign Ministry made a public statement 
describing the Soviet partial troop pull-out from Afghanistan as being “void of practical 
significance.” It pointed out that “the Soviet action is designed to moderate the pressure 
from the international community only.” 320  At the same time, some Chinese Soviet-
watchers also expressed their resentment against what they saw as Moscow’s insincere 
approach toward removing the three obstacles. They pointed out that this behaviour ran 
counter to the principle of New Thinking.321  
After the end of 1987, owing to the gradual improvement of Sino-Soviet relations, 
Chinese Sovietology writings tended to display a more positive attitude to Gorbachev’s 
foreign policy. Since then, Chinese scholars started to view Gorbachev’s foreign agenda 
as a genuine gesture accorded with the interests of both the Soviets and the peoples of the 
world. The MSUEE editorial board published an article in the first issue of 1988, asking 
that Chinese academics should pay more attention to the new views of foreign policy 
thinking in the Soviet bloc:  
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Recently, some Soviet and East European leaders and scholars have put forward many new 
arguments on globalization, world economic integration, technological revolution, war and 
peace, etc. Gorbachev’s New Thinking is getting increasing attention from the international 
society. For deepening our understanding of the contemporary world, we should do more 
research on those theories and arguments on international affairs in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe.322 
 
In an article published at the end of 1987, Huang Tianying explicated that Gorbachev 
had started to understand that “cooperation but not competition” was the key for good 
relations between socialism and capitalism.323 Regarding the policy on China, he said that 
the Kremlin would no longer regard any countries not belonging to the Soviet bloc as 
being necessarily non-socialist in nature. The new Soviet leadership now “genuinely 
recognizes that the PRC is a true socialist country.” 324 In 1988, a small seminar took 
place in IREECAS that was attended by several scholars, in order to discuss the New 
Thinking and exchange views on Soviet foreign relations after Gorbachev. During the 
meeting, Liu Ping, a professor at the Central Party School, argued that Gorbachev’s New 
Thinking was “by no means the duplication of Khrushchev’s peaceful co-existence in the 
1960s.” IREECAS researcher Li Jingjie extravagantly praised the New Thinking as “the 
greatest theoretical breakthrough since Lenin.” 325  
In his 1988 article, Yan Zhu, a CASS scholar in Russian Literature, remarked that the 
New Thinking was the antidote to Soviet hegemonism. He said, unlike the previous 
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Kremlin leaders, “Gorbachev always stays true to his principle.” 326 According to Wang 
Yushu, a professor at the Jilin Provincial Party School, Gorbachev had renounced the 
flawed Brezhnev Doctrine, which included such components as “common law” and 
“proletarian internationalism,” and acknowledged Stalin’s crimes and his improper 
methods for dealing with other socialist allies. In his opinion, “the Soviet leader starts to 
agree that Soviet socialism should not be the only model for emulation,” and “the 
international communist movement no longer has a ‘centre’ now, and there would be no 
leading communist party to shepherd socialism.” 327 
Similar to the MSUEE articles, works in other Chinese academic journals in the late 
1980s were in open espousal of Gorbachev’s New Thinking. Some writers pointed out 
that Gorbachev’s New Thinking was integral to Lenin’s principle of peaceful co-
existence,328 while others emphasized that Gorbachev’s conception had even corrected 
many deficiencies of the theories raised by Lenin, such as the inevitable decay of 
capitalism. 329  Qiu Gengtian, a professor at the Central Party School, drew parallels 
between Deng Xiaoping’s notion of “one country, two systems,” which had been used for 
resolving China’s territorial problems in Hong Kong and Macao, and Gorbachev’s New 
Thinking. The author attested that both concepts were “based on the principle of peaceful 
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co-existence between socialism and capitalism.” They “have no longer viewed the world 
in black and white, and have broken the traditional way of thinking and charted the way 
in a new epoch.” 330  
In his 1989 article, Dong Bainan delineated the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations in 
the second half of the 1980s. According to him, there were two stages of development 
since Gorbachev’s rise: the first was from March 1985 to 1986, when the Kremlin 
stubbornly refused to acknowledge the three obstacles, and Sino-Soviet relations were 
still in a stalemate. From 1987 and 1988, when Moscow began to discuss the issue of 
border demarcation with Beijing and withdraw troops from Afghanistan, to early 1989, 
there appeared a strong potential for settling the deadlock between the two countries.331 
As we have seen in those articles presented above, evolving attitudes to Gorbachev and 
the New Thinking roughly correspond with the changing climate of Sino-Soviet relations 
described by Dong Bainan. 
More to the point, Chinese growing interest in and positive assessment of 
Gorbachev’s New Thinking may have also been encouraged by the new spirit of post-
Mao China, which calls for forsaking the past communist doctrines and promoting the 
renewed comprehension of Marxism. In late 1986, MSUEE carried an article that 
included a letter of Wu Xiuquan, the PRC’s first deputy foreign minister in charge of 
Soviet and East European affairs. Wu demanded that the current Chinese research on the 
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USSR and Eastern Europe uphold “the scientific attitude of seeking truth from facts,” 332 
and observe the lessons from the past by avoiding “the flaws of one-sidedness and over-
simplification,” as well as “the black-and-white approach.” 333  
In the subsequent landmark event of the 13th CCP Congress in October 1987, which 
called for moving the reforms forward at a faster pace, the new Party Secretary General 
Zhao Ziyang indicated in his keynote speech, that people should “discard some theses 
which are utopian and formulated by our predecessors within the limits of their historical 
conditions,” and “further develop the theory of scientific socialism on the basis of new 
practice.” Zhao also repeated the long-time CCP policy of “double hundred flowers,” 334 
in order to offer fresh encouragement for exploration of many long-ignored issues in 
socialism. His advocacy of the theory that China is only at the initial stage of socialism 
provided an impetus, recognizing that China borrows from theories and practices of other 
socialist countries which have many things in common.335 This call appealed to China’s 
Soviet-specialists to follow closely the Soviet changes and gave a big boost to far-
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reaching scholarship.336 Since then, not only Chinese intellectuals, but also the official 
Chinese media, began to appreciate Gorbachev and his reforms.337  
Finally, one of the important aspects of Zhao’s 13th Congress report is that the PRC 
intended to undertake the first major political reform since 1949.338 Zhao stated that one 
of the purposes in this was to establish a system of consultation and dialogue, whereby 
the CCP might allow the people to have their own say in national and international 
affairs.339 In the talk, he clearly demonstrated the relationship between the Party reform 
and open policy, and how the latter could contribute to the improvement of the former: 
 
Under the new circumstances of reform and opening to the rest of the world, it has become 
even more important to improve the Party’s work style. Reform and the open policy have 
helped to substantially reduce negative practices that were common in the past, such as 
subjectivism, coercion and commandism, practices that resulted in setting excessively high 
targets, giving arbitrary directions and resorting to struggle and punishment without good 
reason.340  
 
Some pieces of writings in MSUEE in the late 1980s had responded to the ethos of 
Zhao’s speech. By analysing the relationship between Gorbachev’s glasnost at home and 
his foreign policy abroad, the scholars suggested that the internal political reform and 
policies toward the outside world might have mutual impacts on each other. They 
remarked that both endeavours would push socialist regimes, such as the Soviet Union, 
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further in the direction of liberalization.  
IREECAS scholar Xing Shuguang wrote that the deepening of glasnost and 
democratization in the USSR would make the design of its foreign policy “based on the 
interests of the peoples of the world,” rather than those of the Soviet state.341 Another 
IREECAS scholar Xu Zhixin predicted that once the Soviet Union was transformed into a 
democratic state, its long-time “great power chauvinism,” “cult of personality,” and 
“despotic rule” would finally expire. 342  While both authors above considered that 
Gorbachev’s political reform would affect Soviet foreign policy, Li Jingjie presented the 
opposite view – the New Thinking would also make a difference on Soviet domestic 
environment. He said that under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union no longer needed to create 
“external enemies” in order to maintain the terror necessary for effective rule, so there 
would be fewer class enemies and political prisoners at home. Moreover, Moscow 
decided to cut its military spending, and to allow the West to investigate its nuclear 
weapon facility. The Kremlin would also permit its citizens to engage in more business 
activities and academic exchanges with the world. Both measures would “make the USSR 
become more open” and “clear the way for further reforms.” 343 
As will be discussed, the celebration of Gorbachev in China culminated before the 
Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989 and lasted after the troublesome moment of the 
Tiananmen Incident until early 1990 – when the Chinese once again changed their 
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perceptions of Gorbachev after he initiated the process of terminating the power 
monopoly of the CPSU. The existing secondary literature indicates that soon after the 
Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Chinese scholars had become completely hostile to 
Gorbachev.344 However, the researcher’s findings show that during and after the 1989 
Tiananmen uprising, no major criticisms of Gorbachev appeared in Chinese academic 
writings. Instead, Chinese scholars still seemed to admire, and produce positive 
evaluations of, the New Thinking during this anti-liberal period in contemporary China.    
Upon the news of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989, there began a 
final clean-up of the three obstacles in blocking Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and an 
upsurge of Chinese commendations for the New Thinking appeared. Both Yang 
Yunzhong (a scholar at East China Normal University) and Gu Guanfu attributed the 
replacement of confrontation by mutual understanding and dialogue between Moscow 
and Washington to the New Thinking, and stated that this was the first time in history that 
there was a true détente between the superpowers – and this was owing to Gorbachev’s 
efforts.345  
In another article, E Huancheng, an associate professor at the Ningbo Party School in 
Zhejiang Province, praised Gorbachev for being “the most educated and knowledgeable 
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Soviet leader since Lenin,” saying that he possessed “the best personal quality compared 
with other leaders from Stalin to Brezhnev.” He said that Gorbachev’s outstanding 
character would “ensure the final success of the New Thinking.” 346 IREECAS scholar 
Zhao Guilin reiterated that Gorbachev had fundamentally transformed the Soviet image in 
the world, and refuted the arguments that “Gorbachev has been kowtowing to the West, 
exploited by the peaceful evolution, therefore he compromised too much to the US and 
rendered the loss of Soviet great power status.” 347 In his conclusion, the commentator 
even foresaw that “Gorbachev’s domestic and foreign success will one day completely 
alter the terrain of world politics.” 348  
There are several reasons why Gorbachev was decidedly not a subject of ridicule in 
the eyes of Chinese scholars in the wake of the Tiananmen demonstrations. First, between 
1989 and 1990, the Chinese official view still considered that the Soviet Union was “with 
us” and there was no direct attack on Gorbachev. After comparing the foreign policies 
between China and the USSR in his late 1989 article, Jia Qingguo, dean of the Institute of 
International Relations at Beijing University, summarized many commonalities between 
Gorbachev’s New Thinking and Deng Xiaoping’s open door principle, such as politically 
peaceful co-existence, mutual economic benefits, and independent foreign policy making. 
He concluded that “both leaders have spoken almost in the same vein.” 349  
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In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, China did not consider that Gorbachev and 
his liberalization policies posed an immediate threat to its socialist system. In fact, the 
West was perceived as a much greater danger to the survival of the regime than the 
USSR.350 In late 1989, Deng Xiaoping complained that “some Westerners are trying to 
overthrow the socialist system in China.” 351 In the early 1990s, the CCP demanded that 
scholars working in the social sciences “build up the Great Wall of Steel (Gangtie 
changcheng) in the realm of ideology against the attack of capitalist peaceful evolution 
engineered by the international hostile forces.” 352   
Second, the Sino-Soviet relations had been in tension since the 1960s. Deng 
Xiaoping had been waiting eagerly for the Soviet response to remove the three obstacles 
for the eventual normalization of bilateral relations.353  When the Sino-Soviet summit 
meeting finally took place in May 1989, both sides placed great emphasis on the principle 
of mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and normalized the relations 
between the two countries. Having learned the lessons of history, they were committed to 
not letting ideological disagreements disrupt cordial bilateral relations. 354  All this is 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
47-48.   
350 The point is illustrated by the following sources: Xu Dashen, “Xinxingshi xiade meiguo heping yanbian 
zhanlue” [American Strategy of Peaceful Evolution under the New Circumstances], Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi, 
no. 11 (1989): 5-6. “‘Heping yanbian’ shishehui zhuyide zhuyao weixian,” [‘Peaceful Evolution’ is the 
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Correspondent Mike Wallace,” September 2, 1986, in Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 170-71. 
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19, 1989.  
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reflected in the main import of Deng’s summit conversation with Gorbachev – putting the 
past behind them, opening up a new era, doing more practical things, and indulging in 
less empty talk.355  
Moreover, it was Gorbachev who mended the Sino-Soviet fences after a protracted 
period of mutual distrust, repairing the relationship almost entirely on Chinese terms. 
Gorbachev may not have personally agreed with China’s strategy of violence in handling 
the Tiananmen Incident,356 but even when he was pushed by Western reporters during his 
visit to Beijing in 1989, the Soviet leader refused to comment on the student 
movements, 357  and he did not encourage the Soviet media to criticize the Chinese 
government after he returned to Moscow.358 It may, therefore, have seemed ungrateful for 
the Chinese state to start criticizing someone who had made a significant contribution to 
the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, and who had adopted a neutral position when China was 
experiencing domestic problems.   
Third, the Chinese leadership had by then taken stock of the Sino-Soviet frictions 
under Mao Zedong, and did not want to be at odds with a large and powerful country that 
had the longest land border with the PRC. Harmony and rapport between the two 
countries would be the primary considerations, despite the fact that some officials and 
scholars might feel suspicious of Gorbachev’s reform programs.  
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Because international sanctions were already being imposed on China and the West 
was exerting pressure on the PRC to change course after Tiananmen, the CCP also saw 
the Soviet state as a much-needed partner with which China could confront Western 
power politics.359 After the Tiananmen Incident, many Chinese Party leaders were keen to 
maintain relations with Moscow, expressing their hopes that the USSR would still uphold 
the cause of socialism.360 During his state visit to Moscow in April 1990, Chinese Premier 
Li Peng spoke to Soviet journalists that “socialism could have different models,” and in 
his understanding, “Gorbachev’s reforms have not deviated from the tradition set by the 
October Revolution.” 361 In May of the year, Qiao Shi, a member of the CCP Politburo 
Standing Committee, said to a group of CPSU delegates in Beijing that “China always 
pays particular attention to the Soviet reforms,” and he hoped that “the USSR can 
overcome difficulties and march toward socialism.” 362 In addition, by the 1990s the US 
had achieved “superhegemonist” status, forcing other countries to follow the Western 
model of development, and China suspected the Americans of having the intention of 
relegating China and various other nations to subordinate roles on the world stage. The 
unexpectedly quick American victory in early 1991 in the Gulf War further exacerbated 
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Beijing’s sense of vulnerability.363   
Fourth, according to Yan Sun, under the pressure of mounting domestic tensions 
leading up to Tiananmen and facing the prospect that international communism was in 
deep crisis everywhere in the world, the CCP leadership saw the compelling need to 
expedite the process of normalizing China’s relations with the Soviet Union. From their 
perspective, a new and cooperative relationship with the world’s largest socialist country 
would help the CCP to showcase the fact that Beijing and Moscow were joining force in 
reforming socialism, while at the same time allowing the Party to present the 
rapprochement as a great diplomatic achievement for the Chinese people. Both effects, as 
the CCP leadership hoped, would enhance the regime’s position in dealing with the 
deepened legitimacy crisis that it was facing. However, after the Tiananmen Incident, the 
Chinese communist state immediately faced its gravest crisis in its 40-year history. The 
image that Beijing had built during the years of reform and open door was shattered 
almost overnight. Moreover, the tragedy became a defining moment in which 
international communism lost any moral strength that it once might have possessed.364 
Therefore, it was wise for Beijing to avoid criticizing Gorbachev at this critical juncture. 
It would certainly have eroded further the legitimacy of the CCP regime and the cause of 
international communism, and would have brought the roof crashing down on the whole 
show should the Chinese leadership have chosen to oppose Gorbachev publicly.   
Last but not least, many Chinese official organizations were facing ideological 
                                                             
363 For details, see Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams (London: Atlantic Books, 
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remoulding after the Tiananmen Incident. The CCP mouthpiece journal Hongqi (Red Flag, 
renamed as Qiushi or Seeking Truth in 1988), which used to be owned by the Central 
Party School, was placed under the immediate control of the Party Central Committee 
after the quelling of the Tiananmen demonstrations.365 On the other hand, compared to 
other academic institutions across China, the Party had treated CASS relatively 
leniently.366 The large-scale shake-up of CASS did not take place until February 1990, 
and the process officially wound up in August of the same year. During this period, the 
CCP dispatched crop of personnel to keep a tight rein on CASS, in order to reinforce the 
Party rule in administration, shower scholars with thought education, and penalize the 
dissenting academics.367 As we will see in the next chapter, it was roughly in and after 
this stretch of time (February to August 1990), that many Chinese writings in MSUEE 
(the journal was under the direct jurisdiction of CASS) began to turn hostile to Gorbachev.  
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has studied the analyses of Chinese Soviet-watchers on Moscow’s 
foreign policy against the larger context of PRC’s political setting in the 1980s, and 
investigated how scholars placed China’s official agendas centrally in their research. In 
the 1980s, Chinese discussions on Soviet foreign relations with other countries 
corresponded closely to PRC’s real security concerns on its border, its historical 
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memories of the wrongdoings done by Tsarist Russia and the USSR, and the principle of 
post-Mao China’s Soviet policy. As demonstrated in this chapter, and contrary to the 
claims of the previous secondary literature, the motive of Chinese Sovietology writings 
was largely to legitimize the post-Mao PRC state agendas, rather than to study and 
criticize the actual Soviet policies. 
Its research of Soviet hegemonism, Soviet-Yugoslavian conflicts, and Soviet-Third 
World relations all reflected Beijing’s ambitions of challenging the orthodox Soviet 
model of economic development in the socialist world, competing with the Kremlin for 
leadership in the developing countries, and projecting a fair and benevolent image of 
Chinese socialism vis-à-vis Moscow. Since the mid-1980s, Chinese perceptions of 
Gorbachev’s foreign policy characterized as the New Thinking were also changing in 
sync with Sino-Soviet relations, as well as with the ups-and-downs of the political 
climates in both countries.  
As has been demonstrated, Chinese Soviet-watchers did not present many 
vicissitudes of Soviet international manoeuvres in their writings; instead, through 
research on the formation and evolution of Soviet foreign policy, they attempted to adjust 
their analyses to align with China’s vision of itself and the world. Their writings function 
to highlight lessons learned from Moscow, legitimize the CCP rule and the Chinese way 
of practicing socialism, and to envision the future direction of China in the reform era.  
The next chapter will follow the Chinese discussions on Soviet foreign agendas in the 
1990s. At first, it will focus on Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev across the 1990 divide. 
As will be discussed, the turning point appeared in March 1990, when Gorbachev decided 
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to relinquish the CPSU power monopoly. The CCP leadership received this message with 
great trepidation, as such a move from Moscow would produce unwanted repercussions 
in its one-party communist dictatorship. Since then, Chinese scholars started to dispense 
negative views on the last Soviet leader, criticizing his New Thinking as not only a 
deviation from Lenin but also the root of the dissolution of European socialism.  
The chapter will also investigate the use of Lenin in Chinese Sovietology writings 
after Tiananmen. Scholars argued that Lenin’s post-1917 foreign policy of engaging with 
the West while upholding the communist party dictatorship, was the best way for China 
to weather the Tiananmen crisis. Their interpretation of Lenin’s works tapped into the 
context of the international sanctions which were being imposed on China after the 
Tiananmen Incident, and corresponded closely to Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen 









Analyses of Soviet Foreign Relations  
Chapter 4 
The 1990s’ Changing Views on Gorbachev’s Foreign Policy and 
the Use of Lenin after Tiananmen 
 
Introductory remarks 
Existing secondary literature on Chinese Sovietology indicates that soon after the 
Tiananmen Incident in 1989, Chinese Soviet-watchers had become completely hostile to 
the last Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, and that their criticisms did not stop even after 
the collapse of the USSR in 1991. This chapter, however, demonstrates that strong 
criticism of Gorbachev by China did not appear until early 1990, and not immediately 
after Tiananmen as existing secondary scholarship claims. After Gorbachev was elected 
President of the USSR, and after he initiated the process of terminating the power 
monopoly of the CPSU on March 15, 1990, both the CCP and Chinese scholars became 
aware of the possible negative ramifications of such a move on the PRC, which has 
remained committed to one-party communist rule. After that point, they started to view 
Gorbachev negatively, criticizing his agendas as being against Lenin’s principles. Having 
said this, the wave of Chinese criticism was a short-term phenomenon. It gradually 
subsided after the mid-1990s as a result of the marked improvement in Sino-Russian 
relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and, most importantly, as a result of 
China’s own reflections on the lessons already learned from the Sino-Soviet ideological 
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disputes that had taken place under Mao Zedong.  
The chapter will also examine the use of the first Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin by 
Chinese scholars in the early 1990s. Contrary to the descriptions in the secondary 
literature, it is incorrect to say that Chinese Sovietology after 1991 was only 
concentrating on the dark sides of the Soviet Union, studying its negative lessons for 
China’s use in preserving its own communist regime. After the Tiananmen Incident, 
China became the target of global outrage, due to the brutal military crackdown over 
civilians ordered by its ruling Communist Party during the pro-democratic demonstrations 
in the summer of 1989. After Tiananmen, Chinese scholars manipulated the symbol of 
Lenin and his post-1917 foreign policy, in an attempt to support Deng Xiaoping’s post-
Tiananmen agenda of buying time and keeping a low profile – all while finding a way out 
of international isolation and re-connecting with the world. This chapter demonstrates that 
Chinese scholars had drawn parallels between the early Soviet Union and China after 
Tiananmen, when both regimes were facing international sanctions. Those scholars 
argued that China might learn from those of Lenin’s teachings that encouraged 
engagement in formal relations with the West, while concentrating on economic 
development and maintaining a proletarian dictatorship. 
By upholding the work and teaching of Lenin, Chinese scholars not only attempted to 
support the Chinese communist regime after the Tiananmen crisis, they also made an 
effort to safeguard and legitimize Deng Xiaoping’s position in China after 1989, when the 
Party conservatives launched a series of attacks on his reform and open door policies 
taken since 1978. According to the scholars, Deng’s long-standing policy represented 
Part One—Chapter 4 
143 
 
what they saw as the true Leninist legacy of building socialism by combining economic 
liberalization and the political one-party rule, which was the best way to weather the post-
Tiananmen challenges, as well as the future direction of world socialism after the end of 
the Cold War.   
 
Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev across the 1990 divide 
One thing that should be noted is that Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev from the 
mid-1980s onward were quite evolutionary. Views changed not only in response to the 
ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations and China’s domestic 
political climate, but also in response to the political developments in Moscow. The 
investigator has found that China’s strong criticism of Gorbachev did not appear until 
early 1990, and not immediately after Tiananmen as existing secondary scholarship 
claims.368 After Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR and initiated the process of 
terminating the power monopoly of the CPSU on March 15, 1990, both the CCP and 
Chinese scholars became aware of the possible negative ramifications of such a move on 
the PRC, which has remained committed to one-party communist rule. In a speech made 
immediately afterward on March 18, CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin issued the 
following warning:  
 
Our Party is the ruling party, which means that the Party has an absolute leadership over the 
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state organs. If we renounce this leadership, then the Party will no longer enjoy ruling party 
status. Therefore, all the state organs, including the People’s Congress, the government, the 
Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, should be under the 
leadership of the Party. Any thoughts on or practices involving weakening or undermining 
the authority of the Party are wrong.369 
 
In reaction to the alarming announcement after the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990 
that the monopoly of communist power in the Soviet Union had been officially abolished, 
Jiang made the following more severe criticism in September of that year: 
 
After Soviet-American détente and the turmoil in Eastern Europe, there are indeed many 
communists in the world who have doubts about the future of socialism, and are even 
losing faith in it. But the reality has proved that this kind of thinking is terribly naïve.370  
 
Afterward, some articles in the Chinese official media started to criticize the 
deviation in the socialist world without referring to the name of Gorbachev. One day after 
the two-year anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident, Renmin ribao commented that the 
setback of the international communist movement was “due to the sabotage of the 
opportunists and rightists inside the socialist bloc,” and “the bourgeoisie has never ceased 
the effort to place their proxies in communist parties, for imposing the mischievous 
Western strategy of peaceful evolution on socialism.” 371 In the wake of the August Coup 
in 1991 Moscow, Guangming ribao issued a warning that “the anti-socialist deviational 
forces have penetrated into the Party,” and stated that countering such tendencies would 
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be “the biggest task of our theoreticians and the Party.” 372 One week after the August 
Coup, Guangming ribao published another article that came just short of openly attacking 
Gorbachev and his liberal programs:       
 
Some thoughts against Marxism and Leninism are rampant in today’s international society. 
They have crept into the communist parties of some countries and become the guiding 
principles of those parties. Those thoughts are the fundamental origin of the crisis of some 
socialist states. The opportunists inside the international communist movement flaunt the 
banners of ‘diversity,’ ‘universal human value,’ and ‘democracy is the highest principle of 
socialism’ to confuse the masses. They are in fact writing off the class struggle, socialism, 
and proletarian dictatorship. They stand for using the Western model to replace the 
communist leadership and its theoretical premise of Marxism.373 
 
A series of IREECAS journal articles criticizing Gorbachev’s foreign policy 
appeared after the first half of 1990. In his article, IREECAS scholar Huang Tianying 
targeted Gorbachev’s plan to establish Soviet diplomatic relations with South Korea. He 
argued that the Soviet leader’s purpose was “seeking economic aid from Seoul, at the 
expense of its long-time communist ally of North Korea.” The author foresaw that 
Gorbachev’s decision would cause the situation in the Korean Peninsula to deteriorate.374 
In early 1991, Yuan Shengyu, dean of the Shanghai Institute of International Affairs, 
made a list of Gorbachev’s East European policies to condemn. The list included 
Gorbachev’s pampering the formation of the multiparty system in the region, agreeing to 
have East Germany annexed by West Germany, and giving a green signal to the 
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disbandment of the Warsaw Pact – all for “trading benefits from the West.” 375   
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Cao Shengqiang, a professor of history at 
Shandong University, did not think that Gorbachev had implemented the Sinatra Doctrine 
in Eastern Europe (unlike Yuan Shengyu). He believed instead that Gorbachev, like his 
predecessors, had imposed not Sovietization but glasnost on the region, whereby the 
Soviet leader became “the grave-digger of East European socialism.” 376  Unlike the 
previous scholars’ arguments that praised the New Thinking for its historical innovation 
(as cited in the last chapter), Wang Yanwei (then a PhD philosophy student at the Central 
Party School) argued that the past Soviet leaderships had already formulated the concept 
and “Gorbachev was only duplicating the term only.” 377  An in-depth investigation 
appeared in IREECAS researcher Jiang Yi’s 1995 article. According to the author, 
socialist ideology and universal human value are two sides of the same coin in terms of 
the definition of New Thinking. However, “If there is incompatibility appeared between 
the two elements, Gorbachev would rather favour the latter and do without the former.” In 
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Jiang’s opinion, socialist ideology was “the bond to preserve the Soviet-East European 
alliance,” and once it was taken away, “socialism in Europe would disappear without 
trace.” 378 As he finally concluded: 
 
Gorbachev’s New Thinking was a utopian idea and out of touch with reality. His 
democratic socialism and universal human value had been influenced more by Western 
thoughts, and were antagonistic to the principle of Leninism. We can say that Gorbachev’s 
such package of thoughts was exactly the theoretical origin of the Soviet demise.379 
 
As demonstrated in the last chapter, both Chinese officials and intellectuals showed 
little difference in their perspectives on Gorbachev before and after the Tiananmen 
Incident. It was only after early 1990, when Gorbachev started the process of 
constitutionally terminating the one-party system in the Soviet Union, that the CCP 
became nervous. After that point, Chinese scholars began to sense its potential 
implications for China, which were far more ominous than the effect of the New Thinking 
and glasnost that had allegedly fuelled the student unrest in 1989.380 As was evident in the 
writings presented in the last chapter, Gorbachev’s slogans of plurality and universal 
human value would not cause concern for the Chinese socialist regime, as many Chinese 
scholars generally agreed with these ideas before the middle of 1990. However, this 
behaviour of Gorbachev’s in overturning the dictatorship of the communist party was 
absolutely unacceptable to the CCP. At that time Beijing was confronting the perceived 
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threat from the West of “peaceful evolution,” 381 and the Chinese leadership similarly 
feared that the abandonment of socialism by the Soviet Union would reignite pro-
democracy sentiments at home and challenge its legitimacy. Following this, the last 
Soviet leader was doomed to become the focal point of attack by the Chinese.  
Having said this, Chinese Sovietology writings never excoriated Gorbachev in the 
1990s, and the torrent of attacks had gradually subsided by the middle of the decade. One 
major reason for this may be the improvement in Sino-Russian relations after the tragic 
collapse of the USSR. Once in power, Russian President Boris Yeltsin announced in 
November 1992 that Russia would tilt its foreign policy toward Asia, and that Sino-
Russian relations would top his agenda. 382  Two days later, Yeltsin told the visiting 
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that China and Russia should not turn back the 
clock to when both sides were at each other’s throats, and suggested that ideological 
differences should not become a barrier to normal bilateral relations.383 With this overture 
from Russia, China decided to consolidate relations, and the agreement was enshrined in 
the Sino-Russian Joint Declaration signed by both countries during Yeltsin’s visit to the 
PRC in December 1992.384 Finally, during Jiang Zemin’s reciprocal visit to Moscow in 
September 1994, both sides confirmed the nature of their future new type of 
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cooperation – “constructive partnership” (jianshexing huoban guanxi).385  
Second, Chinese scholars’ analyses show that many aspects of Gorbachev’s New 
Thinking, such as peaceful co-existence, respect for sovereignties, emphasizing equality, 
and a refusal to export revolution and ideology, bore a strong resemblance to Deng 
Xiaoping’s vision of international policy making. 386  Indeed, as presented in the last 
chapter, some Chinese scholars concluded that the foreign policies of Gorbachev and 
Deng were almost identical with each other, and that they both made major contributions 
to Marxist-Leninist theories of international relations.387 Apart from China’s disagreement 
with Gorbachev’s political democratization and a fear of the impact of glasnost on China, 
the CCP regime in fact accepted Gorbachev’s concept of New Thinking – as this was seen 
to be in accordance with China’s long-time principle of regulating foreign relations.388 
Most Chinese scholars included in this research are establishment intellectuals in the 
PRC,389 and thus might have felt obliged to change suit and heed the Party call to criticize 
deviationist tendencies after the turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
However, if those scholars displayed their exorbitant criticisms of the New Thinking, 
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such negative views might seem to be self-contradictory to their positive comments not 
long before.  
At the end of the 1990s, some Chinese writers once again reversed their positions, 
lending their sympathy to Gorbachev’s foreign policy.390 Kang Zhiwen, a professor at the 
Heihe College in Heilongjiang Province, portrayed Gorbachev as a victim of the West. He 
criticized the US for exploiting the Soviet predicament to pressure the Kremlin to give up 
socialism. As a result, Gorbachev was “incapable of action except giving in to American 
demands.” 391 IREECAS scholar Lu Nanquan felt puzzled by some Chinese scholars, who 
had once accused Brezhnev of being “a social imperialist” because he had ordered the 
suppression of the Prague Spring. These scholars had also denounced Gorbachev as “a 
communist traitor,” when the last Soviet leader refused to send troops to crush the anti-
communist uprising in Eastern Europe. 392  Rong Zhi, a researcher in the Institute of 
International Studies at CASS, defended the New Thinking as “a wise decision” in his 
1999 article. He extolled Gorbachev’s efforts in normalizing the Sino-Soviet relations and 
concluding the Cold War. He asked that Chinese scholars “assess Gorbachev’s policy 
objectively and not slander him as a traitor or a capitulationist categorically.” 393   
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Third, although the CCP regime had concerns about the fate of Chinese socialism 
after the crumbling of the USSR, the disintegration of the Soviet Union ended up 
benefiting the PRC more than anything else. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident 
the Chinese government still worried gravely about potential attempts of the West to 
relegate China to a subordinate role in the post-communist world. However, the CCP 
leadership increasingly realized that the downfall of European socialism and the 
weakened USSR would offer the PRC a better chance to restore what it saw as its rightful 
place, in a multipolar world no longer controlled by the superpowers. In 1989, Deng 
Xiaoping was still not sure what the international direction would be in the coming years, 
and he urged the Chinese people to “observe the situation coolly” and “act calmly.” 394 In 
1990, Deng became more confident and optimistic about China’s future in the world. He 
said, “The situation in which the United States and the Soviet Union dominated all 
international affairs is changing,” and “China will be counted as a pole” in a multipolar 
world. 395  Immediately after the Soviet collapse, Deng joyfully claimed in 1992 that 
“Socialist China should show the world through its actions that it is opposed to 
hegemonism and power politics,” and “China is a steadfast force for safeguarding world 
peace.” 396  
Last, after the Soviet collapse, Russia and other succeeding states to the USSR 
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seemed unlikely to be in a position to sustain armed forces and its past superpower status; 
therefore, the main potential threat to Chinese security had been removed. China wanted 
the CIS states on its borders to remain stable, for otherwise grave problems would be 
created for the PRC. Because of the CCP’s efforts to normalize Sino-Russian relations in 
the early 1990s, both states achieved arms control, border settlement, and trade 
resumption in the post-Soviet era.397 The prospect of bilateral relations after 1991 looked 
far brighter than in the pre-1991 time. After the Cold War the CCP leadership not only 
needed good relations with Russia in diplomatic terms, but also expected to retain Russia 
and other CIS states as a counterbalance in resisting the Western notion of peaceful 
evolution, which they saw as an existential threat.  
In addition, Chinese leaders in the 1990s tried hard to secure the border demarcation 
with the surrounding Soviet successor countries (Russia included). They sought to further 
trade relations with those states and take advantage of their rich energy resources to 
sustain China’s fast growing economy. They also wanted to cooperate with the CIS states 
to combat religious extremism and national separation in China’s north-western 
territory.398 Therefore, it was a rational decision for Chinese scholars after 1991 not to 
indulge in negative criticisms of the defunct Soviet socialism founded by the Russians in 
1917, since this would arouse suspicions on the Russian side and ultimately harm the 
relationship.  
Indeed, from the mid-1990s onward, some Chinese Soviet-watchers took into 
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account the bitter lessons learned from the Sino-Soviet hostilities that had taken place 
under Mao Zedong, in which name-calling and exchanges of verbal attacks had severely 
damaged relations between the two countries. They made it clear that this tragedy should 
not be repeated. In a 1999 speech delivered to a conference commemorating the 50-year 
anniversary of the establishment of Sino-Russian relations (at which the Vice-Director of 
the International Liaison Department of the CCP, Cai Wu, and the Russian Ambassador, 
Igor Rogachev, were present), IREECAS Director Li Jingjie cited the main import of 
Deng Xiaoping’s conversation with Gorbachev in 1989 – “putting the past behind and 
embracing the future” – and made it clear to Chinese scholars that they should “no longer 
cling to the old scores of history” when they were conducting research into Sino-Russian 
relations in the future.399 In another article published at the same time, Pan Zhengxiang, a 
scholar at the Chinese University of Science and Technology, retraced the sorry history of 
Sino-Soviet relations and asked Chinese scholars to take the lessons of the past into 
account in their future research. He instructed them to “uphold the notion of seeking 
common ground while preserving differences,” and warned them “not to engage in open 
polemics and in criticizing Party or state leaders on the other side by name” in order to 
“prevent a repetition in the 21st century of the historical tragedy.” 400  
Moreover, in a 1995 article Ye Shuzong, a professor at Shanghai Normal University, 
asked Chinese scholars to learn a lesson from the painful memory of Sino-Soviet 
polemics after the early 1960s. He pointed out that the mutual recriminations and 
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vituperation had contributed to China’s self-imposed isolation and the emergence of 
political radicalism that had culminated in the disastrous Cultural Revolution. After that 
point, China refused to learn from the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s initiatives in 
reforming the moribund Stalinism, denouncing his plans as “revisionism” (xiuzheng 
zhuyi); this was a pejorative term used by Mao Zedong to describe Khrushchev’s 
programs as being equivalent to a revision of orthodox Marxism. The author finally 
concluded that it was these sorts of meaningless squabbles that had made China “waste 
the opportunity to reflect on Maoism and develop the economy, and remain backward 
until the late 1970s when the outside world had changed more swiftly than ever before.” 
401 
 
Lenin and the fate of Chinese socialism after Tiananmen 
The foreign policy of Vladimir Lenin started to draw the attention of Chinese 
scholars in and after 1989, when China became a political pariah owing to the ruling 
Communist Party’s brutal military crackdown on civilians during the pro-democratic 
Tiananmen demonstrations in the summer of that year. Chinese perspectives in the wake 
of the Tiananmen Incident argued that the PRC might learn from Lenin’s policy in War 
Communism (1918-1921), when the newly-born Soviet Union was besieged by 
imperialist military encirclement. At the time, Lenin adopted a foreign policy that 
encouraged engagement in formal relations with the West, while concentrating on 
economic development and maintaining a proletarian dictatorship. Such principles were 
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akin to Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen agendas of buying time and keeping a low 
profile while finding a way out of the Western sanctions and re-connecting with the 
world.402 As Yu Liangzao, a lecturer at the University of Hubei, summarized in his 1991 
article, “China should learn from Lenin’s post-1917 peaceful-coexistence strategy, by 
pursuing the continued economic cooperation with the West and upholding the open door 
policy,” in order to “overcome the international sanctions, change China’s global image, 
and finally restore its rightful place in the world.” 403 
After the CCP’s military crackdown in 1989, China was facing four consequences. 
First, internationally, many countries in the world endorsed the political and economic 
sanctions against China, as a form of punishment for its armed suppression over civilians 
and its infringement upon human rights. Second, domestically, the Tiananmen Incident 
was followed immediately by an intensified intra-CCP power struggle, wherein the 
conservative Party members attempted to seize the opportunity to criticize Deng 
Xiaoping’s reform and open door policies after 1978, and push China back to the rule of 
Maoism. Third, the event paralleled the failure of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
USSR from 1989 onward, and many Chinese people almost entirely lost their faith in 
socialism. Last, combining all the causes above, China after 1989 was at a crossroad; 
from the top leadership to ordinary people, all felt deeply puzzled about the future 
direction of China and had no concrete idea about how China would weather the 
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In late 1989, the new Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin gave a warning to Party 
cadres about hostile international forces and the critical situation of the CCP:  
 
At present we must realize that our party is in peril and the international hostile forces are 
engineering the plot of peaceful evolution to push the CCP on the verge of death. We 
should be acutely aware of the urgency of current situation. All cadres should work together 
to safeguard our Party and ensure socialism in China will survive the test and remain 
undefeated.404 
 
Deng Xiaoping also expressed his concern about the issue. He believed that the West 
had “the same attitude towards China as towards the East European countries,” and that 
the West was “unhappy that China adheres to socialism.” 405 Deng said that Chinese 
people did not fear being isolated. He remarked, “No one can shake China’s 
determination to build socialism,” and “no matter what changes take place in the 
international situation, China will be able to hold its ground.” 406   
From late 1989, a flood of official articles circulated in China, invoking Lenin and 
his writings as a model that could be useful in combating Western attacks and 
safeguarding socialism in China. A commentator in Guangming ribao commented that 
Lenin’s theory about the inevitable death of capitalism had not been outdated in the 
contemporary era. He said, “It is correct for China to adhere to the socialist path,” and 
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believed that “socialism will replace capitalism in the future.” 407  Another article in 
Qiushi (Seeking Truth) described Lenin’s writings as “a good weapon” for China to 
employ to “fight with the international vicious tendencies of peaceful evolution.” 408 Li 
Zhun, vice minister of the Central Propaganda Department, wrote in Renmin ribao 
demanding that “comrades working in ideology apply theories of Marx and Lenin in their 
research works for the battle against the peaceful evolution.” 409  Another article in 
Renmin ribao required all Party cadres to achieve “a high level of understanding of 
Leninist theories,” with a view to “grasp the world situation, uphold the communist 
conviction, and cope with the complicated international environment.” 410   
In response to the calls of Party authorities, Chinese scholars started to follow the 
example of the early Soviet Union when the country was threatened by Western military 
intimidation, and asked the PRC to learn from Lenin’s wisdom of how to break through 
foreign encirclement. 411  According to a scholar at the Guangxi University for 
Nationalities: 
 
Today when capitalists are mounting intensive attacks against socialism, the international 
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communist movement is at the moment of low tide. Under such circumstances, to study 
Lenin’s experience and theories on upholding and developing Marxism will have a great 
practical significance for us to march toward the socialist path unswervingly under today’s 
stormy international climate.412  
 
The IREECAS scholar Jiang Yi wrote in an article that, when the newly-born Soviet 
Union was beset by imperial hostility, Lenin still realized that Soviet socialism was in 
need of peace and respite for economic recovery.413 After that, “peaceful co-existence 
with the West became the major principle of Soviet foreign policy.” 414 Yu Liangzao in 
another article argued that China should heed Lenin’s strategies during its difficult time; 
these included strengthening the one-party rule, fighting bloated bureaucracy and 
corruption, and remaining vigilant of imperialist interventions.415 Even in the late 1990s, 
when China had extricated itself from isolation and re-embraced the global society, Li 
Zhencheng, director of the Institute of Marxism at the Central Party School, still 
remarked that Lenin’s counter-encirclement methods in the early 20th century were a 
useful example for not only Chinese socialism, but also the future of world communism:   
 
At the time, the struggle between the international hostile forces intending for sabotaging 
the October Revolution and the Soviet communists for safeguarding the fruit of the 
Revolution, was a life-or-death final showdown between the proletarians and the 
bourgeoisies. It ended with the victory of the former and the outcome would be honoured 
by history. The struggle was one of the greatest events in the 20th century and it has been 
celebrated by peoples from all over the world. We can see that in a non-military battlefield, 
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a war without bloodshed could be more prolonged, intensive, and brutal. Fortunately, at the 
time the imperialists did not have an effective and systematic strategy of peaceful evolution. 
It would be helpful for us to seriously study and sum up the lessons from this event, for 
subsequent campaigns against capitalist rivals.416  
 
Making use of Lenin is not unknown in PRC history. During Lenin’s 90th birth 
anniversary in 1960, the CCP regime under Mao Zedong’s instruction published several 
harangues in the name of commemorating Leninism in official newspapers. This was an 
attack on Khrushchev’s détente with the West and was also meant to defend the Chinese 
struggle against imperialism right through to the end. 417  Lenin’s theories developed 
during War Communism had also been employed by Mao to serve and legitimize his 
radical policies in the fanatical periods of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural 
Revolution.418 After Tiananmen, the contemporary application of Lenin and his policies 
highlighted China’s apprehension regarding the Western peaceful evolution, the 
implications of European communist demise for China, and concern about the country’s 
position in the world after Tiananmen.  
The use of Lenin in Chinese Party organs and Sovietology writings can also be 
considered as a legacy of traditional Chinese historiography – using the past to serve the 
present (yishi weijian).419 Chinese are traditionally in the habit of appealing to examples 
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in history to serve the present agenda, and drawing such examples from within Chinese 
history is only one end of the whole spectrum. As Dorothea Martin remarks:  
 
The main task of Chinese historians in world history since the mid-1950s has been to trace 
the revolutionary movements of the modern world in such a way as to reveal the inevitable 
victory of socialism over capitalism and to depict the victory of the Chinese revolution as 
the logical outgrowth of this global revolutionary trend.420 
 
World history in China functions not only to promote China’s own desired reading of 
history, but also to serve the political needs of the state and Party. Gotelind Müller-Saini 
reveals that in and after the 1990s the CCP regime increasingly focused on ensuring that 
the official party view of foreign history was transmitted via the official media and 
textbooks, and that the state agenda guided the audience perceptions toward 
legitimization of PRC policies.421 Lenin’s foreign policy and his rule during the early 
Soviet Union were selected as examples, as they had gone well with the stance and 
interest of China after Tiananmen – that is, since both regimes were bound by the shared 
traumas of Western sanctions and the common aspirations of rising to be global powers 
amid international hostility. The Soviet Union under Lenin was viewed as the cherished 
precedent of a golden age upon which present action of the CCP regime had to be based 
or rationalized. Chinese Sovietology’s use of Lenin to promote socialism – like exploiting 
past foreign humiliation in order to fan anti-Western nationalist fervour – was an effective 
measure to strengthen the Chinese communist regime when it was experiencing domestic 
difficulties. Jin Zenglin, a researcher at the Heilongjiang Provincial Academy of Social 
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Sciences, pointed this out quite frankly in his 1992 article on why Chinese Sovietologists 
should review Lenin’s foreign policy in the early Soviet Union:  
 
History is a mirror. It can guide people to week through the old and bring forth the new. 
Although there has been a great deal of change since more than seventy years ago, the 
present international environment is different with that the early Soviet Union was facing. 
However, there are still some similarities between the two periods. So we need to research 
on Lenin’s policy to understand the current grim atmosphere and raise our revolutionary 
spirits.422   
 
Lenin and the post-Tiananmen reform and open door policies 
The use of Lenin in 1990s China was not only a political expedient in the face of 
Western sanctions, it was also a symbol of a long-term strategy for China’s economic 
success and state building after the demise of world communism. After the Tiananmen 
Incident, Premier Li Peng pledged, “China will not return to the old way of self-isolation 
under any circumstances,” notwithstanding the international sanctions.423 At the time, 
Deng Xiaoping was aware of the predominance of the conservative forces within the 
Party, and their exploitation of the grim international climate to push the PRC back into 
radicalism and anti-reform. He stepped in and elaborated the vision of China’s post-
Tiananmen development for outflanking his foes in a series of speeches. In late 1989, 
Deng demanded that China “double its GNP” amid the turmoil in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, in order to “demonstrate the superiority of socialism.” He warned that the 
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PRC “should maintain friendly exchanges” with the West, and “should not criticize or 
condemn other countries without good reason or go to extremes in our words and deeds.” 
424 In a subsequent speech publicized in 1990, Deng required China to contribute to the 
world by promoting “a new international political and economic order.” He said, “If we 
can go on in this way for 50 or 60 years, socialist China will be invincible.” 425  
According to the words above, Deng’s laying great emphasis on economic 
development was not only a remedy for breaking the post-Tiananmen deadlock. It was 
also a political tool for strengthening the CCP regime, and a means to the ultimate end of 
China achieving a powerful status following the demise of orthodox socialism in the 
wake of Tiananmen and the collapse of European communist regimes. Further to his 
attack on the Party old guards, Deng embarked on an ambitious inspection tour in 
southern China in early 1992. He delivered several landmark speeches along the way, 
making clear that the greater danger to China came from the left rather than the right, and 
warning that the people would topple those who opposed reforms. He urged the Party 
members not to fear “elements of capitalism” and not to argue “whether the road is 
capitalist or socialist.” 426 After Deng’s preaching, Jiang Zemin immediately began to toe 
the line and pressed the CCP to be “more emancipated, bolder, and faster” in learning 
achievements from the West.427 
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Complying with the tide, the government’s mouthpiece newspapers and journals 
immediately set off a chain reaction entertaining Deng’s ideas, and clearing the decks for 
a strong defence for reform and open door policies. At this juncture, the use of Lenin 
appeared on PRC’s front-pages as a means of keeping abreast of Deng’s call, and 
gathering support for China’s renewed momentum to resume reforms in full force.   
An article in Renmin ribao pointed out that “learning from capitalism has absolutely 
complied with Lenin’s theories,” and the fundamental reason for Soviet economic 
backwardness and its final demise was because “the post-Lenin leaderships had not 
correctly handled their relationship with capitalism.” 428 Another article in Qiushi put it 
bluntly, that in Lenin’s mind “socialism should not be an isolated system,” and in fact, “it 
should be a more open society than capitalism.” 429  Against this backdrop, CASS 
President Hu Sheng weighed in and rebutted the leftist hostility to capitalism in Renmin 
ribao. He argued that “socialism should inherit the good tradition from capitalism but 
should not be antagonistic to it.” The author quoted Lenin’s The State and Revolution to 
demonstrate that “proletarian dictatorship could only obtain the fruits of socialist 
revolution by learning from the achievements of capitalism.” 430  Hu Sheng finally 
condemned the leftist thoughts as being “utterly absurd and reactionary.” 431   
                                                             
428 Fang Sheng, “Lunduiwai kaifanghe liyong ziben zhuyi,” [On the Open Door Policy and Utilizing 
Capitalism] Renmin ribao, April 20, 1992. 
429 Lu Luping, “Nuliba duiwai kaifang tigaodao xinde shuiping” [To Promote the Open Door Policy to a New 
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430 For Lenin’s theories on the transition from capitalism to communism, see Vladimir Lenin, The State and 
Revolution: Marxist Teaching on the State and the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Revolution (Peking: 
Foreign Languages Press, 1965), 82-86.   
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A number of academic works had predated Deng’s southern tour in early 1992; these 
articles advocated the acceleration of reforms and mutually beneficial interaction between 
socialism and capitalism, against the negative example of the Soviet Union. 432  After 
Deng’s tour and throughout the 1990s, many articles attempted to use both Lenin and 
Deng to enhance China’s renewed momentum in revitalizing reforms.433  
In fact, there were already numerous publications in the 1980s that supported Deng’s 
reform and open door policies, through the study of Lenin’s writings. 434  The 1980s 
                                                             
432 Zhang Weiyuan, “Liening wanqi sixiang” [Lenin’s Thoughts in His Later Years], Dangdai shijieyu shehui 
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guanxide lilunhe celue” [On the Late Lenin’s Theories and Strategies about Two Different Social Systems 
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shijie gejude jidian kanfa” [Some Perceptions of a Changing Pattern of International Relations], Guoji wenti 
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Capitalist Development], Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi, no. 1 (1992): 30-31. Dong Zhuangdao, “Shehui zhuyihe 
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between Socialism and Capitalism in the World], Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi, no. 1 (1992): 68-69.    
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Leftist Theoretical Thoughts in the History of the International Communist Movement], Dangdai shijieyu 
shehui zhuyi, no. 3 (1992): 2. Liu Yichang, “Muqian guoji guanxide zhuyao tezhenghe fazhan qushi” [The 
Main Characteristics and Development Trends in Present International Relations], Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi, 
no. 4 (1992): 31. Gao Fang, “Jianchi dangde jiben luxianyu fazhan youzhongguo tesede shehui zhuyi lilun” 
[Upholding the Basic Line of the CCP and Developing the Theory of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics], 
Shehui kexue, no. 9 (1992): 5. Yan Hua, “Guanyu liyong ziben zhuyide jidian sikao” [A Few Reflections on 
Utilizing Capitalism], Dangdai shijie shehui zhuyi wenti, no. 1 (1993): 17. Zhang Shigu, “Lunshehui 
zhuyitong ziben zhuyi guanxide liangmianxing” [On the Dual Character of the Relations between Socialism 
and Capitalism], Kexue shehui zhuyi yanjiu, no. 1 (1994): 58-59. Liu Seqing, “Xitong yanjiu shenru linghui 
dengxiaoping waijiao zhanlue sixiang” [Systematic Studies on and Thorough Mastery of Deng Xiaoping’s 
Diplomatic Strategic Thoughts], Xiandai guoji guanxi, no. 5 (1994): 31. Pang Renzhi, “Lunshehui zhuyiyu 
ziben zhuyide guanxi” [On the Relations between Socialism and Capitalism], Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi, no. 2 
(1997): 6. Sun Dejie, “Lieningde duiwai kaifang sixiang jiqi qishi” [Lenin’s Thoughts on the Open Door Policy 
and Their Implications], Shehui zhuyi yanjiu, no. 2 (1998): 68. Wang Jincun, “Xinxing shixia shehui zhuyiyu 
ziben zhuyi guojia guanxide xintedian” [The Relations between Socialism and Capitalism under the New 
Circumstances], Shijie jingjiyu zhengzhi, no. 3 (1998): 53. Ding Xinhua, “Qianxi lieningde heping gongchu 
sixiang” [Lenin’s Thoughts on the Peaceful Co-existence], Shehui zhuyi yanjiu, no. 5 (1998): 60. 
434 Yang Yanjun, “‘Zuopai gongchan zhuyizhe’ deguonei zhengcehe liening duitade pipan” [Lenin’s Criticism 
of the Domestic Policy of the ‘Left Communists’], Dangdai shijieyu shehui zhuyi, no. 2 (1981): 4-12. Xia 
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articles were meant to eradicate the Maoist legacy that had obstructed PRC’s 
modernization and open door for three decades, and this legacy eventuated in the 
widening gap between China and the advanced world at the beginning of the 1980s.  
In April 1980, an article commemorating Lenin’s 110-year birthday appeared in 
Guangming ribao. The author claimed that according to Lenin, the fundamental task of 
socialism was not “class struggle” and “political campaigns,” but “developing the 
productive forces and commodity economy,” by “learning the advanced technologies and 
management experience from capitalism.” 435  Concurrent with the official tone, Yang 
Yanjun, a researcher at the Harbin Academy of Social Sciences, took Lenin’s Soviet 
Union as an example and put forward that after consolidating power, a socialist regime 
should promptly “shift to economic construction rather than engage in continued 
revolution.” 436 Xia Daoyuan, a translator at the Central Compilation and Translation 
Bureau and an expert in the international communist movement, went on to say, 
“Learning Lenin’s discourse on state capitalism will be of great significance for cleaning 
up the ultra-leftist poisonous weeds, which were produced by the reactionary group led by 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Daoyuan, “Yijiu yibanian lieningyu ‘zuopai gongchan zhuyizhe’ zaiguojia ziben zhuyi wenti shangde 
zhenglun” [Lenin’s 1918 Debate with the ‘Left Communists’ on the Questions of State Capitalism], Dangdai 
shijieyu shehui zhuyi, no. 2 (1981): 51-54. Zheng Biao, “Woguo shixing duiwai kaifang zhengcede lilun 
genju” [The Theoretical Basis of Our Country’s Reform and Open Door Policies], Shehui kexue zhanxian, no. 
3 (1984): 48-49. Yang Yunzhong, “Liening guanyu sue fazhan duiwai jingji guanxide sixianghe zhengce” 
[Lenin’s Thoughts on and Policies of the Foreign Economic Relations of the Soviet Russia], Guoji guancha, 
no. 2 (1986): 1-4. Yang Yunzhong, “Liening heping gongchu sixiangyu suweiai eguode ‘heping waijiao’” 
[Lenin’s Thoughts on the Peaceful Co-existence and the ‘Peace Diplomacy’ of the Soviet Russia], Sulian 
dongou wenti, no. 5 (1986): 25.  
435 Ma Biao, “Xuexi lieningde shehui zhuyi jianshe lilun,” [To Learn from Lenin’s Theories on the 
Construction of Socialism] Guangming ribao, April 19, 1980. 
436 Yang Yanjun, “‘Zuopai gongchan zhuyizhe’ deguonei zhengcehe liening duitade pipan” [Lenin’s Criticism 
of the Domestic Policy of the ‘Left Communists’], 6. 
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Lin Biao and Jiang Qing.” He argued that the agendas in the period of the New Economic 
Policy (1921-1928), which emphasized on economic construction and learning from the 
West, should be the blueprint of socialist modernization in China.437  
In short, Leninism in Chinese Sovietology writings had served as a tool for helping to 
legitimize the Chinese communist regime and justify its state policies in the 1980s and 
1990s. References to Lenin in the 1980s were used in an economic sense in support of 
post-Mao leadership. These demonstrated China’s determination to merge itself into the 
world economic system, since the PRC at the time had already swept away the Maoist 
remnants of the Gang of Four but was still mired in economic crisis inflicted by Mao’s 
rule. On the other hand, when post-Mao reforms had been fully-fledged but the 
conservative force was rampant after Tiananmen, the rhetorical use of Lenin in the 1990s 
was more a political manoeuvre to reinforce the post-Tiananmen mandate of continued 
economic liberalization and anti-leftism, while still maintaining self-reliance and evading 
political Westernization. The symbol of Lenin served to imbue the Chinese people with a 
sense of guarding against the peaceful evolution, and of the inevitable victory of 
socialism over capitalism. 
On closer inspection, the use of Lenin by Chinese Sovietology writings was less 
relevant to the context of contemporary China’s international relations. As mentioned in 
the preceding chapter about Gorbachev and as we will see in the next chapter, since 1987 
Chinese scholars had argued that both Gorbachev’s concepts of New Thinking in 
international relations and glasnost in political liberalization were a return to Lenin’s 
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original principle of true socialism. Some of them even demanded that the Chinese 
government study Gorbachev’s programs and imitate his way of reforming the socialist 
political structure. However, after 1990 and the Soviet demise in 1991 in particular, 
Gorbachev was no longer a favourite figure owing to the change of the political tide. 
Chinese scholars increasingly refrained from mentioning his name and taking his 
programs as an example; instead, they had to forsake Gorbachev. In the eyes of the CCP, 
on the other hand, Lenin commanded high respect and was one of the most authoritative 
communist leaders in human history. Compared to Gorbachev and any other communist 
leaders in the world, using Lenin to mobilize the support of China’s reforms would 
implicate little political risk in Chinese Sovietology writings, particularly in the days after 
Tiananmen when China was facing the comeback of the Party conservative force.  
As we will see in the next chapter, in the early 1980s Chinese official organs and 
scholars had quoted Lenin’s theories to attack the legacy of Mao. Back then, the first 
Soviet leader was seen as a symbol of humanistic socialism in direct contrast to Maoist 
tyranny and oppression. Lenin’s writings were cited to help China recover from the 
trauma of the Cultural Revolution and switch to the path of reform and open door. After 
Tiananmen, the exemplar of Lenin was invoked to fortify the Party’s rule and tighten its 
grip on power. This time, Lenin was used for defending China’s stand of practicing true 
socialism, but not the socialism perverted by Gorbachev and his followers, who were seen 
as leading the Soviet Union into chaos and finally, disintegration. In both the early 1980s 
and early 1990s, the symbol of Lenin was used to legitimate the regime of Deng Xiaoping 
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as a socialist government adhering to the norm of orthodox communism, but not the kind 
of socialism distorted by Mao and Gorbachev.   
It is true that many Chinese scholars made reference to Lenin’s rule in the early 
Soviet Union in order to offer guidance to China for coping with hostile Western 
sanctions after Tiananmen. Still, we need to note some differences between the early 
Soviet Union and China in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident. First, unlike socialism in 
the early 20th century, which was a rising political force after the founding of the Soviet 
Union, communist regimes and ideology in the early 1990s were dying remnants. 
Western capitalism might have felt the need to nip the early Soviet Union in the bud by 
force, for fearing its menace would spread across the world and threaten its own survival. 
However, after the Tiananmen Incident and even in the wake of the Soviet demise, China 
was not in a perilous situation. The West neither sent troops to threaten China’s survival, 
nor had complicity in working with those whom Party authorities judged as opportunists 
within the CCP to overthrow the Chinese regime. Second, unlike what it had done with 
the early Soviet Union, in and after the 1990s, the capitalist West did not show wholesale 
hostility to the PRC, and did not sever their diplomatic and trade relations with China 
(although short-term sanctions had been applied). Afterward, China did not implement 
another militarized War Communism or adopt autarkic methods to counter the Western 
attacks. 
Indeed, the biggest fear of the CCP regime and Chinese scholars in the early 1990s 
seemed to be the emergence of the US as the sole superpower in the world, after the 
demise of world communism. Some considered that Washington would not only seek to 
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prevent China from prospering and restoring its greatness in the world, but also wield its 
unchecked power to bludgeon other countries into submission.438 However, after Soviet 
socialism passed from the scene, the Chinese promptly realized that the post-communist 
system had spurred greater global competition rather than greater global hegemony. They 
could not conceal their delight in witnessing the emergence of a multipolar world, in 
which China would reap the benefits and make itself a crucial factor in the global balance 
by being integrated into the new world order.439 Therefore, what most concerned the CCP 
regime after the eclipse of the USSR was by no means the real military threat from the 
West (which had been a reality in the early Soviet days), or its modern analogy of the 
peaceful evolution (which was actually more of a calculated invention and piece of 
propaganda used to fuel support for the Party after Tiananmen). 
In reality, the use of Lenin and his foreign policy in 1990s Chinese Sovietology 
writings was less pertinent to China’s thinking on its relations with the West and the 
world at that time. Rather, Chinese scholars tended to use the symbol of Lenin and the 
interpretation of his writings to defend Deng’s policies and support his position at home 
after Tiananmen – that is, when socialism in China was in burgeoning crisis and the Party 
conservative force attempted to challenge reform and open door directions taken by Deng 
since 1978. Let us look at several pieces of evidence. First, according to Xiao Feng, a 
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researcher in the Institute of Contemporary World at CASS, Lenin and Deng Xiaoping 
appeared to converge at two pillars: “upholding socialism” and “developing the 
productive forces and undertaking the open door policy.” 440 In this way, the use of Lenin 
serves two functions: firstly, it demonstrates China’s ruthless determination to resist 
political liberalization and the pollution of bourgeois thoughts (upholding socialism). 
Secondly, it symbolizes that the CCP regime would cleave to economic capitalism by 
learning from the advanced West (developing the productive forces and undertaking the 
open door policy). The two points deterred the attacks made by the political dissents and 
the Party conservatives, respectively. This combination of the two directed the path that 
China would take. 
Second, Wei Dingguang, a professor at the Nanjing Institute of Politics, argued that 
after Lenin’s death, both Stalin and Mao “had not properly handled Lenin’s legacy of 
opening to the outside world,” and only Deng Xiaoping “has carried through Lenin’s 
goal” and “upheld the open door direction as part of the socialist state policies.” 441 Liu 
Min, a scholar at the University of Nanjing, went further to put Deng in a higher position 
than Lenin. She pointed out that unlike Lenin, who had employed the open door policy as 
“a means to survive” and as “mainly for the contact with the West,” China under Deng 
had been transformed into “a socialist country that embraces all nations in the world 
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regardless of their political systems.” 442 It is thus evident that quoting Lenin’s writings 
was more about Deng than Lenin. The authors apparently tried to elevate Deng’s standing 
and speak for his policies. Deng, not Lenin, was the real focus of the Chinese scholars.  
Last, Li Daxin, a scholar at Shandong University, indicated that socialist elements 
“could be drawn from capitalism,” and both socialism and capitalism “could be in 
complete harmony but not in competition.” 443 To corroborate his argument, the scholar 
quoted both Lenin’s formula and Deng’s comment during his celebrated southern tour in 
1992,444 in order to emphasize that socialism and capitalism could have positive ties. In 
particular, he argued that the nature of socialism was to be a hybrid of various institutions 
and elements, as long as they could enrich the power of the socialist states.445 In Deng 
Xiaoping’s mind, there was indeed no specific definition of socialism. For him, socialism 
and capitalism could be interconnected and it made little sense to label these two systems. 
It is such examples of Deng’s pragmatism that have produced the famous slogan 
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“constructing socialism with Chinese characteristics,” a very vague slogan that Deng 
himself was unable to clarify. As he admitted in 1985: 
 
In building socialism, the central task is to develop the productive forces. We are adopting 
all measures to develop them, including use of foreign funds and introduction of advanced 
technologies. This is a great experiment, something that is not described in books.446 
 
To summarize, first, the Chinese method of drawing an analogy between the post-
Tiananmen PRC and the early Soviet Union was to create a tense and hostile external 
environment and to keep the Chinese people in a state of perpetual tension. This was 
conducive to strengthening the legitimacy of the CCP rule in the wake of the Tiananmen 
Incident, when the Chinese communist regime was discredited at home and came under 
strong fire from international society. The crisis became even more evident following the 
cascade of collapsing European communist regimes in and after 1989. The Chinese 
leaders feared lest the snowball of the political upheavals shaking Eastern Europe and the 
USSR should threaten their own survival. Therefore, by invoking the example of the 
beleaguered early Soviet socialist state under Lenin and the terms “the peaceful 
evolution” and “the international hostile forces,” the CCP regime was able to use the 
bogey of potential national anarchy and unbridled foreign anti-China sentiment to hang 
on to power.  
Indeed, China had been subjected to Western imperial thrashing in the past. The 
country’s traumatic national experiences still loom large in the Chinese psyche today. In 
China, a country long suffering from the invasion of others, this defensive fear has not 
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only taken deep roots but also long sponsored appropriate countermeasures, both 
culturally and politically.447 As a result, Chinese officials and scholars resolved to exploit 
and intermingle such sorry historical memories and the precedent of the early Soviet 
Union that had been similarly falling prey to Western sanctions. In so doing, they were 
able to appeal to the deep-rooted Chinese victim mentality, and present the communist 
regime as endeavouring to resist China’s victimization in the international community 
again. They made use of the example of the early Soviet Union to mobilize and enhance 
the enthusiasm of Chinese people, and directed them to embrace a new wave of self-
strengthening reform for getting the better of the post-Tiananmen sanctions. Therefore, 
they achieved the goal of strengthening CCP legitimacy after the end of the Cold War by 
playing the cards of the traditional Chinese victim mentality and an exaggerated post-
Tiananmen international hostility. 
Second, debates over the lessons of the failure of communism in Eastern Europe and 
the USSR from 1989 onward coincidentally paralleled the intra-CCP power struggle after 
the Tiananmen crisis. The epochal event in Moscow at the end of 1991 provided a motor 
for the leftist countercurrent, which questioned many of the fundamental directions taken 
by China under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership. Interpretations of Lenin’s writings became a 
major ideological weapon in the struggle between the forces for and against reforms in 
the CCP.  
After Tiananmen, Lenin was used as a device to limit the scope of reform-oriented 
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criticism, and he was seen as a man who had come to appreciate the need for substantial 
market forces. Chinese scholars argued that Lenin remained fundamentally relevant to 
China’s socialist reform and open door policies. In their opinion, the first Soviet leader 
did not oppose capitalist elements, though he also was not dependent on them. He 
advocated establishing a regime with the combination of a strong proletarian dictatorship 
and market economic mechanism. Chinese scholars claimed that Deng’s reform and open 
door agendas after 1978 were emblematic of Lenin’s theories. Their conclusion served to 
defend Deng’s post-Tiananmen policy of accelerating reforms and resist the attacks of the 
Party leftists, who attempted to challenge Deng’s position and policies. The use of Lenin 
after Tiananmen demonstrates that most Chinese officials and scholars had generally 
stood by on the side of the reformist wing, and largely supported and defended reforms in 
the communist system. They did not suggest tight controls in China even in the wake of 
Tiananmen and the Soviet disintegration. 
Third, the three year period between the Tiananmen Incident and the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union was an earth-shaking period that nearly convulsed the CCP regime. The 
Chinese reformist leadership led by Deng Xiaoping understood very well that only by 
successfully carrying out the reforms would the Chinese communist state be able to 
regain the legitimacy that it had lost. They were eager to explore a new way of dispelling 
tough resistance by the hardliners and make a breakthrough. They needed to regenerate 
the Party that was still in a coma after experiencing a heavy blow by the Tiananmen crisis 
and the ensuing collapse of communism in Europe.  
As seen in this chapter, it is apparent that both Chinese officials and Soviet-watchers 
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were trying to use the interpretation of Lenin’s writings to create new momentum. They 
intended for this momentum to revive China’s reform and open door policies, and to 
further the cause of socialist modernization that had been championed since 1978. Lenin 
was a means to rally support for the forces of pro-reform. Afterward, China was bolder in 
embracing economic liberalization while still refusing to transform its quasi-Leninist 
political system. Especially after Deng’s southern tour in 1992, the CCP formally adopted 
the concept of “socialist market economy.” 448  China then registered unprecedented 
economic growth and experienced profound social transformation throughout the rest of 
the 1990s, a phenomenon that continued in the 21st century. As Jean-Philippe Béja 
comments, “The Tiananmen tragedy remains a knot that must be untied and a barrier that 
must be removed in China’s continuous advance toward modernity.” 449 The use of Lenin 
after Tiananmen was seen to be the best way for China to untie the “knot” and remove the 
“barrier.” 
Last, we may conclude by saying that 1990s Chinese Sovietology’s main purpose in 
quoting Lenin’s foreign policy in the early Soviet Union, as well as his willingness to 
learn from capitalism, was to construct a rallying point. This rallying point was intended 
to re-legitimize and reconceptualise the post-Mao state policy of building an amorphous 
socialism with a distinctive Chinese flavour, amid the setback of the Tiananmen crisis 
when the Chinese party-state had become an internationally shunned regime, and 
worldwide socialism had reached a dead end. Scholars put Deng and Lenin together in 
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their articles, demonstrating that Deng was the true disciple of Lenin, who was seen as the 
embodiment of post-Mao China’s direction. They argued that Deng had further developed 
and flourished Lenin’s theories alongside Chinese realities, and made great strides in 
socialist modernization. To quote from the final thoughts of Ye Zicheng (a professor at 
Beijing University) in his 1997 article:  
 
Open door policy is the essence of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It carries on the 
legacy of Marxism-Leninism and brings it into full play today. The policy holds an 
important place in China’s socialist construction. We can even say that socialism with 
Chinese characteristics simply means opening socialism to the outside world.450   
 
The use of Lenin demonstrates that Chinese scholars viewed the former Soviet Union 
as both a warning from the past as well as an image of a possible Chinese state in the 
future. The example of Lenin’s post-1917 open policy reveals that Chinese scholars 
regarded the continued reform to be the best measure for saving socialism after 
Tiananmen. In their understanding, only a strong, stable, open, and wealthy state could 
ensure that the socialist system would survive in the long term. After Tiananmen, Chinese 
scholars not only demonstrated concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but also 
attempted to envision the future direction and position of China in the post-communist 
world. This included analysis of how China could rise to be a powerful nation under the 
authoritarian one-party rule, without succumbing to Western democracy and the sort of 
collapse that engulfed the USSR – all of which had been evidenced by the use of Lenin 
after Tiananmen, as presented in this chapter.   
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In conclusion, then, the shift of Chinese perceptions of Gorbachev across the 1990 
divide had little to do with the barometer of Sino-Soviet relations at the time. In fact, both 
countries had achieved rapprochement and ended past conflicts while still under the 
Gorbachev administration. After Gorbachev’s abolition of the CPSU power monopoly in 
March 1990, the CCP regime interpreted that such a move would pose a threat to China’s 
own communist dictatorship. Following this, Chinese scholars looked at Gorbachev’s 
behaviour with great anxiety and started to explicitly attack his foreign policy after early 
1990. Nevertheless, Chinese scholars reduced their criticisms of Gorbachev in and after 
the mid-1990s, as a strategic partnership was created between the PRC and Russia after 
the end of the Cold War, and with the increasing amount of bilateral economic and 
security cooperation. Moreover, some Chinese Soviet-watchers took account of the bitter 
lessons learned from the Sino-Soviet hostility that had taken place under Mao Zedong, in 
which name-calling and exchanges of verbal attacks had severely damaged relations 
between the two countries. They made it clear that this tragedy should not be repeated, 
and this understanding also restrained them from excessively criticizing the last Soviet 
leader. 
After the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, interpretation of Lenin’s writings by Chinese 
scholars generally supported Deng Xiaoping’s reformist policies and legitimized his 
position at home against the comeback of the leftist offensive. Chinese scholarship put 
Deng and Lenin on the same level and stated that Deng had long followed Lenin’s 
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principle of building socialism. Moreover, Lenin’s foreign policy and his rule during the 
early Soviet Union were selected as they had meshed well with the stance and interest of 
China after Tiananmen, since both regimes were bound by the common aspirations of 
rising to be global powers amid international hostility. Chinese scholars praised Lenin’s 
agenda that embraced reforms and learning from the West, while persisting with 
communist dictatorship, as the key to saving the PRC from the setback of Tiananmen and 
to keeping socialism vital in the future. 
In early 1993, Wu Xiuquan sent his New Year letter to IREECAS, and asked that the 
Chinese scholars researching on the regions of the former Soviet Union commit 
themselves to “strengthening academic exchange and enhancing mutual friendship.” 451 
However, as seen in this chapter, Chinese Sovietology could never be as simple as 
“strengthening academic exchange” or “enhancing mutual friendship.” In 1997, Party 
Secretary General Jiang Zemin disseminated the following words in his inaugural lecture 
at the CCP 15th Congress: 
 
Deng Xiaoping Theory is the principle to understand the world. It has correctly analysed 
and made scientific judgments of the characteristics of contemporary era, the international 
situation, the failure of some socialist states, the lessons of developing nations, and the 
experience of advanced countries. The world is changing rapidly, and Marxists in any 
countries must tackle with this matter seriously. Deng Xiaoping Theory defines our Party 
line and international strategy. It requires us to comprehend, carry on, and develop Marxism. 
By doing so, we can only call ourselves as true Marxists, and sticking to old habits would 
get us nowhere.452 
 
While not a determinant in China’s foreign policy making, Chinese Sovietology is 
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not able to remain outside the confines of Chinese politics. The Party guidepost always 
transcends the academic norm. In response to the Party call, Chinese Soviet-watchers 
have to trim their aims, align the subject on the basis of ideology, and consign Soviet 
studies to the backstage of “Party line and international strategy,” in order to 
“comprehend, carry on, and develop Marxism.” Seen from Part One of the thesis, Chinese 
Sovietology, by providing both principles and tactics, had been making assessments and 
proposing solutions on economic and political aspects of contemporary China, friendships 
and struggles in PRC’s international relations. Through the interplay of politics and 
scholarship, scholars projected and envisioned the future of China in the post-communist 
world.   
Part Two of the thesis will investigate the changing Chinese views of Soviet leaders 
and politics, through discussions of Chinese Soviet-watchers on different Soviet leaders 
and their political agendas in the 1980s and 1990s. The next chapter will study how 
Chinese scholars exploited the policies of Lenin and Gorbachev to tackle the political 
situation in 1980s China, after the disastrous Mao era and before the gathering storm of 
the Tiananmen Incident, respectively. It will show that many Chinese scholars interpreted 
the writings and programs of Lenin and Gorbachev in their favour. Their goal was mainly 
to use the policies of these two Soviet leaders to support the reformers in their power 
struggle against the conservatives within the CCP, reorient the direction of post-Mao 
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After the death of Mao Zedong, when China gradually initiated reform and open door 
policies, Soviet leaders’ political agendas were no less appealing to post-Mao China than 
were Western agendas. This chapter will show that Chinese scholars made tactical use of 
the writings and programs of Vladimir Lenin and Mikhail Gorbachev; this was done to 
grasp the nettle of Chinese socialism in the 1980s, after the disastrous Cultural Revolution 
and before the gathering storm of the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989, respectively.  
According to the secondary scholarship, Chinese Sovietology after 1991 has 
consistently emphasized the role of Gorbachev and his policies, which (in the eyes of the 
Chinese communist regime) brought about the downfall of the Soviet empire. In reality, 
however, Chinese Soviet-watchers were researching various Soviet leaders throughout the 
1980s and 1990s – and particularly Lenin, who featured prominently in Chinese writings 
and claimed equal importance to Gorbachev. In the early 1980s, Chinese scholars used 
the first Soviet leader, Lenin, and his writings to rebuild faith in socialism and to disperse 
scepticism of the CCP regime after the disastrous Mao era. While some pieces of work 
resorted to using Lenin’s socialist humanism to attack Maoism and Chinese communist 
rule, most of the time Chinese scholars used Lenin to strengthen the weakening 
legitimacy of Chinese socialism without tarnishing the image of Mao, and to command 
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support for new leader Deng Xiaoping’s open door policy and future reforms. Their main 
argument pointed out that Lenin’s moderate approach to socialism should be China’s 
model after Mao.  
From the mid-1980s onward, Gorbachev’s glasnost (openness) became a popular 
topic in China. Back then, many Chinese Soviet-watchers praised Gorbachev’s glasnost 
and political reform as a return to Lenin’s orthodox socialism. They were keen to learn 
from Gorbachev’s programs and portray them as deus ex machina for China, in the hope 
that his thinking might become a stimulus for further political change in the PRC after the 
initial economic reform that had begun in 1978. Indeed, as we will see in this chapter, the 
previous secondary literature has noted the enormous impact that Gorbachev and his 
political liberalization policy known as glasnost (openness) had on 1980s China. It has 
been reported that Gorbachev’s program inspired the former Party Secretary General 
Zhao Ziyang’s political reform proposal on the eve of the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. 
He was held in enormously high esteem among Chinese intellectuals in the 1980s. His 
enthusiasm for freedom and the reform of socialism were instrumental in stirring up the 
student protests in Tiananmen Square. Demonstrators used his example to pressure the 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping into abandoning the authoritarian rule of the Chinese 
government. Moreover, the existing literature points out that Chinese Sovietologists 
admired Gorbachev’s political reform as a model for China’s democratization in the 
1980s.  
This chapter will clarify that the popularity of Gorbachev and his programs in China 
was not only owing to the extraordinary openness and budding democracy of the Chinese 
political environment after the mid-1980s. The impact of Gorbachev’s policies after the 
mid-1980s can also be seen in Chinese scholars’ use of them to support the reformist 
Secretary General Zhao Ziyang in his power struggle against the Party conservatives 
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leading up to the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Moreover, the chapter argues that the 
attractiveness of Gorbachev’s glasnost policy to 1980s Chinese scholars was not because 
it symbolized Western-style democracy; instead, they embraced glasnost as a type of 
“democracy under socialism,” and saw it as being equivalent to the “neo-authoritarianism” 
of Zhao Ziyang that championed pluralism under a strong government. 
 
The Use of Lenin in early 1980s China 
After Mao Zedong died in 1976, China was on the brink of a precipice: the country 
needed to deal with its dire economy, and the people needed to heal the trauma of the 
decay of social morale. Most importantly, the Party was facing the two mammoth tasks of 
rebuilding state institutions and restoring its citizens’ faith in communism; both of these 
had been heavily ravaged by Mao and his radical socio-political movement of the 
Cultural Revolution.  
In the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee taking place in late 1978, 
which signalled CCP’s complete departure from past Maoist politics and opened the door 
for future reforms, Deng Xiaoping, chairman of the Party Central Committee and the de 
facto Chinese new leader, stated that China’s most imminent problems were its self-
isolation and economic and technological backwardness.453 After the passage of time, he 
increasingly realized that Mao’s legacy in China largely consisted only of spiritual and 
moral disruption.454 In Deng’s mind, it was not only the leftist ideology that was inimical 
to China’s coming post-Mao reforms. Since the emergence of the Democracy Wall 
movement in 1978/1979, Deng increasingly felt uncomfortable with China’s widespread 
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scepticism of socialism, which had been bred by decades of Maoist terror. 455  After 
squelching the Democracy Wall movement, Deng seriously criticized “a small number of 
persons” who had attacked the CCP by “raiding Party and government organizations,” 
and “slandering Comrade Mao Zedong.” He argued that “it is not enough for us to keep 
on resolutely eliminating the pernicious influence of the Gang of Four,” and warned, 
“Both the ultra-Left and Right currents of thought run counter to Marxism-Leninism and 
Mao Zedong Thought and obstruct our advance towards modernization.” 456 In order to 
shore up the post-Mao regime, Chinese officials and scholars in the early 1980s acted in 
concert to find the right formula from the creeds of the first Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin. 
They hoped to clean up the dregs of Maoism and restore what they saw as true socialism, 
as well as to discourage deviation from Marxist orthodoxy.  
Two significant articles were published in Renmin ribao in 1980, one of which was 
edited by the CCP Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, and the other of which 
was written by IREECAS scholar Song Hongxun. Both articles reiterated Lenin’s 
teaching that it is compulsory to persevere in the priority of economic construction, once 
proletarian revolution has taken hold in a culturally and socially backward country like 
China. Both articles concluded that economy, not politics, is the linchpin for 
consolidating the proletarian dictatorship.457 Referring to Lenin’s work, Qi Shirong, a 
professor of history at Beijing Capital Normal University, emphasized that “violence is by 
                                                             
455 Democracy Wall was the first political dissent movement in Post-Mao China, which demanded the 
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no means of the essence of proletarian dictatorship.” 458 Chun Yuyu, a professor in the 
Institute of Contemporary Socialism at Shandong University, strongly criticized China’s 
past abuse and mechanical understanding of “continued revolution” (buduan geming). 
Chun brought in Lenin’s speech to emphasize that exaggerating the importance of 
revolution had been destructive for China in the past.459  
On the other hand, another group of works played a role in safeguarding the role of 
Chinese socialism by quoting Lenin’s phrases. In 1980, an article appeared in Beijing 
Review commenting on the case of former PRC statesman Liu Shaoqi, whose course for 
modernization had been rejected in political struggle and who died at the hands of Mao in 
1969; the article eulogized Liu’s great contributions to the Chinese revolution. The 
editorial took advantage of the posthumous rehabilitation of Liu in 1980, to demonstrate 
that the CCP “has restored the true qualities of Mao Zedong Thought,” and “has firm 
unity within its ranks and firm unity with the people.” 460 The article quoted Lenin’s 
following words to pay respect to the CCP and defend its position: 
 
The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and 
surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it in practice fulfils its obligations 
towards its class and the toiling masses. Frankly admitting a mistake, ascertaining the 
reasons for it, analysing the conditions which led to it, and thoroughly discussing the means 
of correcting it – that is the hallmark of a serious party.461 
 
 
In scholarly writings, while in complete agreement with reinstating socialist 
humanism (shehui zhuyi rendao zhuyi) in Lenin’s terms, Ma Jihua, a researcher at the 
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Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, considered humanism to not be an abstract 
concept. He remarked that many slogans derived from bourgeois humanism, such as 
“freedom, equality, fraternity, democracy, and human right,” are “oppositional to 
Marxism-Leninism.” 462 After encapsulating all the essentials of Lenin in constructing 
socialism in an economically backward country, both Wu Renzhang (an IREECAS 
scholar) and Xu Pohan (director of the Institute of Scientific Socialism at the Shanxi 
Provincial Academy of Social Sciences) averred that, while focusing on the productive 
forces is indispensable, the most fundamental tenet of Leninism is upholding the 
proletarian dictatorship and communist one-party rule.463  
The two categories of writings above are not contradictory but complementary to 
each other. Both Party mouthpiece papers and scholarly works adroitly manipulated the 
tenets of Lenin’s thought, in an attempt to renew the CCP legitimacy after the discredited 
Maoist era. They did this by undercutting the position of residual radical and conservative 
forces, and arresting the cynicism and crisis of faith in communism – two of the biggest 
political and ideological tasks haunting Deng’s early rule.   
To confront the post-Mao crisis, the early Deng regime also attempted to find a way 
to overhaul the outdated Maoist institutions. Deng once boiled down all his thoughts on 
Party reform in a talk to an enlarged meeting of the Politburo in 1980. His standards 
consisted of several elements, such as institutionalization of the Party system, facilitating 
the economy, parrying the errors done by the Cultural Revolution, and most importantly, 
strengthening but not enervating the Party dictatorship. 464  Deng’s concept of Party 
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democracy was no different to that of Mao, who viewed “the extension of democracy in 
the party” as a way to “strengthen discipline” and “an essential step in its consolidation 
and development.” 465  
Deng did not regard Mao as having created the wrong system; rather, it was the bad 
elements of the system that distorted Mao’s behaviours. 466  Most importantly, Deng 
perceived that Mao had actually undermined the CCP during his rule, so it was essential 
for the post-Mao political reform not to de-centralize the Party power, but to reinforce it 
for ruling the PRC more effectively. 467  This thesis has been corroborated by Frank 
Dikötter and Michel Bonnin. Both scholars argue in their books that Mao’s numerous 
mass political campaigns not only destroyed the social fabric of China, but also hollowed 
out the communist ideology and ultimately buried Maoism. After the departure of Mao, 
the new CCP leadership realized that the prior personalized and dogmatic politics had led 
to bureaucratic inefficiency, and the absence of systems of responsibility and 
administrative regulations.468   
To keep up the tempo, Chinese scholars took great efforts to invoke Lenin’s writings 
and the early Soviet rule for promoting China’s socialist political reform (or, more 
accurately speaking, administrative reform). First, China under Mao had suffered from 
rampant bureaucratism, and curbing the infestation of bureaucratic practice was a major 
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agenda of Deng’s political reform.469 Some writers remarked that, according to Lenin, the 
root of bureaucratism is found in the legacy of old society, feudalism, and colonization.470 
Others argued (by drawing on Lenin’s works) that the disease of Soviet bureaucratism 
had originated in the Tsarist tradition, the pathetic economy, and a low level of education 
of the masses before 1917.471  
As a commentator in Beijing Review pointed out, in Lenin’s view all the Soviet 
Union’s problems after the October Revolution could be traced back to its “semi-Asiatic 
conditions.” 472 China, according to the author, “was much more backward than Russia in 
Lenin’s time,” and the past backslide of the Cultural Revolution was a “typical feudal-
bureaucrat autocracy home-grown on the ruins of the millennia-old feudal empire.” The 
commentator finally suggested that the CCP was only “a victim of feudalism,” and 
“eliminating the influence of feudalism institutionally and ideologically, therefore, is 
necessarily an urgent task in Party building in the period ahead.” 473 The conclusion of 
these arguments can be summed up as stating that bureaucratism and other negative 
vestiges in the socialist states are by no means the intrinsic problem of socialism; instead, 
they are the dross from old tradition and old society. 
Second, Chinese scholars appreciated several of Lenin’s points in reference to the 
early Deng political reform. Using Lenin’s work encouraging mass participation in 
governmental administration, Xiao Lifeng, a professor at the Zhongnan University of 
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Economics and Law in Hubei Province, argued that proletarian democracy is far superior 
to bourgeois democracy; in the former system it is the people who have the oversight of 
the state, while the exploitative class dominates in the latter system. 474 According to 
IREECAS scholar Xu Yunpu’s survey, the Soviet state institutions under Lenin were “a 
highly democratic socialist system,” and “a thousand times better than bourgeois 
democracy.” In his view, Lenin’s creation “should be the right direction for all future 
socialist democratic developments.” 475  
In addition, aside from having agreed with Lenin’s thesis that proletarian democracy 
should be advanced over bourgeois democracy, and that it is the highest form of 
democracy in the world, scholars Hong Yunshan (a researcher at the Sichuan Provincial 
Academy of Social Sciences) and Wang Lixing (a researcher at the Shandong Provincial 
Academy of Social Sciences) argued (by quoting The State and Revolution) that in order 
to facilitate the implementation of proletarian democracy, proletarian dictatorship (the 
synonym of communist party dictatorship) is essential. In their final judgment, proletarian 
dictatorship should exist until the state enters the stage of communism.476  
Seen from the comparison between Deng and the Chinese writings presented above, 
scholars’ arguments on the characteristics of Lenin’s rule in the early Soviet Union 
largely resonated with the thrust of Deng’s various speeches. Under the full cover of the 
most authoritative communist leader Lenin, Chinese scholars ascribed all the past defects 
and wrongdoings in socialist China to the imperial and feudal tradition before 1949 – the 
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founding year of communist China. 477  They suggested that all impoverishments and 
sufferings of pre-1976 PRC had little to do with the true nature of socialism or even Mao 
himself. Their assurance of the absolute superiority of proletarian democracy and the 
fundamental necessity of holding fast a proletarian dictatorship was undoubtedly 
welcomed by the Deng regime, which at the time desperately sought a theoretical basis 
for keeping the corpus of Mao unimpaired and ensuring the long-term survival of 
communist rule in China.478 China specialist Willy Wo-Lap Lam once commented that 
Deng’s blind faith in the absolute necessity of CCP leadership, and his intolerance of 
people who oppose socialism, had demonstrated that the Chinese leader “never tried, or 
dared, to exorcise totally the Chairman’s ghost,” and he “was nothing more than Mao’s 
disciple.” 479 
There is a more telling example illustrating why Lenin was so relevant to the political 
context of China in the early 1980s. Deng Xiaoping had been quite enthralled by the first 
decade of the PRC administration, when Mao’s personal power was subordinated to the 
collective leadership or democratic centralism of the CCP. He once stated, “Comrade Mao 
Zedong’s leadership was correct before 1957,” 480 and complained that since the Great 
Leap Forward “this fine tradition has not been upheld, nor has it been incorporated into a 
strict and perfected system.” 481 In his speech on Party reform in 1980, Deng prioritized 
tackling the over-concentration of power in the hands of an individual, as “it hinders the 
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practice of socialist democracy and of the Party’s democratic centralism.” 482 He was fully 
aware that the over-concentration of individual power in leaders had become “one 
important cause of the Cultural Revolution,” and urged “no further delay in finding a 
solution to this problem.” 483 Even in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, when the 
situation required the CCP to tighten the political screws in China, Deng still requested 
the Party to maintain “a strong collective leadership.” He said, “It is unhealthy and very 
risky to base the destiny of a country on the prestige of one or two individuals.” 484  
In the early 1980s, the use of Lenin to corroborate the significance of democratic 
centralism in Party building had gained momentum, particularly after the release of 
Deng’s speech on political reform in August 1980.485 Under the umbrella of Lenin and his 
words, some articles compared the Soviet Union after Lenin and China during the 
Cultural Revolution. They made it clear that both periods had seriously violated the 
norms of democratic centralism and resulted in personal dictatorship and factional 
strife. 486  Others asserted that democratic centralism is the principle of intra-party 
democracy. They demanded that democratic centralism be re-enforced for rebuilding 
Party democracy in post-Mao China.487  
An article appeared in 1985 that challenged the long-time Chinese understanding of 
“democratic centralism,” which had been mechanically interpreted as a simple equation 
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of democracy plus centralization. The author Shao Xing, a professor at the Central Party 
School, suggested that the Chinese translation of “democratic centralism” change from 
minzhu jizhongzhi to minzhude jizhongzhi, which would clarify its fundamental 
differences with the concept of bourgeois democracy and would be closer to Lenin’s 
definition. This was the first time in the PRC that a scholar unequivocally pointed out, in 
view of Lenin’s original work, that the term “demokraticheskii tsentralizm” (democratic 
centralism) should include both the adjective “demokraticheskii” (democratic) and the 
noun “tsentralizm” (centralism). “Demokraticheskii” is being used to modify the main 
word “tsentralizm.” 488  
In another article published one year later, IREECAS scholar Li Yuanshu also studied 
the problematic Chinese definition of “democratic centralism” against Lenin’s original, 
and recommended that the Chinese translation be corrected by reprinting the word 
“centralism” in bold, for putting accent on the importance of the phrase in this context. Li 
argued that in Lenin’s organizational principle, the Bolshevik Party should be the 
combination of “strong collective leadership and iron discipline.” It was exactly such a 
powerful Party that had kept score during the victory of the October Revolution and 
withstood the harsh civil war and international hostility after 1917. Moreover, Li 
remarked that it was Stalin who had overturned the democratic centralism created and 
reinforced by Lenin after the latter’s pre-mature death, and since then the USSR had 
evolved into a state saddled with tyranny and ideological fetishism.489  
Before the 1949 liberation, British journalist James Bertram wrote that he, being 
from a Western context, felt puzzled by the self-contradictory term “democratic 
centralism” and asked Mao Zedong for clarification. Mao answered: 
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On the one hand, the government we want must be truly representative of the popular will; 
it must have the support of the broad masses throughout the country and the people must be 
free to support it and have every opportunity of influencing its policies. This is the meaning 
of democracy. On the other hand, the centralization of administrative power is also 
necessary, and once the policy measures demanded by the people are transmitted to their 
own elected government through their representative body, the government will carry them 
out and will certainly be able to do so smoothly, so long as it does not go against the policy 
adopted in accordance with the people’s will. This is the meaning of centralism. Only by 
adopting democratic centralism can a government be really strong.490  
 
 
Mao’s response came at a time when a strong Chinese government was needed in 
resisting the Japanese aggression in the 1930s. Upon the end of Mao’s radical era and at 
the beginning of the 1980s, when China was ready to return to normal politics, the 1982 
PRC Constitution stipulated that democratic centralism should be the guiding principle 
for the actions of the CCP, and defined the term in the following words: 
 
Within the Party, democracy is given full play, a high degree of centralism is practiced on 
the basis of democracy and a sense of organization and discipline is strengthened, so as to 
ensure unity of action throughout its ranks and the prompt and effective implementation of 
its decisions. Applying the principle that all members are equally subject to Party discipline, 
the Party duly criticizes or punishes those members who violate it and expels those who 
persist in opposing and harming the Party.491  
 
 
The Constitution also specified that there are two essential elements making up 
democratic centralism. While the second guideline states that the Party must be the 
representative of “the broadest masses of the people,” the most important clause is that 
the CCP should form “a high degree of ideological and political unity,” and should be “in 
adherence to the socialist road, to the people’s democratic dictatorship, and to Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought and in the concentration of our efforts on socialist 
modernization.” 492  Clearly, the Russian original of democratic centralism in Lenin’s 
works has every signature of the ideological tradition of Chinese communism. Both of 
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these stress Party discipline and strong collective leadership, while keeping distance from 
Western liberalization and democracy. The term is not directed toward the expansion of 
individual rights, but for the power concentration of communist party. Lenin’s definition 
of democratic centralism was no doubt an effective tool used by the CCP in the early 
1980s – useful for rebuilding intra-party democracy and erasing the lingering throes of 
Maoist dictatorship and factional struggle, while making a serious effort to strengthen the 
CCP rulership as it drove China into modernization. 
Last, Deng Xiaoping on several occasions bluntly stated that the goal of his early 
1980s political reform was to facilitate China’s modernization and economic 
development.493 Chinese scholars were also quoting Lenin at this time to promote Deng’s 
purpose. In 1984, Ren Jianxiong, a scholar at the Sichuan Provincial Academy of Social 
Sciences, described how Lenin in his later years had urgently felt the need to reform the 
Soviet political structure and shake off its economic backwardness. The scholar presented 
the substance of Lenin’s political reform after War Communism (1918-1921), which 
included distinguishing the responsibilities of the Party and of the government, allowing 
people to enjoy the right to manage state affairs, curbing bureaucraticism, achieving high 
working efficiency, training cadres with professional knowledge, and promoting a large 
number of young personnel. 494 These agendas are almost identical to Deng’s mission 
published in his 1980 speech on reforming the Party and state institutions, and expediting 
the economic growth.495  
In the early 1980s, several articles also invoked Lenin’s words to say that socialism 
has no fixed model and people should not build socialism using only books and 
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experiences.496 They urged China to construct socialism based on its own conditions, and 
to draw lessons from either socialism or capitalism. The authors remarked that Lenin’s 
New Economic Policy (NEP, 1922-1928) would be exemplary for China, and associated 
War Communism and Stalinism with the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution 
under Mao.497 Deng once admitted that he did not know what socialism really meant, but 
he did know that socialism is certainly not pauperism, which was the situation under 
Mao.498 To quote his words in 1985:  
 
What, after all, is socialism? The Soviet Union has been building socialism for so many 
years and yet is still not quite clear what it is. Perhaps Lenin had a good idea when he 
adopted the New Economic Policy. But as time went on, the Soviet pattern became ossified. 
We were victorious in the Chinese revolution precisely because we applied the universal 
principles of Marxism-Leninism to our own realities.499 
 
 
Whether the New Economic Policy was the correct model for China under Deng is 
not relevant in this context. The most important thing is that both Deng and Chinese 
scholars had been using the symbols of Lenin and his NEP as a public declaration for 
post-Mao China to renounce its past Soviet and Maoist shackles, and to live up to its 
claim of building and reforming socialism in a very different way.  
 
Lenin and post-Mao Chinese socialism 
As evident in the writings above, the influence of Lenin in the political context of 
early Deng’s China are multi-dimensional. First, throughout the 1980s Deng had stated 
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unequivocally that, while he was itching for the reversal of Maoist radicalism, post-Mao 
China should “distinguish between socialist democracy on the one hand and bourgeois, 
individualist democracy on the other.” 500 Chinese people must be “under the leadership 
of the Communist Party,” and “cannot adopt the practice of the West.” 501 Some scholarly 
writings on Lenin in the early 1980s, while ostensibly paying lip service to the official 
line of opposing bourgeois liberalization, boldly attacked many dark sides of the CCP 
regime: continuous revolution, class struggle, and the trampling of human rights. By 
drawing upon Lenin, scholars were advocating for Chinese people to have a real say in 
managing state affairs and ultimately to rebuilt what they saw as true socialism. They 
claimed to target the derailment of the Cultural Revolution; in essence, their writings 
seemed to be an unspoken disguise for criticizing Mao and his tyrannical rule.502  
Moreover, the central point of these writings was demanding the restoration of 
“people’s democratic rights,” and the authors considered such rights to be inseparable 
from true socialism as defined by Lenin.503 People’s democratic rights in the context of 
these works did not seem to conform to the thinking of Deng, who linked “democracy for 
the people with dictatorship over the enemy, and with centralism, legality, discipline and 
the leadership by the Communist Party,” and stressed “the importance of subordinating 
personal interests to collective ones, interests of the part to those of the whole, and 
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immediate to long-term interests.” 504 Because these scholars signalled a discrepancy with 
(though not an outright rejection of) the orthodox CCP ruling philosophy, it was 
convenient to draw upon Lenin. That is, Lenin was a sacrosanct symbol and figure who 
might instigate less political danger. Thus, Lenin’s thought was applied to Chinese 
writings in order to ask for the return of humanistic socialism, if not wholesale democracy 
in the Western sense; this occurred in the early 1980s when the vestiges of Maoism were 
still rampant in the PRC.  
Second, once Mao died in 1976, Deng had to wait for several years to outdo his rival 
Hua Guofeng (allegedly Mao’s designated successor), and to rise to the dominant position 
of the Party in the early 1980s. During this interim, Deng was facing intensive 
competition for power from Hua Guofeng. In a 1979 speech, Deng employed Mao’s 
maxim “seeking truth from facts” to symbolize his pragmatic approach,505 and to oppose 
the dogmatic stand of “two whatevers” upheld by Hua.506 Deng accused that the “two 
whatevers” “did not represent Marxism-Leninism,” and were “merely peddling the old 
stock in trade of Lin Biao and the Gang of Four in new guise.” He even argued that the 
contest of these two political lines (Hua and himself) was the life-and-death struggle for 
the mandate to rule China after Mao.507 One may assume that if Hua Guofeng proclaimed 
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that he had full legitimacy to succeed Mao, then Deng may have needed the umbrella of 
an ultimate figure of authority in the communist world to sustain his competition with 
Hua. The use of Lenin appears to be the best vehicle for serving Deng’s purpose in his 
political campaign against Hua and extricating China from Mao’s residue.  
At the time, some Chinese scholars seemed to have been involved in the Deng-Hua 
rivalry and positioned themselves on Deng’s side in an effort to undermine Hua. A 
number of them cited Lenin’s debate with the left communists during the early Soviet 
Union, to serve their purpose in their articles.508 One example of this is the article written 
by Yang Yanjun, a researcher at the Harbin Academy of Social Sciences. Although the 
author did not mention the name of Hua Guofeng, he remarked that the goal of socialism 
is “developing the economy” but not aiming at “world revolution and class struggle.” 509 
He praised Lenin’s stand on “prioritizing the economic development and criticizing the 
high-sounding style of the left communists,” who opted for “marching toward 
communism at the time when the Soviet Union was still underdeveloped.” 510 In some 
ways, Yang’s veiled attack seemed to target Hua’s assertions, as the Chairman announced 
that he would wholeheartedly follow Mao’s order of continuous revolution and class 
struggle, 511  and proposed an over-ambitious plan for China to achieve industrial and 
agricultural modernization within ten years – this at a time when the country was still 
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mired in a dismal economic state after the Cultural Revolution.512 Hua soon became the 
target of the CCP reformers, and his Maoist and bombastic style quickly turned into the 
source of his eventual downfall.   
At the time Chinese scholars had wisely used Lenin for symbolizing Deng, whereby 
they attempted to break down the outdated Maoism and its incarnation in Hua and other 
leftists, and usher the PRC into a new age. According to Zhidong Hao, the goal of the new 
leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping after the death of Mao coincided with the goal of 
intellectuals to find out what had gone wrong in the Cultural Revolution. With Deng’s 
support, they first began to pave the way for a climate that tolerated more questioning, in 
an effort to overcome Mao’s dogmatism. From 1978 onward, with the help of 
intellectuals, Deng began to win the debate and forced Hua and his followers to suffer 
through self-criticism. The debate led to the firm establishment of Deng’s position in the 
Party. It also guaranteed the government’s shift from class struggle to the economy, a 
policy established in December 1978.513 
Third, the use of Lenin in the early 1980s was also propitious in justifying Deng’s 
regime as the legitimate socialist government after the rejection of radical Maoism. Mao 
Zedong once commented:  
 
It was through the Russians that the Chinese found Marxism. Before the October 
Revolution, the Chinese were not only ignorant of Lenin and Stalin, they did not even know 
of Marx and Engels. The salvoes of the October Revolution brought us Marxism-Leninism. 
The October Revolution helped progressives in China, as throughout the world, to adopt the 
proletarian world outlook as the instrument for studying a nation's destiny and considering 
anew their own problems. Follow the path of the Russians – that was their conclusion.514 
 
 
Mao’s words actually reveal an undeniable veracity that, although the PRC was 
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created by Mao and his communist fellows, the founding principle and genesis of Chinese 
communism came from Lenin and the Soviet Union. In a 1979 speech, Deng pointed out 
squarely that Lin Biao and the Gang of Four were targeting not only Mao, but most 
importantly, Marxism-Leninism.515 At the same time, Party veteran Chen Yun in another 
speech put post-Mao China into the larger picture of the international communist 
movement, and argued that the fate of the CCP regime would affect the “victory of world 
communism.” According to him, the USSR after Lenin was no longer a socialist state in 
nature, as its intra-party democracy had been encroached upon since Stalin took power. 
He argued that post-Mao China should recover intra-party democracy and normal Party 
life – a return to Leninist norm.516 In other words, the CCP is an international socialist 
Party belonging to the global communist movement, and it is a truly Leninist Party, but 
by no means an indigenous product created by Mao. Consider, for example, that in a 
speech made by Ye Jianying, marshal of the People’s Liberation Army, the term 
“Marxism-Leninism” always precedes “Mao Zedong Thought.” 517 Such a writing format 
became common in China after Mao’s death, and we can find many of these examples in 
the speeches and works of PRC officials from 1978 onward.518  
Deng once divided socialism into “utopian socialism” and “scientific socialism,” the 
latter of which included “the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong 
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Thought.” 519  Subsequently, Gao Fang, a professor of the history of communism at 
Renmin University, outspokenly remarked that both China under Mao and the USSR 
under Stalin had practiced utopian socialism, which plunged both states into “chaos and 
darkness.” He, therefore, demanded that post-Mao China return to the path of scientific 
socialism set by Lenin.520 The arguments above redefined the Chinese communist regime 
as a true Leninist state, the Maoist past being only an aberration but not the nature of the 
CCP. Deng’s rule was perceived as following the path of Lenin – orthodox socialism, not 
the socialism distorted by Mao. In sum, post-Mao China has devolved Mao’s role to the 
Party as a whole, and the CCP has identified itself as a legatee of Lenin rather than of 
Mao. 
Having said this, the paradigm of Lenin in early 1980s China by no means functioned 
to overrule Mao. Mao founded the Chinese party-state in 1949, and his fate and the PRC 
are always inter-connected, so it would be out of the question for Deng to obliterate the 
unsurpassable landmark of Mao’s position through any measure. According to Yang 
Haikun, a professor of law at Suzhou University in Jiangsu Province, socialist democracy 
as defined by Lenin was not only antagonistic to “personal dictatorship and patriarchism,” 
but also incompatible with “anarchism and bourgeois liberalization,” which are the targets 
of every Chinese communist leader.521 Seen from the examples cited above, the use of 
Lenin after Mao’s death was mostly intended to cut away the bad side of Maoism only, 
and not to totally root out the status of Mao. As Deng once said, “Criticizing Comrade 
Mao’s personal mistakes alone will not solve problems.” He believed that it was “the 
faulty systems and institutions of the past” that pushed Mao “in the opposite direction.” 
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In reality, the use of Lenin in early 1980s China could be regarded as protecting or 
saving Mao’s place in history. CCP Secretary General Hu Yaobang once defined the 
quintessence of Maoism as “the integration of Marxism-Leninism and present Chinese 
realities,” which was “the only correct road opened by Mao for our future.” Hu equated 
Mao’s strategy of liberating China through encirclement of the cities from the countryside 
with Lenin’s victory of the October Revolution. He said that both courses were the same 
as they were “examples of seeking truth from facts and achieving successful revolutions 
by integrating the universal truth of Marxism.” 523 Hu’s words echoed Deng Xiaoping 
who had used the same motto “seeking truth from facts” to absolve Mao’s crimes and 
banish the remaining Maoists, while establishing his own credentials as China’s new 
leader and preparing the country for the path of socialist modernization.524  
From Deng’s point of view, the best part of Mao’s rule was before the Great Leap 
Forward in 1957, and during those years Mao “developed Lenin’s theory of Party 
building most comprehensively.” 525  According to the CCP verdict, Mao only made 
mistakes in the evening of his life, a period that was the antipode to true Maoism.526 It 
seemed that true Maoism appeared before the emergence of the Great Leap Forward and 
it was equivalent to Leninism. The aim of post-Mao China was to return to true Maoism 
as well as Leninism. As American scholar David Goodman comments, the essence of the 
reforms launched in 1978 highlighted Deng’s obsession with “the golden age of the 
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unforgettable 1950s,” when the collective leadership, inner-party democracy, style of 
honesty, cleanliness in government, and frugality in enterprise were the norm. In 
Goodman’s view, Deng was not “an innovator,” but rather “a traditionalist,” who was 
eager to restore the good sides of Maoism and legitimize contemporary politics.527  
In 1981, Jiang Yihua, a professor of history at Fudan University in Shanghai, 
described War Communism as being equivalent to the direction under Mao, while the 
New Economic Policy symbolized Deng’s path of reform and open door. In the 
conclusion of his article, Jiang remarked that the formulation of the New Economic 
Policy was a result of Lenin having learned from the mistakes of War Communism.528 
According to Gilbert Rozman, in the mind of Chinese Sovietologists in the 1980s, War 
Communism epitomized a rigid system that aimed to eliminate private property, 
commodity production, and market exchange. On the other hand, the New Economic 
Policy represented a moderate approach allowing small businesses, cultural diversity, and 
faster economic growth under the one-party rule, which is a model of value for present-
day China and similar to the economic policy that Deng had carried out after 1978.529 In 
1982, IREECAS scholar Ye Shuzong controverted some scholars’ arguments that War 
Communism was a leftist error while NEP was a clear manifestation of true Leninism.530 
Ye demonstrated that the two programs were different stages of socialist revolution, and 
NEP could not have been conceived without the precedent of War Communism:   
 
Lenin was a human being but not God. As a human being, his thoughts were changing from 
time to time. Both War Communism and the New Economic Policy were the ways used by 
Lenin to construct socialism. Such measures could not be found in the books of Marx. 
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From War Communism to the New Economic Policy, every stage was the inseparable part 
leading to the development of Leninism.531  
 
 
Ye’s stand on Lenin was exactly the same as Deng’s view on Mao, evidenced by his 
1977 speech entitled “Mao Zedong Thought Must Be Correctly Understood as an Integral 
Whole.” 532 
Last, some Chinese scholars in the early 1980s greatly appreciated Lenin’s notion 
that socialism could be founded in a backward nation without previous experience in the 
capitalist stage.533 In their opinions, an economically backward country like China could 
reach the final victory of communism by learning from Lenin’s teachings, such as 
persisting in a proletarian dictatorship, observing advanced elements from all over the 
world, and most importantly, seeking truth from facts to build socialism. 534  Chinese 
scholars’ defence of Lenin on this point was attempting to excuse the economic and social 
backwardness that still existed in China after more than three decades of the CCP rule. 
Lenin’s statement was being used to explain that the extensive poverty in early 1980s 
China was not due to Mao or the intrinsic Party rule, but rather to historical legacies of 
the feudal past – or something else altogether.  
Through the enduring lustre of Lenin, scholars attempted to bring vigour to the 
weakening legitimacy of Chinese socialism after the Cultural Revolution, and to provide 
a mandate for Deng’s policies and future reforms. Interpretation of Lenin thus became a 
solvent of the old order as well as a catalyst for major changes in early 1980s China. 
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Their introduction of Lenin’s argument laid the groundwork for the “primary stage of 
socialism” theory built on by the later CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang in his key-
note speech delivered during the 13th Party Congress in 1987. In Zhao’s words, because 
China had attained socialism without proper capitalist experience before, the PRC may 
use whatever means is available to catch up with the advanced countries, including 
commodity economy and other capitalist elements.535 The use of Lenin’s argument also 
opened the path to Deng Xiaoping’s word-juggling of “socialist market economy” 
propounded in the early 1990s. The slogan envisions the future development framework 
of China, namely economic capitalism plus the guaranteed Chinese Communist Party 
monopoly.536 China in the early 1980s wanted to wriggle out of the Maoist model in 
economic terms, but still needed to retain socialism in political terms. Hoisting the flag of 
Lenin was a much-needed convenience for the PRC, as Lenin’s model of manipulating 
unorthodox methods to achieve orthodox socialism in a backward state bears the stamp of 
the Zeitgeist of post-Mao China. This Zeitgeist can be defined as: there is no universal 
truth, only the truth according to the tide is truth.  
 
Glasnost and China 
Former CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang once said that Soviet glasnost had more 
impact than “Western values, concepts, and political systems” in encouraging “China’s 
intellectuals, youth, and young workers to demand more democracy” in the 1980s.537 
When Zhao was in power in the mid-1980s, with Deng Xiaoping’s approval he organized 
and supervised the first political reform group since the founding of the PRC, in order to 
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design a proposal for the institutional restructuring of the CCP.538 Wu Guoguang, former 
advisor to Zhao and the chief editor of the Renmin ribao in the late 1980s, has revealed 
that during this period of formulating political reform, Zhao’s aim was to learn from 
Gorbachev and implement economic and political reforms in China concurrently. The 
Secretary General always asked the staff to obtain the minutes of the CPSU Congress (at 
which Gorbachev had delivered his speeches), in order to give him inspiration for China’s 
political reform.539 In addition, Zhao occasionally invited over the PRC ambassador to 
Moscow together with some well-known IREECAS Soviet specialists such as Wu 
Renzhang, Wang Qi, and Zhao Naibin – in order to provide him with seminar talks on 
Soviet glasnost.540 After he was removed from the leadership owing to his unwillingness 
to endorse the Tiananmen crackdown ordered by Deng Xiaoping, Zhao admitted that his 
thinking on political reform had changed in 1985/1986, when he was “aroused somewhat 
by events in the broader international environment and problems that had emerged in the 
Eastern Bloc.” 541  
After the mid-1980s, not only Zhao Ziyang, but also other CCP leaders, such as Tian 
Jiyun and Bo Yibo, expressed their admiration for Gorbachev’s program and their 
willingness to learn from the Soviet experience.542 The official recognition obviously 
stimulated intellectual interest. In a speech given to the National Social Sciences 
Congress in April 1988, CASS President Hu Sheng complained that China had not 
previously carried out much research on Soviet politics owing to the Sino-Soviet conflicts, 
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with the result that Chinese scholars lacked knowledge of recent developments, such as 
glasnost, in the Soviet Union. Hu urged Chinese people to conduct research into “Soviet 
political and economic structural reforms immediately,” as “those reforms are analogous 
to what China has undertaken,” stating that such comparative studies were “necessary and 
beneficial.” 543  
At the same time, some Chinese scholars expressed their great appreciation for, and 
excitement about, Gorbachev and his political reform. 544  On hearing the Soviet 
announcement at the 27th CPSU Congress concerning the termination of the 
concentration of power in the hands of the Communist Party and the life-long tenure of 
the Secretary General, Gao Fang predicted that Gorbachev might become “a proletarian 
George Washington” and bring “a blessed message to socialism.” 545 Zhao Yuliang, a 
professor of economics at Beijing Jiaotong University, foresaw that Gorbachev’s reform 
would be “another epoch-making revolution comparable to the one under Peter the Great 
in Russian history.” 546 At the time, the Gorbachev fervour had influenced the Chinese 
language and writing style, evidenced by a piece of editorial statement in Shehui zhuyi 
yanjiu (Socialism Studies) in early 1989: 
 
According to socialist new thinking (shehui zhuyi xinsiwei), in the future, we will publish 
more articles rethinking the past, present, and future of socialism. We will emphasize on the 
aspect of being “new” when choosing the submissions. In line with the current trend of 
“glasnost” (gongkaixing), the journal in the future will let readers know more about our 
selection criteria, and invite you to participate in the selection process.547  
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As discussed in the last chapter, Chinese scholars only started to have a good 
impression of Gorbachev’s foreign policy in late 1987, owing to the problems of Sino-
Soviet relations at the time. However, a positive Chinese assessment of Soviet political 
reform had already appeared as early as 1986. In Renmin ribao, one commentator praised 
the new Soviet cultural policy for breaking through dogmatism and making a bold move 
to encourage the emergence of many dissenting works that were unthinkable in the past, 
such as sponsoring the production of movies that would address current Soviet social 
problems.548 IREECAS scholar Zhou Xiangguang in a special report (zhuangao) strongly 
agreed with the new Soviet direction, stating that only by being accompanied by political 
restructuring could economic reform become successful. 549  At the same time, other 
Chinese scholars also appreciated Gorbachev’s courage in reforming the ossified Soviet 
political system after he took power.550  
In contrast with the Chinese reaction to Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s, China’s 
positive response to Soviet glasnost and political reform was far more obvious and 
appeared not long after Gorbachev took the helm. The reasons were manifold. The most 
important of these was the extraordinary openness and budding democracy of the Chinese 
political environment after the mid-1980s. At a national symposium in 1986, Vice-
Premier Wan Li had already called for the introduction of “a more democratic and 
scientific policy decision-making process” in the CCP.551 In 1988, one author publicly 
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demanded the end of censorship in China.552 The National People’s Congress (NPC), the 
national legislature of China, vetoed a personnel appointment recommended by the CCP, 
which was unprecedented in PRC history and, as the Renmin ribao reporter described, “a 
manifestation of the increased democratic awareness of NPC members.” 553 In the realm 
of academia, in 1986 the editorial board of Shehui kexue yanjiu (Social Science Research), 
funded by the Sichuan Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, published an article in 
which, after a re-examination of the disastrous decade of the Cultural Revolution, it was 
suggested that China learn from the West in “instituting political democratization and 
allowing intellectuals to be critical of those in power.” 554 At CASS, a new policy issued 
in early 1989 encouraged scholars to “apply research methodologies that are not 
concerned with Marxist theory, as long as they abide by the Chinese Constitution.” 555 
Second, since the mid-1980s China had placed political reform high on the agenda. 
In 1986, Deng Xiaoping acknowledged that, “without political reform, economic reform 
cannot succeed,” and “the success of all our other reforms depends on the success of the 
political reform.” 556 Back then, even the Party conservatives, such as Peng Zhen and Bo 
Yibo, voiced their support for initiating political reform in China.557 In response to the 
official mandate, several articles appeared in various journals. The authors proposed that 
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China should closely scrutinize the process of political reforms in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union, and argued strongly that economic modernization could not be realized 
without socialist democracy. 558  Seen from the perspective of such scholars’ profound 
esteem for glasnost, those Chinese observers of the Soviet Union might either have been 
genuinely impressed by Gorbachev’s program, or have wanted to speed up China’s own 
glasnost and seek to highlight the achievements of Soviet political reform in order to give 
the Chinese regime the extra push that was needed for the adoption of similar measures.   
Last, although Sino-Soviet relations were mediocre at the time, the diplomatic 
deadlock did not translate into China’s total rejection of Gorbachev’s political reform. In a 
press conference held in 1988, Premier Li Peng stated that the prerequisite of the 
improvement of bilateral relations must be the removal of the three obstacles, and urged 
Gorbachev to do so accordingly. However, when being asked about his view on Soviet 
political reform, the Premier answered that he was delighted to note “the dynamic 
atmosphere of the last 19th CPSU Conference,” and gave his “best wishes for the success 
of the Soviet reforms.” 559 Li Peng’s words demonstrate that Maoism had been removed 
from the PRC after 1978. Chinese communist leadership understood how to evaluate the 
Soviet Union more objectively and recognized the need to de-ideologize international 
relations.  
There are two features in Chinese writings to expatiate on how scholars had made use 
of Gorbachev and glasnost to speed up China’s political change after the mid-1980s. First, 
after 1986, many articles attempted to demonstrate that Gorbachev’s reforms were a 
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return to Lenin’s orthodox socialism. Some writers argued that Gorbachev’s economic 
restructuring was inspired by the New Economic Policy in the 1920s, 560  and some 
contended that the concept of glasnost originated from Lenin. 561  Others appreciated 
Gorbachev’s efforts in either re-establishing the people’s right to participate in state 
affairs,562 or in reinstating democratic and humanistic socialism.563 They argued that both 
had been developed by Lenin, but later sabotaged by Stalin, and had not been fully 
revived by the Soviet leaders after Stalin. It might be correct, based on the opening 
speech of the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986, to say that Gorbachev’s reforms 
were a return to true Leninism;564 however, Chinese scholars had a tactical consideration 
in placing Gorbachev and Lenin in the same category.  
Since Gorbachev’s program of glasnost had spread to China, Chinese intellectuals 
were keen to learn from it and portray it as a lesson for China, in the hope that 
Gorbachev’s thinking might stimulate further political change in the PRC after the initial 
economic reform that was begun in 1978. It should be noted that a short-lived campaign 
against bourgeois liberalization had emerged in the first half of 1987, after the 1986 
student demonstrations and the forced resignation of Secretary General Hu Yaobang, who 
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was accused of being sympathetic to bourgeois thinking.565 Although the event was not 
large in scale and was nothing like the type of political persecutions that had taken place 
under Mao, Deng Xiaoping had made it clear in late 1986 that slogans against socialism 
and soft approaches toward bourgeois liberalization would not be tolerated. 566  It is 
therefore understandable that Chinese scholars chose to use the less risky figure of Lenin 
to channel their arguments during this sensitive period, making their interpretations less 
vulnerable to attack. Quoting Lenin to boost Gorbachev’s positive image might generate 
less political trouble and be more acceptable to the Party old guard, who were not very 
familiar with Gorbachev’s ideas. A balancing act was required in coverage of this theme.  
Second, while Soviet political reform had been making headway since 1985, Zhao 
Ziyang’s political reform had remained a work-in-progress since the mid-1980s, and was 
stillborn on the eve of the Tiananmen Incident. Zhao’s reform proposals included the 
power decentralization of the CCP, the separation of the Party and the state, the 
introduction of the rule of law, reform of the National People’s Congress, the 
institutionalization of the civil servant system, and permission given to other parties to 
compete with the CCP in rank-and-file elections.567 The CCP Secretary General once 
revealed that the slow progress of his political reform and the difficulty of putting it into 
practice were mainly the result of Deng Xiaoping’s orthodox thinking and his interference 
preventing any bold experimentation.568  
Before the 13th Party Congress in 1987, Chinese scholars began to mention the need 
for China to initiate a political restructuring. To take an example, Song Mengrong, vice 
                                                             
565 “Zhonggong zhongyang zhengzhiju kuoda huiyi gongbao,” [Report of the Enlarged Meeting of the CCP 
Central Committee] Renmin ribao, January 17, 1987. 
566 Deng, “Take A Clear-cut Stand against Bourgeois Liberalization,” December 30, 1986, in Deng, Selected 
Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 194. 
567 For the detail, process, and nature of Zhao’s political reform, see Wu Guoguang, Zhaoziyang yuzhengzhi 
gaige [Political Reform under Zhao Ziyang].   
568 Zong Fengming, Zhaoziyang ruanjin zhongde tanhua [Zhao Ziyang: Captive Conversations] (Hong Kong: 
Open Books, 2007), 33. 
Part Two—Chapter 5 
213 
 
president of the Liaoning Provincial Party School, took the case of the Polish uprising in 
1980 and demonstrated that “the productive forces could not be developed further without 
the change of old political system,” and “the ruling party should undertake the political 
reform before structural problems have accumulated to a point of explosion,” otherwise 
the situation might generate political crisis and jeopardize socialism.569  
After the 13th Party Congress in 1987, Zhao’s plans for political reform were warmly 
welcomed by Chinese scholars.570 However, after seeing that Zhao had not translated 
many of his promises into practice, from 1988 onward the attitude of Chinese scholars 
became more demanding. Xiao Gu and Yang Xinyu (both professors of Russian language 
at Fudan University) insisted that the Chinese government should learn from Gorbachev 
and implement political and economic reforms simultaneously.571 After criticizing the 
absence of democracy from post-Mao politics, Xu Hongwu, a professor of Marxism-
Leninism at Beijing Normal University, requested that China take notice of Gorbachev, 
and argued that “apart from glasnost, there is no way for China to introduce democratic 
politics.” 572 Zhou Yuansheng, then a PhD law student at Renmin University, remarked 
that it was essential for the PRC to establish “glasnost with Chinese characteristics.” 573  
The reason why Chinese scholars zealously supported Zhao’s proposals and 
consistently pressed for further political reform activity might have been the 
intensification of the power struggle between Zhao and the conservative forces in the 
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CCP leading up to the Tiananmen Incident. Firstly, if one compares Zhao’s report to the 
13th Party Congress and Deng’s conservative approach to political reform, one finds they 
are similar in substance. 574  However, Zhao’s speech to the Congress was largely for 
public consumption. The report needed Deng’s prior approval before it was delivered, and 
thus it may not reflect Zhao’s real intentions for political reform. In his publications, Wu 
Guoguang reveals that Zhao’s agenda was more radical than the 13th Party Congress 
speech suggested,575 and the CCP Secretary General even said that China’s future political 
reform should go one step further than Gorbachev’s glasnost.576 Zhao also recalled that 
the political reform report presented at the Congress would have been more open and 
liberal if Deng had not interfered so much during the writing process.577 Moreover, unlike 
Zhao and his followers, some key CCP leaders did not favour the direct adoption of 
Gorbachev’s program for China even before Tiananmen. While Zhao on some occasions 
demanded that political and economic reforms in China should operate in tandem,578 both 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Premier Li Peng were cautious about any radical 
approach toward reform, claiming that Gorbachev’s political reform model was 
unsuitable for China, on the grounds that the two countries had very different social, 
political, economic, and geographical conditions.579  
As the power struggle in the higher echelons of the Party escalated in the period 
before the student demonstrations, some Chinese scholars seemed to position themselves 
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on the side of the reformers in an effort to weed out the conservatives. David Shambaugh 
reveals that the time when Chinese scholars were commending Gorbachev’s glasnost 
“was precisely the time that Zhao Ziyang and his advisers were pushing political reform,” 
and that it also coincided with “a fierce intraparty debate within the CCP, and 
considerable swelling opposition to Zhao and his reforms.” 580 Prior to the Tiananmen 
Incident, Wang Chongjie, a scholar at Liaoning Normal University, affirmed that 
“Glasnost is a power to break down the arrogant, ossified, and stagnant forces in the 
socialist countries.” 581 Wang Yizhou, a researcher in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism 
at CASS, stated unequivocally that China should learn from Gorbachev’s political reform 
how to “overcome the inertia, conservatism, and dogmatism among the cumbersome 
bureaucracy,” and “get rid of the politics of septuagenarians.” 582  Shen Yiming (a 
researcher at Qinghua University) argued that through Gorbachev’s glasnost socialist 
pluralism had spread all over the world.583 He boldly commented:  
 
We should not exclude the possibility that there could be several Marxist parties existing 
side by side in a socialist state. Although the struggle to achieve political pluralism is 
extremely fierce, however, political pluralism will be an irresistible trend nonetheless, as 
long as the ruling party starts to admit its weakness and gives way to a more correct reform 
line; therefore, a healthy pluralist political mechanism will finally emerge.584 
 
 
There is another reason explaining why Gorbachev’s glasnost had become a 
desideratum of 1980s China. As already noted, the former CCP Secretary General Zhao 
Ziyang was a lover of glasnost. He was favoured and supported by many Chinese 
intellectuals in the 1980s as a patron of political reform. 585  Although on the surface 
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Zhao’s ideas looked more liberal than those of the Party old guard, in the eyes of Richard 
Baum Zhao’s thoughts on political reform still “stressed the need for strong, centralized 
technocratic leadership throughout the ‘primary stage of socialism’,” and he was not an 
advocate of “Western-style liberalism, but of Chinese-style ‘neo-authoritarianism’.” 586 
Chinese-American scholar Yan Sun has also defined Zhao’s style as “elite democracy.” 587 
Indeed, after having been purged in the wake of Tiananmen, Zhao revealed that he would 
never have countenanced a multi-party system but had advocated a reformed one-party 
dictatorship. He said that “neo-authoritarianism is good for a developing country.” 588  
The concept of “neo-authoritarianism” did not escape the attention of Chinese 
scholars in the 1980s. A 1989 article in Jingjixue zhoubao (Economics Weekly) stated that, 
“China needs a new kind of Gorbachev-like strongman.” 589 Zhao Liqing, an associate 
researcher at the Central Party School, openly remarked that, “present-day China needs 
democratic authoritarianism.” In his opinion, for the sake of economic modernization, 
“circumscription of personal freedom is essential,” and “a powerful government with 
sufficient authority” would be the best type of government to ensure the social and 
political stability necessary for reforms. According to the author, China should consult 
Gorbachev’s political reform model.590 It is interesting to note that some 1980s Chinese 
scholars tended to regard Gorbachev’s glasnost as a kind of government-led protection of 
citizens’ rights and supervision of bureaucratic conduct. They expressed the hope that 
some such guided democracy, whereby the people would gradually be given more say, 
would be introduced, while popular participation would be within limits fixed by the 
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Party. According to their definition, this was “democracy under socialism,” which, in their 
understanding, was equivalent to Zhao’s concept of neo-authoritarianism that champions 
pluralism, diversity, and efficiency under a strong government.591 
Similarly, many Western scholars make it clear that Gorbachev’s glasnost was not the 
same as Western democracy.592 His goal was either “a democratized one-party system” 593 
or “a more enlightened dictatorship.” 594 Russell Bova reminds readers about “the Russian 
heredity of Gorbachev’s policy,” and remarks, “While glasnost did involve a significant 
increase in the flow of information and liberty, it was Gorbachev who maintained his 
hand on the control valve.” 595 With regard to the Chinese understanding of glasnost, we 
need to compare the Chinese translation of gongkaixing (publicity or transparency) and 
the English equivalent of openness.596 The meaning of gongkaixing is a little different 
from that of openness. Gongkaixing conveys the impression that political transparency 
will be circumscribed by the top echelons of government to a certain extent. It is an 
authorized openness, not a complete openness; in other words, gongkaixing is openness 
licensed by the central government, rather than a fundamental political right of the 
citizens of a country. This difference is equivalent to the difference between rule by law 
and the rule of law. Lowell Dittmer profoundly captures the subtle difference between the 
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Chinese and Western concepts:  
 
The concept of “publicity” (gongkai) in contemporary China is derived from the age-old 
concept of the “public” (gong). In the Confucian classics a prominent polarity exists 
between the terms of “self” (zi) and “public” (gong), which is linked to an opposition 
between selfishness (zisi) and selflessness (wusi). The juxtaposition corresponds to the 
Western “public-private” distinction, though it is more invidious. Selflessness is lauded for 
having the interests of all the people in mind, as selfishness is condemned for a cognitive or 
even a moral failure to perceive the self in terms of a more comprehensive social organism 
to which the person’s fate is inextricably connected. The Western concept of the “private” is 
less pejoratively defined than the Chinese, with a strong strain going back at least to Adam 
Smith construing the private sector as making an almost necessarily positive contribution to 
public welfare. Private interests per se are sanctioned by the free market model in economic 
thoughts, by social contract theory in politics, and by the adversary tradition in 
jurisprudence. The public is, to be sure, also positively evaluated in the West (e.g., “public 
interest”, “public weal”), but even though it is favourably evaluated it has subtly different 
connotations from the Chinese concept.597  
 
Seen from these perspectives, glasnost seems to be akin to Chinese traditional 
thinking on political philosophy and statecraft. While the fact that Chinese scholars 
cloaked Gorbachev in the mantle of Leninism suggested that their understanding of his 
ideas was still orthodox in nature, their interpretation of glasnost also appeared to 
converge with the substance of Zhao Ziyang’s neo-authoritarianism.   
 
Concluding remarks 
Arriving at the conclusion of this chapter, first, Lenin’s name could be used to help 
rally Chinese communists against the radical policies that had long prevailed. On many 
issues, his views were introduced in an effort to justify new policies or rally support 
behind new proposals in the early 1980s. His stand was invoked to weaken the hold of 
Maoist remnants in favour of utilizing all possible resources for economic construction, 
and to support reformers in their pursuit of more sweeping changes. Having said this, the 
use of Lenin was by no means for leading the attack on Mao, but rather for defending the 
legitimacy of Chinese socialism founded by the Chairman. His theory was intended to 
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help save the CCP regime that had been paralyzed by the Cultural Revolution. The first 
Soviet leader was seen by Chinese officials and scholars as an epitome of the new kind of 
image the Party forged for itself after the maelstrom of the Cultural Revolution. The 
Chinese writings played on these positive associations of the Grail of Lenin, making him 
the moral centre of its representation of post-Mao China. 
Second, the existing secondary literature seems to have exaggerated the impact of 
Gorbachev on l980s China. Previous scholarship suggests that after the mid-1980s 
Chinese Soviet-watchers identified Gorbachev’s concept of glasnost and his political 
reform with Western democracy, and used Gorbachev and his ideas to push the Chinese 
regime toward political democratization on the eve of the Tiananmen Incident. This 
chapter, however, has shown that 1980s Chinese scholars interpreted glasnost in a way 
designed to serve their own purposes, and that this interpretation was quite different from 
democracy in the Western sense. The Chinese definition of glasnost remains 
circumscribed by China’s own mentality and history, reflecting the traditional Chinese 
understanding of human values and political culture.  
Moreover, few Chinese scholars used Gorbachev and his programs to put pressure on 
the CCP to introduce some form of political Westernization. Instead, most scholars 
manipulated the symbol of Gorbachev to support the reformist wing led by Zhao Ziyang 
in their factional warfare against the Party conservatives leading up to Tiananmen. In 
short, Chinese scholars did not regard Gorbachev and his programs as having the 
potential to transform the political landscape of the PRC; rather, they perceived 
Gorbachev and his agenda as a tool that could be used to define, create, and legitimize a 
reformed communist system on their own terms.  
The next chapter will turn to the topics in the 1990s. At first, it will re-examine the 
reasons for Chinese criticism of Gorbachev since the early 1990s. In contrast to the view 
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of the secondary literature, the investigator found that Chinese scholars’ scorn for 
Gorbachev after Tiananmen was not primarily owing to his role in promoting 
democratization. Rather, it was because of Gorbachev’s soft line approach toward dissent 
when communism in Europe was on the verge of collapse. By drawing attention to 
Gorbachev’s soft line approach, Chinese critics justified China’s use of the Tiananmen 
crackdown and the brutal measures adopted by Deng Xiaoping to preserve socialist rule 
and social stability. Moreover, the chapter will study the Chinese debate about the 
policies of Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin starting from the mid-1990s. Many 
scholars argued that the Soviet state since Stalin was no longer in line with what they 
defined as true Leninism, and as a result, the post-Lenin policies paved the way for the 
final collapse. They concluded that China after the end of the Cold War should observe 
the lessons of Brezhnev and Stalin. The country needed to be economically liberalized 
and prosperous while persevering in the communist one-party rule.   
 




Analyses of Soviet Leaders and Politics 
Chapter 6  
The Misuse of Gorbachev after Tiananmen and the 1990s Debate 
about the Two Soviet Leaders 
 
Introductory remarks 
Existing literature points out that Chinese Sovietologists admired Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s political reform as a model for China’s democratization in the 1980s. 
However, after 1991, because of its impact on China’s pro-democracy movements as 
perceived by the Chinese government, the same Chinese scholars consistently criticized 
Gorbachev and his liberalization policies for being the fundamental catalysts in bringing 
down the USSR. This chapter is going to argue, however, that Chinese scholars’ scorn for 
Gorbachev after Tiananmen was not primarily owing to his role in promoting 
democratization; rather, it was because of Gorbachev’s soft line approach toward dissent 
when communism in Europe was on the verge of collapse. By drawing attention to 
Gorbachev’s soft line approach, Chinese critics justified the Tiananmen crackdown and 
the brutal measures adopted by the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to preserve socialist 
rule and social stability.  
Moreover, the secondary literature argues that most Chinese scholars after 1991 
concentrated on criticizing Gorbachev and his liberalization as the fundamental catalysts 
in triggering the collapse of the Soviet Union. In reality, Chinese Sovietology writings 
never excoriated Gorbachev in the 1990s, and the torrent of attacks had gradually 
subsided by the middle of the decade. Gorbachev and his liberal programs were by no 
Part Two—Chapter 6 
222 
 
means the only, or even the most significant, factor in the USSR’s dissolution, as 
represented in Chinese analysis in and after 1991. This chapter also reveals that after the 
demise of world communism in the early 1990s, many Chinese academic writings 
appeared to excite debates on the two Soviet leaders – Leonid Brezhnev and Joseph Stalin.  
Many scholars blame the legacies of these two Soviet leaders as the cause of the 
collapse in 1991. According to them, after Stalin took power, the Soviet Union started to 
deviate from what they saw as true Leninism. These writings contrasted the legacies of 
the two Soviet leaders with Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism, and served to shore up Deng’s 
post-Tiananmen line of accelerating economic development and anti-leftism, which he 
promoted during his 1992 southern tour. However, while Chinese Soviet-watchers 
criticized the negative policies of the USSR, they did not condemn socialism. They 
targeted the imperfections of the Soviet economic apparatus rather than its political 
repression. Their conclusion confirmed the CCP’s post-Tiananmen policy of liberating 
economic force while keeping a tight leash on political control. They argued that 
economic prosperity, not political reform, was the reigning principle for the survival of 
Chinese socialism after the fall of the USSR.   
 
Gorbachev and Tiananmen 
As analysed in Chapters Three and Five, there was no immediate attack on 
Gorbachev and his domestic and foreign policies in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident. 
Extensive research shows that Chinese writings from Tiananmen to early 1990 were still 
keen at lauding Gorbachev’s humanistic socialism and glasnost. When talking to a Soviet 
delegation in September 1989, Wan Li, chairman of the Chinese National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, said that “the Soviet Union and China are both carrying 
out reforms, and can share each other’s experience in many fields.” He expressed his 
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“sincere wish for the success of reforms in the USSR.” 598 At the time, many scholars 
argued that Gorbachev’s reform programs were socialist in nature; they also suggested 
that China should learn from the Soviet experiment, and expressed their goodwill on 
Gorbachev’s final success.599 Although a number of articles had noted some negative 
effects resulted from Gorbachev’s liberalization, their overall assessments were 
nonetheless positive. 600  IREECAS researcher Xing Guangcheng even broached the 
subject of Gorbachev’s vision of democracy and the multiparty system under socialism, 
and discussed the possibility of promoting the multiparty system in other socialist 
countries.601  
A portion of the secondary literature suggests that after 1991 Chinese scholars tended 
to blame Gorbachev’s programs, such as glasnost and liberalization, for being the 
fundamental causes of the downfall of the USSR – those scholars felt extremely nervous 
about the negative implications of these policies for China.602  First, a perusal of the 
primary documents in which Chinese scholars expressed their criticisms after March 1990, 
when Gorbachev was launching his process for ending the CPSU monopoly, reveals that 
most scholars did not oppose Gorbachev’s political reform of socialism. Some disputed 
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Gorbachev’s notion that political reform should precede economic reform, and remarked 
that the former should serve the needs of the latter.603  Others criticized Gorbachev’s 
program for being too Western-oriented, and in particular criticized his termination of the 
CPSU power monopoly as an incorrect method of political reform.604  
Second, not every Chinese scholar had engaged in criticizing Gorbachev after early 
1990. Particularly after Deng Xiaoping had released his southern tour speech in 1992, 
which heralded the wave of anti-leftism and urged a breakthrough in reforms, some 
Chinese scholars started to display their sympathy and poured out positive re-assessments 
on Gorbachev and his political agenda.605  IREECAS scholar Li Jingjie reminded the 
Chinese scholars doing research on Gorbachev’s reform programs that they should 
observe the lessons under Mao, when China had mistakenly determined Khrushchev’s 
reforms as being “revisionist.” He commented that the episode had resulted in not only 
the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, but also the later calamitous Cultural 
Revolution, which was Mao’s invention to “avert the Soviet capitalist restoration in 
China.” 606 Li believed that “socialism could not exist without democracy,” and admired 
Gorbachev’s courage for learning from “the capitalist political civilization.” 607  
Zhu Huanghe, a professor at Jiangxi Normal University, did not agree that Gorbachev 
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was “a traitor of world socialism,” and did not think that a single person could have so 
much power as to overthrow a 70-year regime. In his opinion, there was nothing wrong 
with undertaking both political and economic reforms concurrently, and it was “the 
system not the person” that bore responsibility for the collapse.608  
Third, this chapter further posits that Chinese scholars’ scorn for Gorbachev after 
1990 was not primarily owing to his role in promoting democratization and changing the 
nature of socialism; rather, it was because of Gorbachev’s soft line approach toward 
dissent when communism in Europe was on the verge of collapse. This point has been 
overlooked by the previous secondary literature. By drawing attention to Gorbachev’s soft 
line approach, Chinese critics justified China’s actions in the Tiananmen crackdown and 
the brutal measures adopted by Deng Xiaoping to preserve socialist rule and social 
stability.  
In fact, what the CCP Secretary General Zhao Ziyang and Gorbachev shared in 
common was that both the CCP and Chinese scholars would have had difficulty in 
claiming that their respective ideas on reform were in contravention of socialism. Firstly, 
according to their own words, neither of the communist leaders had ever thought of 
recommending the overthrow of the socialist systems operating in their respective 
countries. After being purged, Zhao revealed that what he had wanted was democracy 
under the CCP and rule of law in a socialist China.609 In his official speeches Gorbachev 
always emphasized that his goal was “socialist democracy,” which involved “self-control” 
and “the unity of rights and duties.” 610  
Secondly, at the 1987 13th Party Congress, Zhao expressed a firm resolve to shatter 
the “current political structure, which took shape during the revolutionary war years.” 
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According to him, the system was “no longer suited to our drive for modernization in 
economic, political, cultural and other fields under conditions of peace, or to the 
development of a socialist commodity economy.” 611  The revolutionary “political 
structure” Zhao was referring to was none other than the institutions created by Mao after 
1949, of which unpleasant vestiges remained even after 1976. As noted, many Chinese 
scholars approved of Gorbachev’s endeavours in re-assessing past errors and returning 
the Soviet Union to the fundamental ethos of Leninism. These efforts by Gorbachev 
corresponded with Zhao’s proposal to transform the socialist state, which had been 
created through war and revolution, into a state designed to achieve construction and 
modernization. This notion was a shared consensus among the CCP leadership even after 
Zhao’s purge, and was consistently implemented both in and after the 1990s.612  
In actuality, although in the eyes of Chinese communists writing in the 1990s both 
Zhao’s political reform and Gorbachev’s glasnost had some negative impacts, the CCP 
indictment of Zhao was not because Zhao had suggested dismantling Party rule as part of 
his political reform. Rather, as State Council spokesman Yuan Mu intimated, it was 
because of the mistake Zhao made in “supporting the turmoil and splitting the Communist 
Party Central Committee.” Zhao’s removal was thus “only a measure of Party discipline.” 
613 The statement points to the cause of Zhao’s purge as being his refusal to endorse the 
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CCP’s decision to use force to put down the Tiananmen demonstrators, which, in Deng 
Xiaoping’s eyes, was not only injurious to state interests but also a betrayal of socialist 
principles.  
Zhao’s biggest failing, manifested in his disagreement with the method of 
suppressing the Tiananmen protests, was his tolerance of dissent and his respect for 
human rights. These were similar to Gorbachev’s “humanistic socialism,” a characteristic 
that was attacked by some Chinese scholars after 1991 as being too soft and 
compromising toward the anti-communist upheavals in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union. 614  Zhao’s liberal attitude toward dissent was well known even before the 
Tiananmen Incident. He once remarked that the campaign against bourgeois liberalization 
should not be too excessive, and that the people who had committed mistakes in the eyes 
of the Party should be allowed to “keep their posts and give full play to their professional 
knowledge.” 615  He said, “When in the course of emancipating his mind a person 
expresses views that are a bit too liberal, we should not say that he is advocating 
bourgeois liberalization.” 616  Similarly, one of the aspects for which Gorbachev was 
heavily criticized by Chinese scholars was his neglect of Marxist class struggle and his 
sympathy for the enemies of socialism. Many scholars explicitly questioned why the 
Soviet leader did not send troops into Eastern Europe when the communist powers there 
were being overthrown, and crush domestic anti-socialist forces when the Soviet state 
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was under threat.617  
Therefore, to some extent, the all-out post-1990 Chinese criticism of Gorbachev had 
more to do with the Soviet leader’s renunciation of the use of force in suppressing the 
anti-socialist movement than with his political reform. These criticisms could be 
considered as a surreptitious way of justifying the CCP’s brutal suppression of the 
Tiananmen demonstrations, which was seen as an effective and prompt method of 
defeating anti-party forces.  
Judging from the publication dates of the writings, in the wake of Tiananmen, 
Chinese scholars had few criticisms to make of Gorbachev. However, after the Soviet 
economy deteriorated and domestic turbulence began to unfold in 1990, coinciding with 
Gorbachev’s announcement of his decision to terminate the power monopoly of the CPSU, 
many Chinese scholars stopped praising Gorbachev, and after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991 their criticisms intensified. The contrasting pictures of post-1989 China 
and the post-1990 USSR (or Russia after 1991) led some to conclude that Gorbachev’s 
failure was not caused by socialism, but because he had not made a firm commitment to 
socialism. They argued that the chaotic situation in many post-socialist states 
demonstrated the disastrous outcome for a country of renouncing socialism, while the fact 
that China had survived demonstrated the positive outcome of taking a firm stance to 
support the continuation of socialism in the country.618   
In hindsight, such criticisms of Gorbachev might have given the public the 
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impression that soft approaches and lax ideologies brought about nothing but tension and 
mayhem in a socialist country, whereas tough measures ensured order and stability. Their 
attacks on Gorbachev’s relaxed attitude served to justify not only the CCP’s violent 
crackdown on the Tiananmen protesters, but also Deng’s post-Tiananmen announcement 
of his intention to maintain stability in China (which was synonymous with retaining the 
CCP’s monopoly of power) at any cost,619 with a view to the domestic audience.  
Moreover, the CCP regime had reportedly been disappointed with the inability of the 
communist leaders in Eastern Europe to implement a “Chinese solution” that would save 
those nondemocratic regimes in the interest of maintaining the stability of the whole. The 
Chinese government seemed to have argued that it was nothing but the negative 
consequence of Gorbachev’s liberalization and his desire to pursue a different course 
which led to the demise of European socialism. Chinese communists thought that the 
Soviet Union could have retained the military ability to end protests in 1989, but that it 
was unwilling to pay the bloody cost necessary to crush them. The CCP regime saw the 
Tiananmen example as a ray of hope, and wanted to show that violence remained a real 
option for European communist leaders in 1989. In the end, it failed to transfer the 
Tiananmen model into the European context, which had deeply annoyed the Chinese 
leaders.620 
As such, Chinese scholars were seemingly mounting efforts in defence of Deng’s 
iron-fist policies, which had successfully preserved socialist rule and propelled China 
down the road to prosperity since the 1990s. They compared this with the faltering Soviet 
Union that would eventually lurch into disorder and break down under Gorbachev’s 
liberalization and hands-off approach. The conclusion was that strong authoritarian rule 
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that ensured political stability was far preferable. In short, they were criticizing 
Gorbachev’s soft line approach as well as defending the CCP’s rationale for its violent 
suppression of student demonstrations in 1989. 
Last, as demonstrated in the preceding chapter, in the 1980s many Chinese scholars 
had thought highly of Gorbachev’s inspiration in undertaking political reform for 
facilitating economic modernization. However, in the 1990s most of them dismissed such 
an idea as one of Gorbachev’s weaknesses and a precipitating cause of the Soviet breakup. 
The changing tone of Chinese Sovietology writings tied in with the shake-up of the CCP 
in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident, when Deng made a comeback and reasserted 
his supreme position in China. While both Zhao and Gorbachev championed the notion 
that economic reform is a product of political restructuring, Deng consistently remained 
wary of such a concept and emphasized political stability but not political pluralism. He 
found it good enough to have economic prosperity under the one-party rule, and felt there 
was little need to tackle the communist institution.621 This was particularly evident after 
Tiananmen, when the CCP became simply a delivery vehicle for material progress or a 
self-preservation machine, claiming the modern mandate of heaven with no greater 
purpose than to hold on to power.  
Therefore, Chinese criticisms of Gorbachev after 1990 were a response to the return 
of such Deng’s orthodox line, which focused on the sheer survival of the communist 
regime by economic means. It also disregarded any political demands, while making it 
clear that the policy of prioritizing political liberalization did not comport with socialism, 
and was not a future direction of the PRC in the post-communist world.  
 
Revival of research on Brezhnev 
                                                             
621 For details, see Deng, “Bourgeois Liberalization Means Taking the Capitalist Road,” May and June 1985, 
in Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 129-30. 
Part Two—Chapter 6 
231 
 
In 1997, Chen Zhihua, a researcher in the Institute of World History at CASS and a 
prominent scholar on Leonid Brezhnev, commented that Chinese research on Soviet 
history had overwhelmingly focused on the periods of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and 
Gorbachev, while overlooking the 18-year rule of Brezhnev, which was “the time when 
the Soviet Union started to decline,” and “the key to understanding the historical lessons 
of the Soviet downfall.” 622 Chen’s remark is not altogether correct. In reality, Chinese 
research of Brezhnev and his administration had flourished in the 1990s.  
Throughout the 1980s, Chinese inquiries on Brezhnev were mostly seen in the 
IREECAS journal; many writers did not have positive views on the Soviet leader, because 
his conservative thinking was running afoul of China’s reform and open door policies. 
Some articles examined the bureaucracy and life-long tenure cadre system under 
Brezhnev, and remarked that the Soviet ruling machine had become more ossified and 
less efficient since the 1970s. 623  Others concentrated on the analysis of Brezhnev’s 
concept of “developed socialism.” They compared the living standards between the USSR 
and the West, and concluded that the Soviet Union was by no means a developed country 
with an advanced economy and material abundance. The articles criticized the notion of 
“developed socialism” as a utopian belief and a political calculation to keep the Soviet 
Union as the leader in the communist camp. 624  However, the social and economic 
stagnation under Brezhnev had not fallen within the purview of analysis until the 1990s.   
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In 1992, Deng Xiaoping embarked upon a trip to China’s southern provinces, where 
he repeatedly urged the need for learning from capitalism and rekindling China’s all-
round economic development – particularly after the setback of Tiananmen, in which the 
Party conservative force attempted to attack and quash Deng’s policies taken after 1978. 
Deng stressed that it was “the achievements of the reform and the open policy” that had 
helped China to weather the Tiananmen crisis. He argued that the PRC should “make 
socialism develop in a healthier direction,” in order to overcome the panic caused by the 
worldwide defeat of socialism. He especially emphasized that he could not tolerate “slow 
growth” and “stagnation.” He pointed out that “it is necessary to fundamentally change 
the economic structure,” and “to establish a vigorous socialist economic structure that 
will promote their development.” 625 Deng seemed to fully understand that, after having 
squandered what legitimacy communism had in the brutality of 1989 and the Soviet 
demise, the only resource of the CCP regime was economic performance, which meant 
putting more food in the shops and improving the living standard of the Chinese people.  
Moreover, another important purpose of Deng’s 1992 southern tour was to win the 
factional warfare and succeed in having his reform strategy prevail after the Tiananmen 
backlash. The fact that his trip at first received no official media coverage and Renmin 
ribao did not publish anything about it until one month later was a testament to the 
strength of CCP leftist opposition. In his talk, Deng asserted that the reason for the failure 
of European socialism had little to do with democracy, and more to do with the lack of 
security and prosperity. During the trip, Deng attempted to make moves against the Party 
conservatives, saying those insufficiently enthusiastic for reform should go.626    
In response to Deng’s messages, on June 4th, 1992, three years after the Tiananmen 
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Incident, Renmin ribao published an article saying that China should “give up the highly 
centralized socialist economic system borrowed from other countries before,” and 
“overcome the problem of the leftist thinking.” 627 On the same day in 1993, another 
article in Renmin ribao indicated that “leftism is the biggest enemy of socialism.” 628 In 
scholarly writings, Wu Xingtang, vice-president of the Chinese Association of 
International Communist Movement Studies, praised Deng’s speech in early 1992 as “the 
guiding principle for studies in international relations and the communist movement.” Wu 
sneered at the leftist thinking, which put blame on “the excessiveness of reforms and 
insufficient class struggle” as the main factors for causing the Soviet demise. He 
concluded that the real intention of leftism was for “obstructing Deng’s reformist line.” 629 
Gao Fang in another article also strongly attacked the leftist tendencies. The author 
attributed the failure of Soviet socialism to economic, not political, factors. He said that 
“leftism was the true gravedigger of the USSR, while rightism was only putting a nail in 
its final coffin.” 630 
In and after 1992, many pieces of academic work seemed to lavish attention on the 
Soviet Union under Brezhnev. 631  Unlike the 1980s writings presented above, which 
focused on the aspects of ideology and political administration under Brezhnev, in the 
1990s Chinese scholars were targeting his obsession with the status quo and ignorance of 
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true reality, which made the Soviet economy lag behind the West more and more. The 
commentaries meshed with Deng’s emphasis on economic growth and anti-leftism after 
the Soviet demise. As IREECAS scholar E Huancheng wrote, “Comrade Deng Xiaoping 
once remarked that the priorities of development are scientific technologies and the 
productive forces, and such remark inspires us to seek the true reason of Brezhnev’s 
failure.” The author concluded that the Soviet problems had surfaced under Stalin and 
escalated in Brezhnev’s time, which he termed as “the long medieval ossified rule.” He 
said that the Brezhnev administration had rendered the subsequent reforms launched by 
Gorbachev insufficient to rescue the Soviet system.632  
Another IREECAS scholar, Liu Guanghui, described the USSR after the 1970s as “a 
pool of lifeless and stagnant water.” He found that the biggest reason for Brezhnev’s 
unwillingness to take up reforms was his predecessor Khrushchev’s rashness in 
improvising the reform programs that had contributed to the chaotic economic situation – 
thus causing the CPSU to become tired of such adventure and to itch for stability. He 
concluded that the lesson from Brezhnev was that socialism should “persist with reforms 
forever.” 633 After criticizing the Brezhnev administration for being “conservative and 
rigid,” Huang Zongliang, vice-director of the Russian Studies Institute at Beijing 
University, concluded that a socialist country should always find a balance between 
reform and stability. While a stable environment could ensure the success of reform, 
nonetheless reform should always be prioritized in order to maintain stability and 
prosperity.634  
In the late 1990s, IREECAS senior researcher Xu Kui retraced Brezhnev’s early life 
and trajectory to power, and studied his personal attributes and characters, such as 
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“mediocrity, lack of innovation, being pleasure-seeking and vainglorious.” He argued that 
these explained why the Soviet Union since the 1970s had been fraught with personality 
cults, incorrigible bureaucracy, and economic deterioration. He commented that the era of 
Brezhnev was “the turning point when the Soviet Union went from prosperity to decline.” 
635  In late 1998, Chen Zhihua (in his new book funded and published by CASS) re-
examined Brezhnev and his time. At the beginning of the book, Chen wrote that his 
analysis was in accordance with the motif of Deng’s speech in 1992, which was the 
theoretical framework of the project.636 The author said that the rule of Brezhnev was not 
only the dividing line for the USSR’s turn from strength to weakness, but also “the bane 
of the final demise in 1991.” In his view, “Studying Brezhnev’s period is a must in 
finding out reasons for the downfall.” 637 He finally contended that the crumbling of the 
USSR was not historically inevitable. The state under Brezhnev was ripe for reforms, but 
he “slept through it,” as it were. Brezhnev might have helped the Soviet Union survive, 
but he had missed the chance to transform the sorrow into strength in the 1970s.638   
A number of secondary sources point out that Chinese Soviet-watchers after 1991 
almost unanimously blamed Gorbachev and his reform programs as the major factors in 
capsizing the Soviet Union.639 David Shambaugh even suggests that this so-called “blame 
game” persisted throughout 1990s Chinese Sovietology.640 Those works have obviously 
overlooked the revival of research on Brezhnev in Chinese writings since 1992. Unlike 
the 1980s’ sporadic inquiries on Brezhnev presented above, the 1990s writings were more 
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divergent in views and had a focus, pertaining to the state agenda set by Deng Xiaoping 
during his southern tour in 1992.  
First, the renewed discussion on Brezhnev was a product of a more open political 
milieu resulting from Deng’s 1992 landmark speech. Accordingly, Chinese intellectual 
debates became, to a limited degree, more lively and animated than the dreary period after 
1989. In the wake of Deng’s southern tour, the spirit of “seeking truth from facts” was re-
emphasized to give a new impulse to the study of socialism.641 Although the general 
political climate in China was still uncertain, this modest progress had made it possible 
for scholars to discover more objectively the problems of the USSR, and to diversify the 
roots of the collapse. It provided encouragement to reinterpret and challenge the prevalent 
one-sidedly views that were mainly concerned with the cause of Gorbachev. 
Second, unlike the post-Tiananmen official and academic analysis, which argued that 
the peaceful evolution engineered by the West had played a prominent role in jolting 
Eastern Europe and the USSR, the debate on Brezhnev and the moribund economy under 
his administration marked the termination of the peaceful evolution thesis, which seemed 
to be an exaggerated accusation that the Soviet collapse was simply a victim of Western 
subversion.642 The doctrine of peaceful evolution was more a propaganda trick than a 
genuine academic argument. The Party hard-liners had used the threat of peaceful 
evolution as the justification to shut down reforms.643 Mao Zedong once said that “the 
fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal.” 644 Some 
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Chinese scholars also remarked that putting blame for the Soviet downfall on external 
factors such as the peaceful evolution was either “superficial” 645  or “one-sided and 
noxious.” 646  
Seen from his 1992 speech transcript during the southern tour, Deng Xiaoping 
believed that the chief cause of turmoil in socialism was not the imperialist peaceful 
evolution. The problem lay with the internal factors, such as poverty and the under-
developed economies in many socialist countries. In his view, the only way for China to 
survive after the Soviet dissolution was to continue the open door policy and reform the 
past economy characterized by centralized control and enforced egalitarianism. He argued 
that abandoning the path of reform set in 1978 would only lead the country to the sort of 
catastrophe befalling the USSR.647 In Deng’s mind, to admit that the socialist system 
itself has fundamental flaws was more important than to blame foreign machinations. 
Instead of giving the excuse of the so-called peaceful evolution and ignoring true 
problems, China after 1991 should face up squarely to reality and meet the challenges 
ahead.  
As Joseph Fewsmith demonstrates, firstly, after the Tiananmen Incident and the 
Soviet demise, Deng needed to rely on economic development to convince those who no 
longer believed in socialism, and to restore the Party legitimacy through its ability to 
“deliver the goods.” 648 Moreover, following the ouster of Zhao Ziyang, the conservative 
faction was clearly directed at Zhao’s former patron Deng Xiaoping and attempted to 
undercut his reform policy, which was being criticized for neglecting politics and 
ideology and concentrating merely on economic development. Deng would interpret the 
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conservative manoeuver as an effort to challenge his position in China and have the 
country revert to the old days of Mao. To strike back, Deng must ensure the reform 
process would become “a national rallying cry” and survive his own death.649 Since 1992 
some scholars also concluded that, if the impact of glasnost and the peaceful evolution 
were rational explanations for the collapse, then it was because the inherent weakness of 
the Soviet socialist system that had made it become unable to resist the restoration of 
capitalism and democratization.650 By dispelling the assertion of peaceful evolution, Deng 
won the power battle over his Party rivals, ensuring a state-wide consensus to embrace his 
strategy of faster growth, enhanced economic reform, and greater interaction with the 
outside world. Similarly, the research on Brezhnev in the 1990s also signalled the return 
of a down-to-earth and critical approach in studying the Soviet demise, and the 
repudiation of seemingly non-scholarly and irrelevant official rhetoric. 
Last, as we have seen, there was a distinct change in Chinese Sovietology writings in 
the 1990s, from attacking Gorbachev’s liberalization to condemning Brezhnev’s 
conservatism. After that, Gorbachev became the lesser of two evils and was rarely seen as 
the cardinal source of the downfall. In and after 1992, when China had come out of the 
shadow of Tiananmen and the Soviet demise, and was at the height of campaigning for 
anti-leftism, the practice of criticizing Brezhnev’s orthodoxy instead of attacking 
Gorbachev’s liberalization was instrumental in encouraging more innovation to keep the 
socialist regime vital. The discussion of Brezhnev played a role in affirming and 
promoting China’s market-oriented path, thereby revivifying the pace of reform that had 
slowed in the wake of the 1989 repression. Chinese writings intended to take advantage 
of the study of Brezhnev to give credit to the ethos of Deng’s 1992 speech, and to enlist 
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support for his future vision for China in the post-communist world.  
There is one more illustrating example demonstrating that Chinese scholars had taken 
advantage of the use of Brezhnev, in order to give the Chinese regime the extra push that 
was needed for the acceleration of reforms in the 1990s. In 1996, CASS funded and 
published a book “Yuzongshuji tanxin” (Chatting with the Secretary General). The book is 
a collective project written and edited by a group of CASS scholars, which consists of 
more than 20 academics from different institutes at CASS and includes the IREECAS 
scholar Xing Guangcheng.651 The book title is quite misleading. In reality, it is not a 
record of face-to-face interview with the Party Secretary General Jiang Zemin; instead, 
Jiang appears as the dramatis personae, which the authors use as a form of 
communication to channel their views on the future development of China.   
The book starts with the full text of Jiang Zemin’s 1995 speech “Zhengque chuli 
shehuizhuyi xiandaihua jianshe zhongde ruogan zhongda guanxi” (To Correctly Handle 
Certain Important Relations in Building Socialist Modernization). The content of the 
speech is in fact no different from Deng’s 1992 southern tour talk, both of them espousing 
the goals of technological innovation, acceleration of economic modernization, and 
further opening to the outside world.652 The authors commented that China at the time 
was at a crossroads and its reforms were facing a bottleneck, in which economic disparity 
and corruption were rampant across the country. As a result, many people doubted if the 
market economy was still compatible with socialism, and whether the third generation of 
the CCP leadership led by Jiang was able to maintain the economic growth and Party 
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dictatorship in the post-Deng era.653  
The solution given by the authors was “reforms, reforms, and reforms,” since this 
was the only way and “China has no choice.” 654 To elaborate the point, the authors 
presented the example of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev in the following section 
entitled “Lishi jiaoxun: cengjing youguo yige bolieriniefu” (A Historical Lesson: Once 
Upon a Time There Was the Person of Brezhnev).655 According to the section, there were 
three critical moments in Soviet history. After the first wave of Khrushchev’s incomplete 
reforms, his successor Brezhnev balked at “the knot and complexity of the social and 
economic structural problems.” He, therefore, chose to eschew reforms. He wanted to 
preserve the status quo and was reluctant to move forward. When the last wave of reforms 
came in the 1980s, the last Soviet leader Gorbachev had to employ “the radical method of 
liberalization” to reshuffle the moribund system. Unfortunately, such measures brought 
“the counter-effect of instability and the ultimate collapse.” 656 The authors warned: 
 
Absolute stability does not exist. The lesson of Brezhnev was that not to push reforms, not 
to persist in reforms, not to carry reforms through to the end means only that the Party, state, 




Unlike what Jeanne Wilson remarks that the book was to “commend Jiang’s vision of 
reform based on a 1995 speech,” 658 upon a closer reading, the tone of the authors appears 
to be more like an admonition. They argued that the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping 
should not be stalled or slowed down once Deng retired, otherwise China might face the 
fate of the USSR ahead. China specialist Willy Wo-Lap Lam reveals that in the late 1990s, 
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Chinese intellectuals increasingly felt unsatisfied about the dearth of initiative and the 
roll-back of reform, and “there were signs that the more liberal among Jiang’s advisors 
were urging the president to take bolder steps in reform.” 659  According to the book 
authors, unlike other Chinese scholars, who tended to “wait and annotate” the speeches of 
the leaders in their research, this time these CASS academics would like to “use a new 
way of thinking to tackle leaders’ theories” in this project. As such, in this book they 
decided to “invite Secretary General Jiang Zemin and the third generation leadership for 
heart-to-heart talks,” and “contribute our limited knowledge to finding solutions to 
China’s present problems.” 660  
Indeed, unlike the previous writings presented in this thesis, the book reflected a 
change – namely, that these Chinese scholars were attempting to take the lead rather than 
follow the tide in drawing the lessons of Soviet socialism and its implications on China’s 
future to influence the government.661 Their eagerness for making the Party leadership 
hear their voice demonstrated the anxiety of those scholars. They seemed to worry that 
post-Deng China would become the USSR under Brezhnev, which was content with the 
status quo and losing momentum for bolder reforms in the face of economic uncertainty. 
It might eventually result in the equivalence of the Soviet failure in China. They argued 
that the third generation of Party leadership should not just accommodate Deng’s legacy 
to move on, as “a politician with broader vision and greater historical sense will choose 
the deepening of reforms.” 662  
Moreover, the discussion in the book was not only about examining the negative 
lessons of the Soviet demise, but also about presenting an important message for China’s 
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future direction in moving toward the path of state-led capitalism. The authors argued that 
amid the economic difficulties at the time, China might confront two possibilities: going 
back to orthodox socialism (symbolized by Brezhnev’s rule) or slipping into wholesale 
capitalism (represented by the Gorbachev administration), and that either way, China 
would probably end up getting nowhere.663 Instead, they recommended a third option, in 
which China should practice laissez-faire economy under a strong state control. They 
advised that China should not go too far in economic privatization and liberalization, 
drawing on the negative example of the USSR under Gorbachev.664 They argued that 
maintaining public ownership was still the key to the future success of reforms.665 Their 
advocacy of a state-led capitalism as the future direction of the Chinese party-state, in 
which the state is the principle actor in directing the market and economy, was not only a 
lesson drawn from the pre-1991 Soviet Union.666 It also resonated with the thesis of the 
Chinese new-left movement, which became an intellectual trend from the 1990s onward. 
The themes of the new-left are common to this approach: reassertion and expansion of the 
role of the state, appeal for the self-renewal of the Party authority, the need for strong 
governmental intervention in a market economy, and a scepticism, if not outright hostility 
to, China’s integration into the Western political system.667 
 
Re-assessment of Stalin 
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Apart from Brezhnev, another Soviet leader had become the subject of avid study in 
1990s China. Joseph Stalin has long been a controversial figure in China. After the 
founding of the PRC, Mao Zedong glorified the Soviet Union led by Stalin, saying that it 
had guided China in the struggle for national liberation, and regarded the USSR as leader 
of all the oppressed countries in the world.668 In fact, Stalin personally disliked Mao and 
always gravely misunderstood the situation of Chinese socialist revolution. For example, 
according to Beijing University professor Niu Jun, Stalin had belittled CCP military 
strength and repeatedly requested that the CCP make a compromise with the Guomindang 
(Republican Party) led by Chiang Kai-shek during the Chinese Civil War period (1946-
1949), which deeply irritated Mao.669 Mao also profoundly sensed the distrust of the 
Soviet leader, and was not able to challenge Moscow’s authority in the socialist camp 
until Stalin’s death in 1953.670 Although having harboured grievances against Stalin, Mao 
still refrained from criticizing him in the wake of the new Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev mounting an attack on his predecessor at the 20th CPSU Congress in 
1956. This was because he understood that consigning Stalin to purgatory was detrimental 
to the unity of the socialist world as well as his rule in China. Mao remarked, “It is the 
opinion of the Central Committee that Stalin’s mistakes amounted to only 30 per cent of 
the whole and his achievements to 70 per cent, and that all things considered Stalin was 
nonetheless a great Marxist.” 671  
After the passing of Mao, against the trends of cleansing the remnants of the Gang of 
Four and opposing leftism symbolized by the Maoist legacy, Chinese Party organs in the 
early 1980s started to level their criticisms at Stalin and his policies. In 1981, an article in 
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Renmin ribao remarked that Stalin’s cult of personality was oppositional to Marxism-
Leninism, and equated the cult with the kind of fanaticism occurring during the Cultural 
Revolution.672 A half year later, a commentator in Beijing Review contrasted Stalin’s 
“grievous deviations” with Lenin’s “tremendous contributions.” He wrote that Stalin had 
violated “the principle of collective leadership and the system of democratic centralism,” 
and practiced “great-nation chauvinism and again interfered in the internal affairs of 
certain countries.” 673 It should be noted that in the early 1980s, several articles appraising 
Stalin published in various Chinese academic journals not only criticized Stalin for 
creating an ossified political and economic system, but also showed contempt for Stalin’s 
inappropriate moral conducts; these included being conceited and arrogant, as well as 
having a propensity for the use of violence.674 Zhou Biwen, a researcher at the Central 
Party School, stated that “it is time for China to stop treating Stalin as God.” 675 
After the second half of the 1980s, the image of Stalin in the minds of Chinese 
scholars was gradually transformed from deity to human, and eventually from human to a 
devil-like villain. Many academic articles in the late 1980s began to attack almost every 
aspect of Stalin: from his attempt to seize the Chinese territory through the post-war Yalta 
Agreement, 676  a disastrous agricultural policy, 677  a rigid political system, 678  failed 
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economic planning, 679  and his problematic writing on Philosophy. 680  Wu Wenjun, 
president of the Lanzhou Academy of Social Sciences, in his 1989 article even undertook 
research on Stalin’s childhood, which is rare in Chinese writings. The author revealed the 
tense family relations in which Stalin had grown up, and explained his later cruelty by the 
abusive treatment he endured as a child.681 Most importantly, while Chinese scholars in 
the early 1980s were bold to remark that Stalinism was the distortion of Leninism, in the 
late 1980s some writings were not shy to point out that Stalinism was equal to feudalism 
and a legacy from Tsars, which had nothing to do with what they saw as true socialism at 
all.682  
These intensified criticisms of Stalin in the late 1980s were mainly owing to the 
following three factors. First, as IREECAS scholar He Li revealed, while having many 
problems, the Soviet model established by Stalin was nonetheless accepted by Chinese 
academic circle in the early 1980s as the universal yardstick of socialism. At the time, 
Chinese scholars still recognized that the Soviet model was synonymous with Stalinism, 
but the model needed a fundamental fine-tuning to adjust to the modern society. 683 
However, after the late 1980s, China started to deepen its economic reform and launched 
a war on the Soviet model that had harmed China in the past. As Deng Xiaoping 
announced in 1988: 
 
Frankly, when we were copying the Soviet model of socialism we ran into many difficulties. 
We discovered that long ago, but we were never able to solve the problem. Now we are 
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solving it; what we want to build is a socialism suited to conditions in China.684 
 
 
Second, Moscow’s re-assessment of Stalin under Gorbachev held great appeal for 
Chinese scholars. It coincided with the relaxed political climate since the mid-1980s 
generated by the liberal-minded CCP leaders Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, and more 
importantly, the popularity of Gorbachev’s glasnost in China.685 Some scholars were truly 
impressed by Gorbachev’s determination to face the past and demanded that China learn 
from him.686 CASS President Hu Sheng remarked in 1988 that China in the past had 
never engaged in genuine research of Stalin, therefore “we do not have good ideas on 
many questions.” Right now, “when the Soviet Communist Party decided to reverse the 
verdicts on many previous unjustly charged cases under the impact of glasnost,” he urged 
Chinese scholars to “follow suit and conduct research into such issue.” 687  
Last, although China had embraced reform and open door policies after Mao’s death, 
the relaxation was more about economic liberalization than political democratization, and 
Chinese people were not allowed to criticize Stalin’s counterpart in China – Mao Zedong. 
Chinese studies of Stalin still operated in the shadow of the many remaining statues to 
Mao. In 1980, Deng Xiaoping said that China “will not do to Chairman Mao what 
Khrushchev did to Stalin.” 688 But things changed in the late 1980s when, motivated by 
Gorbachev’s challenge to the orthodox hagiography of Stalin, the Chinese started to 
                                                             
684 Deng, “We Must Emancipate Our Minds and Think Independently,” May 18, 1988, in Deng, Selected 
Works of Deng Xiaoping, 3: 256. 
685 In his article, Su Shaozhi, director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism at CASS, compared Zhao Ziyang’s 
endeavours to redress the wrongdoings of the Cultural Revolution with Gorbachev’s efforts to sweep away 
the 1930s negative residue. See Su Shaozhi, “Lun ‘xinliweitan’” [On “New Leviathan”], Dushu, no. 5 (1988): 
207. 
686 An Suhua, “ ‘Gongkaixing’ yuanzeyu sidalin wenti” [The Principle of “Glasnost” and the Question of 
Stalin], Dangdai shijieyu shehui zhuyi, no. 6 (1987): 5-6. Wu Jing, “Congsulian chongping lishi kanshixue 
zaigaige shiqide shehui gongneng” [On the Social Function of Historiography in the Reform Era: The Soviet 
Re-assessment of Historical Events], Shijie lishi, no. 5 (1988): 134-36. 
687 Hu Sheng, “Shehui kexue mianlinde xingshihe renwu” [The Situation and Tasks Facing the Social 
Sciences], Zhongguo shehui kexue, no. 4 (1988): 6-7. 
688 Deng, “Answers to the Italian Journalist Oriana Fallaci,” August 21 and 23, 1980, in Deng, Selected 
Works of Deng Xiaoping, 2: 344. 
Part Two—Chapter 6 
247 
 
question Mao’s own brutality – though this was by no means a large scale open attack. In 
1989, the Shantou University history professor Zheng Shaoqin, who had studied at the 
University of Leningrad in the late 1950s, wrote that the cult of personality created by 
Mao “had wreaked havoc in China and exacted an enormous human toll on Chinese 
people. The depredations were many times than those in the 1930s USSR.” 689  
Two weeks prior to Gorbachev’s state visit to China and one month ahead of the 
Tiananmen Incident, Beijing Review conducted an interview for several IREECAS 
scholars. All of them blasted Stalin and expressed aversion to his monocracy, when the 
Chinese authorities had not officially reappraised the former Soviet leader. It is 
noteworthy that one of the scholars Wu Renzhang, an expert on the Soviet economy, said 
in the interview that he recommended that Stalin’s portrait be removed from Tiananmen 
Square, because “his status is different from that of Marx, Engels, and Lenin,” and “is not 
on the same level as the other three are.” 690   
Since 1976 China has consistently superimposed Mao Zedong’s profile next to those 
of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin in official discourse, in the form of oft-reproduced 
group portraits – the so-called Maen liesimao (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao), for 
demonstrating their equality in ideological terms and significance, whitewashing Mao’s 
past misdeeds, and legitimizing the post-Mao Chinese communist regime. Both Mao and 
Stalin were officially canonized as the successors of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, as the best 
disciples of the dead communist sages. Both of them were depicted as incarnations of 
Marxist-Leninist wisdom and omniscience. However, as evident from Wu’s words, the 
Soviet-watcher omitted Mao’s name in this context and it was certainly at variance with 
the regime’s ideological discourse. He obviously hinted that both Stalin and Mao were the 
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same, but that their conducts were not in tune with the norm of true communism created 
by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Both of their standings were not in the same league as those 
of the other three. Moreover, we should remember that it was Mao who had vigorously 
opposed Khrushchev’s 1956 secret speech and praised Stalin’s legacy. The 1980s negative 
Chinese assessment of Stalin ironically demonstrated Chinese scholars’ unstated 
admission of Mao’s mistaken judgment about Khrushchev in the 1950s, which led 
directly to the later Sino-Soviet schism and a series of disastrous Maoist policies that had 
left a deep scar on China.  
In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident and particularly after March 1990, when 
Gorbachev ordered to abolish the CPSU power monopoly, criticisms of Stalin in Chinese 
writings became silent. After Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in early 1992, China began 
to reflect on its past inefficient socialist economic system, for the take-off of a new wave 
of reforms after the backlash of Tiananmen. In late 1992, the new CCP Secretary General 
Jiang Zemin delivered an opening speech at the 14th CCP Congress. He remarked:   
 
This new revolution is not going to change the nature of our socialist system; instead, it is a 
self-improvement and a further development of socialism. However, it is also not a simple 
repair to our economic structure, but a fundamental reform of it. The past economic system 
was born under the special historical circumstances, and it had once played a key role in 
our socialist construction. However, as time goes on, the system becomes increasingly unfit 
for the requirement of modernization.691  
 
 
Jiang’s words revealed that after Tiananmen and the perdition of European 
communism, China had no intention to change its political system to adjust to the post-
communist world. However, the CCP was eager to tackle its economic institution in order 
to make the regime more viable after the worldwide crisis of socialism.   
Encouraged by the official announcements, Li Zongyu, a researcher in the Institute of 
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Studies of the International Communist Movement at the CCP Central Bureau for the 
Compilation and Translation, reactivated the attacks on Stalin in late 1992. In his article 
published in Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations), the author 
made the point that all problems of the former Soviet Union had originated from the 
Stalinist model after Lenin. He contended that such a model had overly excluded the 
capitalist elements and obstructed the productive forces and economic development, 
when Soviet socialism was still in its infancy – thus contributing to the subsequent 
dissolution of the state. In his opinion, both Deng’s theory of building socialism with 
Chinese characteristics and the goal of the 14th Congress in establishing a socialist 
market economy, were “a breakaway from Stalin’s formulaic understanding of Marxism 
and the highly centralized plan economic system founded by Stalin, respectively.” 692 
Afterward, throughout the 1990s, numerous articles appeared in various academic 
journals and studied the Stalinist model for helpful lessons in building socialism in China. 
Most of them resembled the tone of Li Zongyu’s article; they were criticizing Stalinism as 
a distortion of Leninism and socialism, the origin of leftism in the international 
communist movement, and a fundamental cause of the Soviet demise.693 In the late 1990s, 
several articles generated new arguments and went further to attack the Stalinist model. 
Unlike some erstwhile Chinese writings, which justified that the Stalinist economic 
institution was absolutely essential during the period of war, but not necessary in the time 
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of peace,694  Wu Kequan, a researcher at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, 
dismissed the historical inevitability of the Stalinist model and concluded that such a 
highly militarized but inefficient system was by no means a measure of building 
socialism under any circumstances.695  
Both Wen Yi (a researcher in the Institute of World History at CASS) and Li Zongyu 
challenged China’s long-time assumption that industrialization is equal to modernization. 
They argued that the Soviet economy under Stalin was actually not modernization but a 
strange form of industrialization, which was extremely wasteful and at the expense of 
people’s livelihoods. In their opinion, the Soviet Union was a paradox of industrial plenty 
in the midst of consumer poverty. They criticized that China since Mao had followed such 
a wrong path in constructing socialism, and made it clear that the USSR had never 
realized modernization up to the day of its demise.696   
Unlike Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin at the 20th CPSU Congress, which detailed 
and gave examples of how Stalin engaged in physically torturing his enemies, most of the 
time, Chinese scholars in both decades did not delve into Stalin’s crimes against humanity. 
This was because such an action would open the door to denouncing his Chinese 
analogue of Mao, which was a forbidden zone in China at all times. On the other hand, 
both Khrushchev and Chinese scholars criticized Stalin as a person, and some flaws of his 
policies; however, they only made efforts to condemn the man but not the system, and did 
not display an undercurrent of heterodox thought. They rarely touched the fundamentality 
of the institution established by Stalin, and were concerned about not socialism itself but 
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its problems. 697  While the 1980s Chinese writings manifested their distaste for the 
tyranny of Stalin and the problems of the Stalinist political system up to a point, the 
1990s articles mainly focused on the imperfection of Stalin’s economic apparatus. In a 
nutshell, Chinese scholars were more direct and bolder in criticizing some negative 
elements of Stalinism prior to Tiananmen, although this was by no means an attempt to 
question the dynamic of socialism that had produced such a leader.   
The post-1991 Chinese re-evaluation and criticisms of Stalin should be analysed in a 
broad spectrum after Deng’s southern tour in 1992. In a book on Stalin’s political life 
published in 1997, the authors Jiang Changbin and Zuo Fengrong (both were professors 
of international politics at the Central Party School) wrote in the Epilogue (Jieshuyu) that 
the project was inspired by Deng’s 1992 talk. It was Deng’s remarks on the nature of 
socialism and the Soviet model that had made the authors “become enlightened.” They 
decided to use Deng’s theory as the “guiding principle” in conducting research into 
Stalin.698 According to them, the Soviet model, which had consigned the country to the 
ash heap of history, was, in fact, the Stalinist model – and this model should hold the 
responsibility for the downfall. They contrasted the lethargic and inflexible Stalinist 
model with the pragmatic Deng model, which focused on combining Marxism with 
China’s peculiar conditions.699  
Many Chinese writings after Deng’s southern tour also pointed out that the rightist 
tendencies practised by Gorbachev in the late 1980s were, in fact, an outcome of Stalin’s 
leftism. Gorbachev’s restoration of capitalism was a bounce-back to the long history of 
stagnation and self-seclusion caused by Stalin. At the time, the last Soviet leader had no 
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choice but applied extreme methods to save the falling USSR.700  Such a conclusion 
accorded with the ancient Chinese proverb Wuji bifan, which means when things are 
forced to become worse they begin to go to another extreme for retaliation. While some 
1980s Chinese writings targeting Stalin might in fact be indirectly blaming Mao’s 
political repression in China,701 the 1990s criticisms on the ossification of the Soviet 
model created by Stalin could also be considered as a foil to attack Mao’s past leftist 
economic (not political) policy. This policy was similar to that of Stalin, as both leaders 
favoured heavy industrialization and exploitative economy as their repertoires.702  
Post-1991 Chinese Sovietology put the Stalinist economic model and the discredited 
leftism in 1990s China on an equal footing. By arguing that Stalinism was the root of the 
Soviet demise and retracing its damage on China under Mao, scholars justified Deng’s 
1992 statement that leftism has done more harm than good to China, and like rightism, it 
could also destroy socialism.703 Therefore, they used their writings to defend China’s 
post-Tiananmen policy of accelerating economic reform and open door, and to assist the 
CCP reformers’ efforts to thwart the comeback of the leftist offensive.  
The revival of research on Brezhnev and the re-assessment of Stalin’s model in 1990s 
Chinese Sovietology are two sides of the same coin. They are the two components of the 
principle that argues the decline of Soviet socialism had originated from Stalin and had 
been exacerbated by Brezhnev’s stagnation. The final demise of the country was due to 
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the post-Lenin leaderships’ deviation from Lenin’s principle of building socialism. 
Chinese scholars tended to highlight the intrinsic relations between the two leaders. While 
Xu Kui defining the Brezhnev administration as “Neo-Stalinism,” 704 Gao Fang described 
that the USSR under Stalin was already “a patient with early symptoms of cancer,” and 
Brezhnev later aggravated the situation that led the country into “the terminal stage of 
cancer.” As a result, when Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union had no hope of 
recovery at all and it became a totally spent force.705   
Both research trends not only served to checkmate the resurgent leftist thinking after 
Tiananmen, but their rationales could also be explained in the following ways. First, the 
research outcomes justified Deng’s consistent understanding that the problem was not 
socialism but the outdated Soviet model.706 The underlying concept of Chinese writings is 
that there was nothing wrong with socialism itself, and that Soviet leaders had ill 
intentions to destroy this good system.  
Second, after the demise of the USSR, Deng re-emphasized during his southern tour 
that China is still in the primary stage of socialism and it should make use of any means 
necessary to build socialism. Therefore, he announced “the more elements of capitalism 
will be introduced and the more capitalism will expand in China.” 707 The writings of 
Chinese Soviet-watchers were also pertinent to Deng’s call. Through analysis of the rules 
of Brezhnev and Stalin, a common judgment appeared that argued that self-complacency, 
sheer immobilism, and rigid economic planning are fatal to socialism. By observing the 
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lessons of Moscow, China should not be constrained by the orthodox mode of 
development. It should be more open to innovative experiments. It should learn 
something new from a market economy and replace the problematic Soviet model – 
developing the so-called “Chinese-style socialism” underscored by Deng.708   
Third, according to James Etheridge, before 1989, the Chinese leadership attempted 
to push the price reform, in order to accelerate the process of dismantling the plan 
economy and establish the market mechanism. Unfortunately, the experiment failed and 
resulted in skyrocketing inflation, rampant corruption, and an extraordinary sense of 
uncertainty concerning what the reforms would lead to, which created widespread 
frustration and fear among the people. Moreover, the economic crisis led to a deep 
division within the Party leadership. The reform-minded leaders led by Zhao Ziyang were 
facing fierce challenges from the Party old guards, who believed that the price reform had 
damaged the CCP’s control of China’s political power and undermined the legitimacy of 
the Party. These setbacks resulting from the price reform brought all the accumulated 
societal problems to the surface and piled up the people’s resentments. Most seriously, it 
greatly increased the faith crisis among everyday Chinese by directing it toward the 
CCP’s qualification and capacity to rule the country. After witnessing the rapid rise of 
pro-democracy tides in Eastern Europe and Gorbachev’s promotion of glasnost in the 
Soviet Union, many Chinese, particularly intellectuals and university students, became 
increasingly convinced that it was time to shift the emphasis of China’s reform project to 
the political sphere, exploring the prospect of transforming the party-state structure and 
creating new political institutions with checks and balances. They believed that doing so 
could ensure the better management of the state economy and a cheerful prospect of 
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Chinese people’s livelihood.709  
In sum, the economic situation in the late 1980s was also a factor in touching off the 
Tiananmen crisis. As such, by holding out the negative example of the Soviet economies 
under Stalin and Brezhnev and using the discussion to their advantage, Chinese scholars 
created a rallying point for urging and supporting the CCP’s post-Tiananmen efforts, in 
order to normalize the distressed economy and revive its reform process in the shortest 
possible time. As we have seen in their discussion above, it was not just an economic 
issue for the Chinese leadership, but it was also a major political issue concerning the 
legitimacy of the Party – especially given its unwillingness to implement political reform 
and its decision to brutally crack down on the pro-democratic Tiananmen demonstrations. 
Thus the CCP would desperately seek to regain its weakened legitimacy in China by 
fixing the past economic disorder and catalysing a new round of economic take-offs, after 
the wholesale collapse of world communism.   
Last, while stressing reform and open door directions, Deng in his 1992 talk did not 
forget to defend “the dictatorship of the proletariat” and “the Four Cardinal Principles.” 
710 In the 1990s, Chinese Sovietology concentrated on the economic aspects of Brezhnev 
and Stalin while ignoring their political policies, and such a tendency was in tune with 
Deng’s 1992 guidelines. That the research focused on economic problems suggested that 
scholars seemed to have believed that the breaking apart of the Soviet Union was mainly 
due to economic illness but not the deficiency of political institutions. Having observed 
the economic troubles in the times of Stalin and Brezhnev, the writings appear to suggest 
that state legitimacy comes from economic results and consumer satisfaction, and 
socialism would be going down the wrong road if it could not deliver economic benefits 
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to the people. The findings gave credibility to Deng’s faith that only a strong one-party 
rule could ensure the effective implementation of rapid economic development. They 
justified the post-1991 China’s state agenda of taking precedence in economic 
modernization while downplaying the importance of political restructuring. Their 
conclusions conveyed a message that it is economic affluence, not political reform, that 
matters the most for the survival of Chinese socialism after the fall of the USSR. 
 
Concluding remarks 
To conclude this discussion of the 1990s Chinese writings on Soviet leaders and 
politics, a few points are worth noting. First, in contrast to the secondary literature that 
suggests that Chinese criticisms of Gorbachev after Tiananmen were to do with his role in 
embracing democratization and the disruptive repercussions this brought to China, this 
chapter has shown that the negative attitude of Chinese intellectuals toward the last Soviet 
leader after 1989 was more the result of Gorbachev’s failure to use tough measures to 
prevent socialism in Europe from collapsing than anything else. Their criticisms of 
Gorbachev served to justify the Chinese government’s brutal crackdown on civilian 
protests and to glorify the Party’s role as a bastion of state unity and stability. Many 
Chinese scholars were seemingly mounting efforts in defence of Deng’s iron-fist policies, 
which had successfully preserved socialist rule and propelled China down the road to 
prosperity since the 1990s. They compared this with the faltering Soviet state that would 
eventually lurch into disorder and break down under Gorbachev’s liberalization and 
hands-off approach. The conclusion was that strong authoritarian rule that ensured 
political stability was far preferable. 
Second, the 1990s Chinese debate about Brezhnev and Stalin revolved around the 
backgrounds of the aftermath of Tiananmen and the collapse of world communism. The 
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discussion confirmed that Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 agendas involved renouncing the past 
Soviet model of economic development, opposing leftism, and saving Chinese socialism 
by speeding up the pace of reform and open door. While ostensibly examining policies of 
the two Soviet leaders, in reality, Chinese scholars were making pointed references to 
Chinese reality against the Soviet precedent. They not only learned the negative 
experience of the Soviet past, but also attempted to sum up lessons for China’s future 
direction and the prospect of its communist regime. By depicting Brezhnev’s stagnation 
and Stalin’s rigid centralization as the primary causes of the collapse, their writings 
suggested that state legitimacy comes more from economic results and consumer 
satisfaction than democratic politics, and socialism would not be attractive to the people if 
it could not deliver economic benefits to them. As can be seen from the second part of the 
dissertation, including the Chinese use of Lenin in the early 1980s, their changing views 
of Gorbachev in both decades, and the re-assessments of Brezhnev and Stalin in the 
1990s, the major conclusion of Chinese Soviet-watchers also reiterated a thesis. Namely, 
the survival of Chinese socialism lies on good economic performance and political 











































Chapter 7  
Chinese Sovietology and Post-Mao State Policies 
 
Summary of the research 
In this final chapter, the investigator will first present a summary of major findings 
and points of analysis made in various chapters of this dissertation. This is followed by an 
analysis of how the Chinese debate on the Soviet Union responded to China’s ever-
changing political environment in both decades. This analysis will focus on how Chinese 
Soviet-observers propagated the three fundamental post-Mao state agendas and issues 
(including one-party dictatorship, state-led capitalism, and the rise of Chinese nationalism) 
before concluding with some final thoughts.  
There are several findings of the thesis that are different from the views of previous 
scholarship. First, Chinese Sovietology in the 1980s and 1990s, like other fields in the 
humanities and social sciences in the PRC at the time, was consistently underfunded by 
the Chinese government. Many institutes were unable to provide research funding for 
scholars specializing in Soviet studies. Many academic journals researching the USSR 
struggled to survive, and some even ceased to exist, because of the bleak financial 
conditions. Therefore, it is not true that there has been a close relationship between the 
government and Chinese Sovietology in the PRC. Even after the Soviet collapse, Chinese 
Soviet-watchers did not play the role of intelligence reporters for the CCP regime, and 
thus the state did not spend a large amount of money on the scholarship in exchange for 




Second, post-1991 Chinese Sovietology has been far from the sort of state-directed 
research project that would have a long-term effect on the development of Chinese 
socialism. The so-called “lesson-drawing” agenda in the scholarship claimed by the 
secondary literature seems to be in doubt. After the collapse, Soviet studies gradually lost 
importance in China. Chinese Soviet-watchers spent more time and effort on studies of 
Russia and other CIS states bordering the PRC. The situation is not only indicative of the 
limited financial resources available for such scholarship, but also reflects the 
reorientation of China’s state policy after the Soviet demise, and the attendant results of 
the shifting needs and interests of Chinese Soviet-watchers from the 1990s onward. The 
academic trend of highlighting negative lessons from the Soviet Union might have been 
only a sudden upsurge and short-term fervour in the early 1990s. In other words, such 
studies might not comprise an adequate systematic and state-supervised research project 
in the long run.  
Third, regarding the role of Mikhail Gorbachev: firstly, the study found that most 
Chinese academic commentators on the USSR did not have positive views of Gorbachev 
either in 1985 or afterward. Only around one year after Gorbachev took the helm did 
Chinese scholars start to view his policies more positively, when the three obstacles 
discussed had started to be resolved and bilateral relations were gradually improving.  
Secondly, my findings also demonstrate that during and after the 1989 Tiananmen 
uprising, no major criticisms of Gorbachev appeared in Chinese academic writings. 
Instead, Chinese scholars seemed to still admire, and produce positive evaluations of, his 




investigator has found that strong criticism of Gorbachev by China did not appear until 
early 1990, and not immediately after Tiananmen (as existing secondary scholarship 
claims). After Gorbachev was elected President of the USSR, and after he initiated the 
process of terminating the power monopoly of the CPSU on March 15, 1990, both the 
CCP and Chinese scholars became aware of the possible negative ramifications of such a 
move on the PRC, which has remained committed to one-party communist rule. After this, 
the last Soviet leader became a persona non grata in China.  
Thirdly, the existing secondary literature seems to have exaggerated the impact of 
Gorbachev on l980s China. Previous scholarship suggests that after the mid-1980s 
Chinese Soviet-watchers identified Gorbachev’s concept of glasnost and his political 
reform with Western democracy, and used Gorbachev and his ideas to push the Chinese 
regime toward political democratization on the eve of the Tiananmen Incident. This thesis, 
however, has demonstrated that 1980s Chinese scholars interpreted glasnost in a way 
designed to serve their own purposes, and that this interpretation was quite different from 
democracy in the Western sense. The Chinese definition of glasnost remains 
circumscribed by China’s own mentality and history, reflecting the traditional Chinese 
understanding of human values and political culture.  
Fourthly, few Chinese scholars used Gorbachev and his programs to put pressure on 
the CCP to introduce some form of political Westernization. Instead, most scholars 
manipulated the symbol of Gorbachev to support the reformist wing led by Zhao Ziyang 
in their factional warfare against the Party conservatives leading up to Tiananmen. In 




potential to transform the political landscape of the PRC; rather, they perceived 
Gorbachev and his agenda as a tool that could be used to define, create, and legitimize a 
reformed communist system on their own terms.  
Moreover, in contrast to the secondary literature suggesting that Chinese criticisms of 
Gorbachev after Tiananmen were to do with his role in embracing democratization and 
the disruptive repercussions this brought to China, this thesis has shown that the negative 
attitude of Chinese intellectuals toward the last Soviet leader after 1989 was largely the 
result of Gorbachev’s failure to use tough measures to prevent socialism in Europe from 
collapsing. Their criticisms of Gorbachev served to justify the Chinese government’s 
brutal crackdown on civilian protests in Tiananmen and to glorify the Party’s role as a 
bastion of state unity and stability.  
Finally, some of the secondary literature authors argue that after 1991 most Chinese 
scholars focused on criticizing Gorbachev and his liberalization policies as the 
fundamental catalysts in triggering the collapse of the Soviet Union. In reality, Chinese 
Sovietology writings never excoriated Gorbachev in the 1990s, and the torrent of attacks 
had gradually subsided by the middle of the decade. Gorbachev and his liberal programs 
were by no means the only, or even the most significant, factor in the USSR’s dissolution, 
as Chinese analysts claimed after 1991. Since the mid-1990s, many Chinese scholars have 
traced the banes of the tragedy back to the administrations of Leonid Brezhnev and 
Joseph Stalin, arguing that conservative forces and the rigid communist system were the 
decisive factors in bringing it about, rather than the figure of Gorbachev alone. 




Chinese Sovietology after 1991 was only concentrating on the dark sides of the Soviet 
Union, studying its negative lessons for China’s use in preserving its own communist 
regime. As we have seen, Chinese scholars since 1989 have drawn parallels between the 
early Soviet Union and China after Tiananmen, when both regimes were facing 
international sanctions and isolation. These scholars argued that China might learn from 
Lenin’s teachings encouraging engagement in formal relations with the West, while 
concentrating on economic development and maintaining a proletarian dictatorship. They 
manipulated the symbol of Lenin and his post-1917 foreign policy, in an attempt to 
bolster and legitimize Chinese communist power after the Tiananmen crisis. After 
Tiananmen, Lenin was used as a tool to limit the scope of reform-oriented criticisms, and 
he was seen as a man who came to appreciate the need for substantial market forces. 
Chinese scholars claimed that Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open door policies after 1978 
were emblematic of Lenin’s theories. Their conclusion served to defend Deng’s post-
Tiananmen policies of accelerating reform and resisting the attacks of the Party leftists, 
who attempted to challenge Deng’s position and directions taken after 1978.   
Last, in the eyes of Chinese scholars after 1991 the example of the Soviet Union was 
not only a past lesson that should be learned from and a grave mistake that should be 
avoided, as claimed by most of the previous scholarship. As we have seen, the 
interpretation of Lenin’s open policy after Tiananmen and the revival of research on 
Brezhnev and Stalin after the mid-1990s both demonstrate that Chinese scholars viewed 
the former Soviet Union as both a warning from the past, as well as an image of a 




continued reform was the best way to revamp socialism. In their understanding, only a 
strong, stable, open, and wealthy state could ensure the survival of the socialist system in 
the long term. By examining the Soviet past, Chinese scholars not only demonstrated 
concern for the survival of the CCP regime, but also attempted to envision the future 
direction and position of China in the post-communist world. This included analysis of 
how China could rise to be a powerful nation under the authoritarian one-party rule, 
without succumbing to Western democracy and the sort of collapse that engulfed the 
USSR. 
While not a determinant in China’s policy making, Chinese Sovietology has not been 
able to stay neutral. The Party guidepost always transcends the academic norm. The 
scholarly writings offered a fertile source of insights into China’s policy behaviour in 
both decades. When Sino-Soviet relations were in tension in the early 1980s, apart from 
criticizing Moscow’s social imperialism and hegemony (as a response to official Chinese 
condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Kremlin’s interference in other 
countries’ affairs), Chinese Soviet-watchers also seriously studied the problems of Soviet 
socialism as a lesson for China’s post-1978 reform and modernization. They commonly 
argued that China should wean itself off the rigid post-Lenin Soviet model, which had 
previously held China back and caused socialism to lose its attraction.  
After Gorbachev launched his glasnost and political liberalization in the mid-1980s, 
and under the relaxed political environment and encouragement of the liberal-minded 
Premier Zhao Ziyang, Chinese scholars began to discover that socialism could not be 




Chinese scholars seemed to understand that political initiatives should also be introduced 
that would make socialism more efficient, tolerant, plural, and democratic; Gorbachev’s 
programs thus provided a relevant example for them to learn from.  
In the wake of the Tiananmen Incident, when China was facing international 
sanctions as well as the more general setback of world socialism, PRC Sovietologists 
invoked the example of Lenin’s foreign policy-making during the early days of the Soviet 
Union. They suggested that continued reform and open door policies could become a way 
to weather the crisis. Such arguments corresponded to Deng Xiaoping’s post-Tiananmen 
agenda of self-strengthening.  
After the Soviet demise in 1991, Chinese scholars switched to studying negative 
lessons of the collapse (such as the rigid economic policies of Brezhnev and Stalin), with 
the aim of preserving Chinese communist rule, maintaining social stability, and seeking 
China’s future position in the post-communist world. 
The main argument of this thesis is that changing Chinese views on the USSR were 
not only shaped by the ups-and-downs of Sino-Soviet (and later Sino-Russian) relations, 
China’s domestic political climate, and the political developments in Moscow. More 
importantly, views changed in response to the earth-shaking events of the rise and fall of 
world communism in the last two decades of the 20th century. As we have seen in the 
thesis, the concept of socialism with Chinese characteristics became the guiding thought 
and teleological narrative in the treaties of Chinese Sovietology writings in both decades. 
As noted in Chapter Two, after 1978 the framework of socialism with Chinese 




to which its present policies were an implicit repudiation of its Maoist legacy and its own 
past. This formula was intended to hide the fact that socialism is being abandoned as 
China speeds along the capitalist road Mao so vehemently condemned. It is a formula 
designed to save face and to discourage critiques of class and exploitation under modern 
Chinese capitalism, but most importantly, it also serves as an excuse to preserve the one-
party rule permanently. 
As shown in the thesis, the principle of socialism with Chinese characteristics had 
three main functions in the discourse of Chinese Sovietology in both decades: a cause (or 
excuse) for explaining the Soviet demise; a fundamental argument for justifying the 
communist dictatorship in China after the collapse of international socialism; and a 
determining factor for propagandizing and reinforcing CCP’s reform and open door 
policies, in order to keep Chinese socialism vital after the end of the Cold War. The 
hidden consensus of Chinese Sovietologists after 1991 is that the causes of the tragic 
denouement of the USSR had little to do with what they defined as true socialism, but 
rather the distortion of it. Since the Soviet Union had stopped practicing genuine 
socialism after Lenin, so the collapse of the USSR was the collapse of a state – but not of 
socialism. Socialism would not die and China is a bona fide socialist country; therefore, 
the PRC will not fall. In sum, they saw that China under the CCP had been true to Lenin’s 
immortal legacy of advancing socialism by taking the country’s own conditions into 
account, and such an endeavour would guarantee the future success of socialism in China 
even after the fall of the Soviet Union.    




socialism with Chinese characteristics seemed to have already known the truth about the 
USSR and the reasons for its final demise, and therefore they only consulted the Soviet 
past in order to find justification for what they conceived to be the truth. Their writings 
were largely limited to verifying that their pre-existing theoretical commitments were 
correct. Their interpretations were based more on their own ideologically inspired 
assumptions than on objective investigation. Research on the Soviet Union in both 
decades, therefore, could be considered as more of a rationalization of their opinions 
about the legitimacy of Chinese socialism, China’s domestic politics, and state agendas, 
than an academic attempt to reconstruct and discover the Soviet past. Scholars 
demonstrated the purported causal relations between the Soviet past and the political 
views they upheld for China’s future. They mainly used their interpretation of the events 
in the USSR to speak for the political agendas that were believed to represent the correct 
directions of Chinese socialism and modernization, and to justify ongoing reform 
programs. Thus Chinese Sovietology in both decades served to render Party policies and 
principles understandable and plausible.  
Sovietology has been a useful tool for the overall task of propagating Marxism-
Leninism and the Chinese way of practicing socialism. As discussed in Chapter Two, this 
overall theoretical framework is quite similar to the tradition of history writing under Mao. 
This tradition emphasizes the pragmatic purposes of academic research. Chinese 
Sovietologists presented, used (or misused), and appropriated their subject study for 
explaining, legitimizing, and even changing Chinese realities, rather than reconstructing 




cost of objectivity in representing the truth. The simplistic doctrine of socialism with 
Chinese characteristics had been applied to Chinese Sovietology, which in effect rendered 
the scholarship a mouthpiece for Party ideologies and agendas. Chinese Sovietology 
research has thus failed to reveal much of the Soviet reality, but instead has resonated 
with Party ideologies and served to legitimate the political claims of those in power in 
China. The goal of the scholars has been to address state policies and satisfy the ever-
changing needs of contending political forces in China – rather than to seek accurate 
knowledge of the Soviet Union.  
As will be demonstrated in later sections, Chinese Sovietology in both decades was 
not only an extension of PRC politics, the passive legitimizer of a predetermined notion 
of political change, or even of a short-term political policy. Many Sovietologists were 
also active adapters and creative developers in the political realities of China. 
Researching post-Mao Chinese Sovietology in both decades involves not only 
knowing and understanding the study of the Soviet Union by Chinese scholars, their 
changing perceptions of the demise of Soviet socialism, and how they measured the 
profound impacts of the collapse on the PRC. More than that, researching Chinese 
scholarly investigation reveals, directly or indirectly, such realities as: the reorientation of 
China’s foreign policy-making in recent years; the background, shift, and dynamics of the 
reform programs; and how the CCP regime drew lessons from the collapse and 
accommodated its domestic policies in order to survive in the post-communist world. As 
discussed, these Chinese writings convey and demonstrate policy principles and future 




maintaining political stability as a fundamental principle, developing a fast-growing 
economy as a top priority, replacing Marxism-Leninism with fanatical nationalism, and 
promoting nationalism as a new ideology to keep the Party in power. These issues have 
been strongly shaped and reinforced by the way in which CCP leaders have perceived the 
events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Many of these issues converge 
with the arguments of Chinese Soviet-watchers presented in the thesis. 
 
Chinese Sovietology and the one-party dictatorship 
After the 1989 turbulence in East Europe, there was a worldwide sense of euphoria 
that the Western liberal model would triumph over communism after the end of the Cold 
War. Such wishful thinking had been applied to anti-authoritarianism uprisings in the 
former Soviet bloc as well as in China.711 However, after the collapse of the USSR in 
1991, the PRC made little progress in the sphere of political reform; it still refuses to 
adopt Western democratic values or to share its centrally controlled political power with 
the people. In short, there is no sign that political liberalization is imminent, which is very 
frustrating to some Western China-watchers wishing to see that the PRC might follow the 
Soviet Union toward disintegration.712 As a result, the post-Cold War expectation of a 
trend toward freedom and political democracy has not been delivered. The new era, rather 
than being a time of democracy and freedom, will be one of growing tensions and 
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sometimes confrontation between the forces of democracy and the forces of autocracy.713  
Since the early 1990s, many Chinese Soviet-watchers (as presented in this thesis) 
have started to rethink the Leninist Party norms. However, they did not recommend the 
fundamental or piecemeal transformation of Leninist Party-style frameworks into CCP 
rule. Instead, their writings generally supported the post-collapse CCP regime in 
consolidating its one-party rule and maintaining the status quo and political stability. 
Scholars rarely doubted the crucial role of the CCP; rather, there was a strong belief 
among Chinese Soviet-analysts that it is in the interests of the country, as well as the 
people of China, to remain unified under a central, authoritarian government. Post-1991 
Chinese Sovietology has actually been encouraging people to believe that the Chinese 
style of autocracy still has strong international appeal. Scholars argued that the renewed 
Chinese model of combining an increasingly open economy with a closed political system 
can be a successful option for development in many Third-World nations.  
Instead of dealing with the potential death of Chinese socialism after the Soviet 
collapse, Chinese writings have been happy to confidently portray the PRC as a 
successful model of how to create wealth and stability without having to give way to 
political liberalization. Such scholars were quick to say that post-1991 China has actually 
provided a more attractive alternative to the liberal model, and a different approach to 
building a powerful state and new world order, without succumbing to democracy, 
Western power politics, and the tragedy that buried the USSR. As their arguments suggest, 
scholars seemed to state that the death of world socialism after the late 1980s might offer 
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an opportunity for China to refurbish its authoritarian institution. They believed that the 
updated model could enhance the PRC in terms of wealth and future global influence. It 
would make the country stronger than it was in the past and more effective in resistance 
to Western subversion. In their opinion, the new direction would not only create a new 
kind of legitimacy for the regime, but also offer a hope and potential blueprint of 
development for many poor nations beleaguered by globalization and Western 
liberalization.  
Why do such views prevail among contemporary Chinese intellectuals (post-Mao 
Sovietologists included), who have been strongly influenced by the liberal tradition of 
their May Fourth predecessors in the Republican periods (1911-1949)?  
According to Huayin Li, modern Chinese intellectuals’ strong admiration for a 
centralized political and economic system originated in the 1930s. This was when 
Republican China was facing repeated failures in marching toward modernization, owing 
to internal strife and external threats. The crises made many Chinese intellectuals believe 
that a strong and centralized power is indispensable to successful reforms in a backward 
country like China, and that a democratic government might weaken the state and render 
it incapable of competing with other countries economically. Particularly, they were 
impressed by the enlightened dictatorships of Germany under Adolf Hitler and the USSR 
under Joseph Stalin. They argued that those authoritarian models could be instrumental to 
China’s rapid industrialization. As a result, many of them were attracted to the version of 
authoritarianism promoted by the Chinese Communist Party thereafter. Huayin Li argues 




predecessors in Republican China. Scholars working after Deng took power have tended 
to favour and justify the ongoing reform policies that aim to drive China into 
modernization through the combination of market economy and a benign and efficient 
authoritarian regime. 714  As presented in this thesis, we can see that this tradition of 
Republican China has left a strong imprint on post-Mao Chinese Sovietology writings.     
Unlike communist powers in Eastern Europe, which involved the non-indigenous 
founding of regimes, the CCP itself made a powerful appeal to many Chinese citizens 
who wished to see China reassert itself as a powerful nation, after a century of 
humiliation at the hands of foreigners. In this regard, anti-imperial sentiments and 
national pride were of great importance both in the foundation of the CCP regime and in 
its persistence. They contribute to a certain degree of guarantee of the survival of 
socialism in China. From 1949 onward, the CCP regime has survived the crises of the 
Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the Democracy Wall movement in 
1978/1979, and the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. The collapse of socialism in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union should by no means be considered as the fatal test for the 
regime, which has endured many internal and external turbulences in the past. Therefore, 
the Chinese leadership could have confidence that it was capable of dealing with any 
potential threat to its own survival in the future.  
Chinese Sovietologists in both decades generally considered the current PRC 
authoritarian political system, despite its many flaws, to still be the optimum one for the 
country. As seen in Chapter Five, even when scholars in the mid-1980s demanded that 
                                                             




China learn from Gorbachev’s glasnost and undertake political and economic reforms 
simultaneously, they viewed Gorbachev’s liberalization through the prism of their 
traditional Chinese mind-set. In other words, they were still motivated by a desire to see 
China become powerful, rather than democratized. After the Soviet collapse, Chinese 
scholars found their faith bolstered upon seeing that Western democracy and liberalization 
might not bring the kind of peace, prosperity, and stability as had been expected to 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the post-communist period.715  Some 
scholars even demonstrated a heightened sense of scepticism toward Western institutions, 
viewing the promotion of democracy by the West in the Soviet bloc as an elaborate 
strategy designed to lead to the collapse of socialism. The fear was that such a conspiracy 
would next be aimed at Chinese disintegration after 1991.  
Like the Chinese leadership, upon learning lessons from the USSR Chinese scholars 
in their post-1991 writings attempted to convince the Chinese people that their nation 
faced the possibility of breakup, and that Western democratization would be the 
destructive force behind this breakup. As we have seen, Chinese scholars thus used the 
case of the Soviet collapse as a reason to subscribe to the virtues of a strong central 
government and disdain the weakness of democratic reform. They believed that large and 
diverse states like the PRC and the USSR need order and stability in order to prosper. 
They saw that the vacillations and chaos of democracy would impoverish and shatter their 
country, and in the case of the Soviet Union had already done so. They knew from the 
Soviet precedent, as well as their nation’s long and turbulent history, that political 
                                                             




disruptions and divisions at home invite foreign interference and depredation. They 
argued that strong rule at home is necessary if the country is to be powerful and respected 
in the world. After the collapse, Chinese scholars argued that the changes in the Soviet 
Union did not symbolize the failure of socialism, but occurred precisely because the 
country had given up socialism. These scholars generally denounced post-Lenin Kremlin 
leaders such as Stalin, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev as the main factors in the decline of 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism. Unsurprisingly, they suggested that the dissolution of the 
USSR was due to human error, rather than to flaws inherent in the institution. 
As Randall Peerenboom argues, the West has experienced a growing fear since the 
Cold War, as China has become an increasingly important and influential country in 
world affairs. The PRC’s continuously anti-democratic model might have a significant 
impact on the diffusion of democracy throughout the world. The author notes that many 
countries in the world, such as Russia, Vietnam, Latin America, and various nations in 
Africa, are all looking closely at China and taking heed of its pragmatic approach to 
markets without democracy.716  
Indeed, as presented in the thesis, Chinese scholars did not feel that the Soviet 
collapse was a problem for China; instead, they viewed it as a chance for socialism to be 
renewed, and for the rise of the new Chinese model in the world. Scholars hoped that the 
renewed Chinese authoritarian regime would not only replace the past Soviet model, but 
would inspire the world in the 21st century and provide a viable alternative to Western 
democracy that has failed to resolve the very pressing issues of social inequality and 
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human well-being for many poor countries. Such views have firmly permeated Chinese 
scholarly research on the Soviet Union since 1991. Thanks to the chaos in the former 
Soviet bloc after the Cold War, China after 1991 has actually stuck more firmly to its 
socialism. As Dingxin Zhao comments, the collapse of the USSR and the so-called 
Western conspiracy “may ironically have stabilized the Chinese regime.” 717  
 
Chinese Sovietology and Chinese state-led capitalism 
Chinese Sovietologists in both decades consistently put forth a strong view that 
pragmatism and performance-based legitimacy, not ideology or politics, should be the 
pillar of an authoritarian one-party regime. Specifically, only economic prosperity could 
keep socialism vital. Their early 1980s reflections on the backwardness of Soviet 
socialism that had influenced China under Mao; criticisms of Gorbachev’s over-emphasis 
of political reform and neglect of economic restructuring since the late 1980s; the use of 
Lenin in demonstrating the significance of continued reforms and learning from 
capitalism amid the international sanctions after the Tiananmen Incident in the early 
1990s; and a re-assessment of the rigid Soviet economic system through debate on 
Brezhnev and Stalin since the mid-1990s. All of the above demonstrate that Chinese 
Soviet-watchers had used their subject study as a supposedly legitimate vehicle for 
justifying China’s economy-first reform orientation. They lobbied strongly for China to 
renounce the socialist economic system and embrace the capitalist market economy, 
while still maintaining a one-party dictatorship.   
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Why did Chinese Sovietologists advocate borrowing capitalist elements and building 
a market economy to sustain the CCP one-party rule? Such pragmatism (or apparent 
contradiction-in-terms) not only derives from their reflections on China under Mao and 
the Soviet collapse, but is also a tradition of Chinese intellectuals.   
Qu Lindong, a professor of history at Beijing Normal University, published a book in 
2007. He presents the example of Hu Sheng, a PRC historian and former CASS president 
from 1985 to 1998, to illustrate that historically Chinese intellectual thinking has been an 
example not necessarily of swimming with the political tide, but, sometimes, has 
demonstrated a genuine commitment to their country. 718 According to the author, Hu 
Sheng in his 1981 book Congyapian zhanzhengdao wusi yundong (From the Opium War 
to the May Fourth Movement) argued that socialism is absolutely inevitable in China and 
is the fate of the country. This is because the predominance of imperialism and feudalism 
in modern China made the development of capitalism impossible; therefore, an anti-
imperialist and anti-feudal socialist revolution guided by the Chinese Communist Party 
was the precondition for China’s state building.719  
In 2000, the year of his death, Hu Sheng’s new book Congwusi yundong daorenmin 
gongheguo chengli (From the May Fourth Movement to the Founding of the People’s 
Republic) changed the tune. While persisting in his conviction of the inevitability of 
socialism in China, Hu Sheng now spoke for the progressive and beneficial elements of 
capitalism, and suggested that China should learn from capitalism in order to strengthen 
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socialism.720 Qu Lindong comments that Hu Sheng’s revision could be partially explained 
by the wholesale change of economic and political situations in China since the 1990s. 
That is, Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in early 1992 triggered a new round of economic 
reform that made China’s transition to capitalist-oriented market economy acceptable and 
irreversible. The Party patriarch openly criticized the leftist thinking within the CCP, in 
which hard-liners demonstrated an inability to understand the realities of China in their 
stubbornness in adhering to outdated orthodoxy. Therefore, Hu Sheng may have felt both 
obligated and justified in making some theoretical changes to show his support for Deng’s 
call for innovative thinking in ideological and theoretical fields.721  
On the other hand, Qu also thinks that Hu’s reinterpretation was not necessary a 
display of his conformity to the updated political line. He points out that Hu’s arguments 
in both books, however seemingly self-contradictory, did reflect his actual thinking. Like 
many other modern and contemporary Chinese intellectuals, Hu Sheng was committed to 
offering a historical justification of the Party’s renewed reforms aimed at transforming the 
motherland. It was his commitment to making China strong and powerful, not serving the 
Party’s agenda, that contributed to Hu’s boldness in reformulating his arguments. The 
“Hu Sheng phenomenon” (Husheng xianxiang), to quote from Qu, “symbolizes the 
Chinese intellectuals that are willing to revise their reasoning for what they believe to be 
the true solution to China’s plight and future, even at the expense of contradicting, 
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disregarding or overturning their previous statements.” 722  
In his 1999 article, Zhang Hanqing, a professor of international politics at Beijing 
University, summarized the three lessons that Chinese scholars had drawn from the 
demise of world communism: to renounce the Soviet model and explore new ways of 
building socialism; to uphold the leadership of the CCP and maintain state unity; to 
rethink capitalism and take correct attitudes toward capitalist elements for constructing 
socialism. Zhang remarked, “The lessons derive from not only the observation of the 
Soviet collapse, but also a wake-up call after we have witnessed how a large state with a 
great history like the USSR lurched into turbulence.” 723 Like Hu Sheng’s writing, the 
research outcomes of Chinese Sovietology (particularly after 1991), were not necessary 
for speaking for the Party. The views more or less reflect Chinese scholars’ real 
understanding of what a large country like China needs in its future development – 
political stability and tangible economic results that would benefit the Chinese people, 
contrary to the negative precedent of the Soviet Union.  
In fact, economic Westernization in China was a reaction not to the Soviet collapse, 
but to the complete chaos of the Cultural Revolution in the late 1970s, when the CCP 
could no longer be proud of the Maoist ideological dogma. It therefore attempted to 
regain a kind of legitimacy by restricting its ambitions to economic objectives and 
presenting a commitment to a general interest that no longer ignored individual interests. 
The reforms taken since 1978 are in fact demonstrative of the process of shedding the 
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past wasteful and inefficient Soviet socialist model. The reform movement of learning 
from the West and capitalism had already started soon after Mao’s death. It was a model 
very different from its Soviet equivalent. Indeed, it was the pre-collapse domestic 
experience, not the Soviet disintegration in 1991, that had taught the Chinese the lesson 
that there was a need of combining reform and stability, with priority being given to 
economic tasks over political ones.  
The late Soviet model presided over by Gorbachev, which aimed at a fundamental 
transformation of the socialist system and allegedly brought the USSR to the precipice of 
breakdown, only made the Chinese stick firmer to their goal of pursuing material 
prosperity. Learning from Gorbachev’s lesson (seen from Chapter Six), Chinese Soviet-
watchers argued that state legitimacy comes more from economic results and consumer 
satisfaction than a democratic election. In their opinion, the Soviet collapse was not due 
to Western economic pressure in the form of trade denial and sanctions, but to the failure 
of the centrally planned economic model and Gorbachev’s unsuccessful attempt to 
integrate the Soviet command economy into the capitalist world system. The basic 
message is that the Soviet model was flawed but not irredeemable, and that Moscow had 
a chance to reform if it delivered needed benefits to the people with little delay, while 
solidifying the control at the top. If the Cultural Revolution had rendered the CCP regime 
unable to resist economic Westernization, the collapse of the USSR assured many 
Chinese people further that it was economic capitalist revolution that offered the best 
method of preventing their nation from suffering a similar sort of tragedy.  




Chinese Sovietologists, which is little different from the themes that many Chinese 
intellectuals since the Self-Strengthening of the 1870s have advocated: attaining wealth 
and power, enhancing the nation and its international dignity, and preserving unity and 
preventing chaos. These visions resonate deeply with Chinese Sovietology writings and 
lend the CCP both legitimacy and continuity with the past.   
While the post-1991 Chinese Sovietologists suggested using the capitalist economy 
to renew socialism upon the Soviet collapse, this should not be interpreted as a deviation 
from the orthodox communist ideology and goal. As Sujian Guo indicates, the 
components of the communist goal set by Mao did not change under the post-Mao regime, 
since Marxist-Leninist communist ideology does not rise in opposition to industrialization 
or modernization; rather, it mandates a strong commitment to industrialization and 
economic fulfilment. In his opinion, the forced industrialization under Mao and controlled 
marketization under Deng amounted to the same thing. They were both pursued in the 
name of a Utopia that serves as a legitimate source of the political regime. Economic 
capitalism taken after 1978, became an intermediate goal necessary for nudging China 
toward a utopian goal of communism. Therefore, the post-Mao regime’s commitment to 
modernization does not contradict its commitment to the ultimate goal of the communist 
ideology.724 Such a commitment was only reinforced after the Soviet collapse. It is not 
surprising that many Chinese Soviet-watchers identified the cause of the Soviet collapse 
as the country’s lack of a firm and clear stance on socialism, and its failure to reform its 
moribund economic system to keep socialism vital. They openly declared that Chinese 
                                                             





socialism would not die and it is still the future of mankind. While disregarding the Soviet 
model and endorsing economic Westernization, their writings in both decades are still 
governed by this ideological goal of marching toward communism, as described by 
Sujian Guo.  
 
Chinese Sovietology and the rise of Chinese nationalism 
After the collapse of world communism, nationalism has become a logical response 
to the decline of socialism as a coherent and meaningful ideology in the PRC. Chinese 
people are now indoctrinated with nationalism as a new faith to supplant Marxism-
Leninism.725 The rise of Chinese nationalism from the 1990s onward also affects post-
Mao Chinese Sovietology. Many writings of Chinese Soviet-watchers examined in the 
thesis play an equal role in constructing the conceptual basis of such nationalism and 
using it as a tool to legitimize the political agendas of the CCP regime in the post-
communist world. This involves post-Tiananmen criticism of Gorbachev’s soft line 
approach toward dissents; debate on Lenin’s post-1917 foreign policy in the early 1990s, 
when the post-Tiananmen international sanctions were being imposed on China; and 
renewed research of Brezhnev and Stalin since the mid-1990s. Instead of learning how to 
integrate China into the world system after the negative precedent of the USSR, Chinese 
writings have often seemed to argue that the West is aiming for China’s disintegration 
after the Soviet demise, and preventing China from receiving well-deserved respect in the 
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family of nations. They argued that only a centralized and powerful state could resist 
Westernization, political chaos, and economic breakdown, as well as bring wealth and 
stability to the Chinese nation. In their opinion, Chinese-style socialism would become a 
universal model for the future of the world, the ultimate fate of China, and the common 
identity of the Chinese people.  
As seen from the thesis, the language of their writings has been exceedingly 
nationalistic and patriotic in tone. Moreover, they have asserted that the CCP saved the 
country after the shockwaves of 1991 and revived its greatness on the world stage, a 
statement that appeals to contemporary Chinese people’s patriotism and nationalistic 
feelings, which are also a result of the CCP’s domestic mobilization efforts from the 
1990s onward. To a degree, Chinese Soviet-watchers succeeded in linking the challenges 
facing communism to the fate of China. Against the negative Soviet precedent, in the 
name of stability and order as the necessary preconditions for China’s continuous 
development, they made the regime the representative of China’s vital national interests.  
Seen from the Chinese Sovietology writings analysed in the thesis, there are two 
themes comprising the formation of nationalism discourse in and after the 1990s. Firstly, 
according to Wang Hui, the idea of “saving the nation overriding enlightenment” 
(jiuwang yadao qimeng) had permeated the minds of Chinese intellectuals throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. Since Deng Xiaoping took power in 1978, China’s reform and open 
door policies were a response to the near-collapse of Maoist socialism. This started after 
the Tiananmen Incident and culminated in the Soviet collapse, which had led to an 




Chinese intellectuals concluded that the West led by the US would be consumed with 
identifying the next enemy of China after the Soviet demise. They interpreted many 
1990s Western manoeuvres, such as the 1991 invasion of Iraq, the 1993 China’s losing its 
bid for hosting the 2000 Olympic Games, and the 1999 NATO bombing of Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade, as being deliberate imperialist expressions meant to weaken the 
Third World – and China in particular.726   
Such post-1991 anti-West nationalist feelings in China find their origin in its modern 
history, when the country was facing the Western partition and humiliation. To quote from 
Paul Cohen, it is “a psychological salve to wounded feelings, something the Chinese 
found emotionally satisfying because of their profound sense of victimization in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.” 727 Nationalism has gained wider appeal and stronger 
momentum after the Soviet collapse in 1991. The Soviet demise was incompatible with 
the traditional Chinese mentality of dayitong (grand unification) that takes state 
sovereignty and unity as the foremost priority. China could not tolerate any attempt by 
foreign forces to divide their country. 728 Many Chinese scholars (as discussed in this 
thesis) have regarded the West, led by the US, as being primarily responsible for 
triggering the Soviet downfall. As Joseph Fewsmith remarks:  
 
Chinese intellectuals believed after the Soviet Union had done everything that the US had 
asked, including getting rid of socialism, that the US had done little to help the peoples of 
the former Soviet Union. Rather, it was believed, America was perfectly happy to watch 
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Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union fall into a position from which 
they would never be able to challenge the US again.729 
 
Dingxin Zhao also comments that “Chinese intellectuals are disappointed by the 
post-1991 Russia’s chaotic internal politics and poor economic performance,” and “by the 
fact that Western countries were actually less interested in assisting Russia in its painful 
democratic transition than in weakening its international positions.” 730  In 1997, 
IREECAS researcher Yan Xuetong wrote that “a new wave of anti-China sentiment has 
been sweeping across the US since the Soviet collapse.” The reason he gave is:  
 
Americans seem to suffer from an ‘enemy-deficiency syndrome,’ a product of the Cold War 
mentality. The end of the Cold War removed the Soviet Union as the arch rival of the US. 
To maintain national cohesion, it is necessary to invent a hypothetical enemy. Now it’s 
China.731 
 
This post-1991 concern about the country’s survival involves a sense of being under 
siege, and a belief that the West is not against authoritarian regimes or even socialism – 
but against China. This has translated into a growing nationalism, or the so-called “west-
against-us mentality,” 732 that calls for the Chinese people to be united under the CCP to 
resist what they deem as the Western conspiracy.  
Secondly, the post-collapse “China threat” theory seems to have pushed Chinese 
scholars in their support for the CCP regime and their appreciation for the country’s post-
Tiananmen economic achievements under the one-party authoritarian rule (rather than the 
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democracy-first approach endorsed by the West).733 Since then, many Chinese people 
have increasingly shown their admiration for the PRC government’s strong ability to 
maintain economic growth and political stability, avoid the fate of the Soviet Union, and 
resist the Western intervention.734   
Historically, China is a nation with a penchant for authoritarianism, a long-held fear 
of anarchy, and an attitude of reliance on order and a strong leader.735 China adopted 
communism as a means of shaking off imperial rule, and did so in a way that combined 
communism with nationalism from the start. China has been distinct since 1978, because 
it is attempting to transform its socialist society through reforms, rather than simply 
abandoning communist rule outright. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, such a 
tradition has been reinforced more strongly than ever before. The CCP regime, the only 
Marxist giant state in the world, attempts to produce an image that communism, 
dictatorship, and patriarchy are the avatar of Chinese civilization. The Party tries to 
reinforce the relations between Chinese nationalism and its authoritarian tradition. As 
such, communism in China after 1991 has been honoured as a sign of the Chinese identity, 
which creates a moral and ideological boundary that separates it from the democratic 
West. The CCP’s authoritarian political model has successfully tied itself to the identity of 
the Chinese nation. As Lan Quanbin, a professor at the Central University of Nationalities, 
wrote in 1997:  
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Today, when socialism is experiencing a setback in the world, some people in the West 
have predicted that socialism will disappear in the 20th century. However, China’s 
experience of building socialism with Chinese characteristics has demonstrated that 
socialism in China is still strong. China and socialism are undivided. To love China means 
to love socialism. Patriotism and socialism are inseparable.736 
 
The CCP revolution has a long history and tradition of being both communist and 
nationalist. After the collapse, the Party regime portrayed itself as the historic agency that 
has restored national unity and political independence, saved the country from foreign 
peaceful evolution, and rejuvenated its economy amid the collapse of international 
communism. Many Chinese people feel uncomfortable with the post-Cold War 
international order authorized by the West. They refuse to bend to the Western norm, and 
instead accept such claims from the Party.737 Gleaned from their writings presented in the 
thesis, many Chinese Sovietologists argued that the Soviet demise did not weaken the 
norm of communism; rather, it strengthened the CCP regime and the Chinese way of 
building socialism. What Soviet-watchers wanted to defend was not a communist regime 
but the principle of a strong Chinese nation allegedly opposed to, and resisted by, the 
West after the demise of the USSR. 
 
Final thoughts as the conclusion of the thesis 
As stated in Chapter Two, the previous secondary literature seems to argue that post-
Mao Chinese Sovietology only became relatively evident after 1991, and the scholarship 
was the by-product of the CCP regime’s own fear of following the USSR into disorder 
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and disintegration. Seen from the secondary sources, Chinese Soviet-analysts indeed had 
exerted a great deal of effort to study the Soviet collapse, in support of the preservation of 
the PRC’s communist rule. However, the secondary literature focuses mainly on how 
Chinese Sovietology studied and learned from the Soviet Union in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but largely ignores the issue of how Chinese Soviet-watchers legitimized what they saw 
as the authenticity and correctness of Chinese-style socialism in both decades.  
As noted previously, Chinese-style socialism – the so-called socialism with Chinese 
characteristics – has been officially put forward by the new CCP leadership since Mao’s 
death. The concept has been gradually reaffirmed as a unique Chinese development 
model, which involves a combination of an open market economy and a closed and 
repressive polity. The Chinese model of socialism is by no means an expedient resulting 
from the concern about the Soviet collapse, but a product and outcome of the long-time 
socialist crisis of its own. It originated from reflections on the disastrous Mao era in the 
late 1970s (the crisis of faith in Maoist socialism), which was reinforced by the 1989 
Tiananmen Incident (the crisis of faith in Dengist socialism) and, finally, was crystallized 
by the rethinking of the Soviet demise from the 1990s onward (the crisis of faith in 
fundamental socialism). These three political crises did not shatter the confidence of 
Chinese Soviet-watchers. Instead, as noted above, they argued that the post-Lenin Soviet 
Union was not socialist at all, but that on the other hand China has persisted with 
socialism consistently. The collapse was the outcome of Moscow’s renunciation of 
socialism, but not indicative of a problem with socialism itself. Since then, the CCP 




been able to stave off the repercussions of the collapse and consolidate its power by 
upholding and improving the methods that have been hailed since 1978. 
Since the end of the disastrous Mao era, China has been committed to building 
socialism by taking its own conditions into account, and not simply learning other models 
mechanically. After experiencing the three crises of socialism mentioned above, Chinese 
scholars seem to have become more optimistic about the future of socialism, and the 
Chinese party-state has been following the socialist path more clearly than ever before. 
The collapse of the USSR was not a disaster, but actually the best opportunity (or excuse) 
for Chinese scholars to reassert the superiority of Chinese-style socialism, and for the 
CCP regime to cling to power by implementing its unique Chinese model of development 
in the post-communist world. As such, we can say that post-Mao Chinese Sovietology is 
the product of 1978, but not of 1991.  
The discussions of Chinese Sovietologists in both decades reflect the traditional 
Chinese zhongyong (moderation) mentality: not going to extremes, but resolving 
problems by treading the middle way. Seen from their writings on socialism, Chinese 
scholars always criticized the Soviet practice as a dogmatic adherence to orthodox 
communist law, and instead promoted the pragmatic and flexible Chinese application of 
Marxist norm. They argued that China has consistently walked through the middle way 
symbolized by Lenin, and such a middle way is also the future path of world socialism. 
As Dong Yuehua, then a PhD history student at Remin University, commented in 1999 
that the reason for the Soviet collapse was that the Kremlin leaders had always gone to 




the other hand, he argued, China always cleaves to socialism by improving the system but 
not shaking off it. So China would exist and would never fall.738 
Research on Chinese Sovietology in both decades suggests that after the PRC had 
experienced several socialist crises, the attitude of Chinese scholars toward the Soviet 
Union was no longer one of wholesale acceptance (like that in the 1950s), nor of 
wholesale rejection (like that in the 1970s). The major conclusion of scholars in the field 
is that one should not learn from other socialist states in a mechanical, unthinking manner, 
but should follow the country’s own way of keeping socialism vital and achieving 
modernization. It is hoped that the Chinese experience of learning from the USSR, both 
positive and negative, will contribute to our understanding of socialism and facilitate the 
reforms and developments of China and other Third World countries in the future.   
James Miles once recalled that “the Soviet Union’s today is our tomorrow,” the 
official CCP slogan of the 1950s, when Beijing’s relations with Moscow were at their 
most intimate, had become a subject of ridicule among Chinese intellectuals in the 1990s. 
Since they saw events across the border as a precursor of a similar collapse in China 
itself.739 However, seen from the post-1991 Chinese Sovietology writings, while there 
was a sign of faith crisis, scholars did not stop learning from the USSR and did not start 
to renounce socialism. Instead, they advocated a reformed socialist path, for making a 
better and powerful China in the post-communist world. They might probably agree, that 
learning from the Soviet Union would continue in China and the process would never 
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terminate, as long as China is still a one-party state, even it no longer practiced socialism 
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